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In anthropological parlance, “key informants” are those individ-
uals native to the communities we study who emerge as integral to the 
anthropologist’s inquiry. Although I found many individuals willing to 
share their time and thoughts with me, I hesitate to call them “informants,” 
for that title somehow seems too formal and oddly traitorous to stand for 
these relationships. There were many individuals whose contributions were 
essential to the writing of this book, but those who proved most key were 
foremost my friends, and our afternoons and evenings spent drinking cof-
fee, carousing through the nightlife of Bahrain, sharing a meal, walking 
along the corniche, or smoking sheesha yielded a lively intellectual atmo-
sphere that made my time on the island all the more enjoyable. With that 
caveat in mind, I foremost thank S.K. for taking me under his wing. A 
pharmacist by training, he was born with a seemingly boundless desire to 
make the world a better place, a trait readily apparent in his unyielding 
penchant for service to those less fortunate. This book would not have been 
possible without his help. I also thank Ashish Gorde and Dhafi  al-Mannai, 
both good friends, and Naman Arora, a student at the Indian School who 
somehow found the time to serve as my fi eld assistant. Many others helped 
me along the way: Dr. R. K. Hebsur, Pragati, Mohammed, Earsil, Veena, 
Joel, Timothy, Aisha, Suresh, Vani, and all the students in the 2003 ILA 
English course I taught.
Shortly before arriving in Bahrain I met with Dr. Sharon Nagy, a cul-
tural anthropologist interested in many of the same issues that brought me 
to the island. What could have ended up as a diffi cult relationship—two 
ethnographers with the same interests on a small island—ended up just 
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In the early months of 2006, newspaper headlines in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain reported that police, offi cials from the Indian embassy, and a 
collection of human rights activists, after receiving a tip from an undis-
closed source, had converged on a scrap yard in the suburb of Hamad 
Town, a government-constructed quarter in the Manama suburbs where 
signifi cant numbers of the citizenry’s lower middle class make their home. 
The owner of the garage and scrap yard, it seems, had sold a work visa to an 
Indian laborer by the name of Karunanidhi for BD1,200 (1,200 dinars), the 
equivalent of US$3,189. Although many of the details remain unclear, in-
dications suggest that Karunanidhi then paid another individual to replace 
him at the work site, a move that angered the owner of the establishment 
and issuer of the work visa. The Bahraini owner grabbed Karunanidhi—in 
other words, moved him by force—and put him under an overturned bath-
tub in the scrap yard. He then parked his jeep over the bathtub, trapping 
Karunanidhi underneath, locked the vehicle, and departed for Manama, 
the central and singular urban center on the small island. In Manama, the 
scrap yard owner found his way to the fl at that Karunanidhi rented with a 
large group of other Indian men and somehow kidnapped six of the Indian 
laborer’s roommates. Returning to the scrap yard with the men, he locked 
them in a large freezer, where they remained until the loose amalgamation 
of help—the aforementioned police force, offi cials, and activists—came to 
their rescue. All the men were freed, although their fate in the agencies and 
courts that govern the foreign population on the island remains in limbo. 
The scrap yard owner was briefl y jailed and then released.
1 INTRODUCTION
Structural Violence and Transnational Migration 
in the Gulf States
2 City of Strangers
In the Gulf newspapers that carried this story, many of the articles and 
letters framed the case as atypical—a sponsor “gone bad”—or as the worst 
that might be faced by a member of the large transnational labor force on 
the island, while seeking a better life in the petroleum-rich nations of the 
Arabian Peninsula. In 2002 and 2003, however, I spent a year in Bahrain 
collecting ethnographic data that sought to explore the intricate matrix of 
relations between citizens and foreigners on the island. I spent countless 
hours in the labor camps, most of which are located on the distant periph-
ery of the city, and in the decrepit urban fl ats, like the one described in 
Karunanidhi’s story, that now comprise much of the central city. The story 
I have just related—from February 2006—fi ts seamlessly into the tapestry 
woven by the many migration narratives I heard on those evenings in the 
labor camps and urban fl ats. These narratives, along with the newspaper 
clippings I have collected since departing the fi eld, abound with accounts of 
stabbings, murders, rape, deportation, confi nement, physical abuse, confi -
dence games, extortion, suicides, suicides under suspicious circumstances, 
workplace injuries, debilitating illness, and more. Moreover, although 
there are certainly religious, gender, and class aspects to this violence, the 
most reliable pattern underpinning these events pits citizens against foreign 
laborers.
Sadly, reliable statistical data concerning the scope of this violence are 
not available.1 In the hallway outside my university offi ce, however, I have 
a large bulletin board, perhaps four feet by six feet, on which I maintain a 
testament to the comprehensive violence committed against Indian labor-
ers in Bahrain. The board, comprising a subset of the newspaper clippings 
I amassed from the local papers during my year in Bahrain, hints at the 
scope of the almost daily violence that plagues the Indian population of 
some 140,000 who make their home, however temporary, on the island. 
In light of this small edifi ce to the Indian experience in the Gulf, the case 
with which I began this volume is but one episode in the ongoing, com-
monplace experience of foreigners on the small island, and hence is in my 
mind far from anecdotal. Rather, the case of Karunanidhi and his time 
under a junkyard bathtub is symptomatic of the structural violence endemic 
to the system by which the large transnational labor force that currently 
works in the Gulf is managed and controlled in Bahrain and all the Gulf 
states.
Unpacking and applying the concept of structural violence is one of the 
principal tasks of this book. To be clear from the outset, however, in lodg-
ing the experiences of the men and women I encountered in the larger 
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Figure 1.1. Map of Bahrain.
4 City of Strangers
rubric of structural violence, I do not intend to imply that we should ignore 
the agency exerted in the scenario I’ve just described, or in the scenarios 
that litter this book: we ought not ignore the basic fact that these scenarios 
are composed of humans choosing to abuse, exploit, maim, and dominate 
other humans. Rather, I seek to couple that basic fact with an analysis of 
the structural forces that cause, permit, encourage, or are in some other 
way involved in the production of violence between citizen and foreigner 
in Bahrain. In the fi nal accounting, the episodic violence levied against for-
eigners in Bahrain becomes one facet of the more comprehensive structural 
forces that govern foreign labor in the Gulf states.
The central mission of the anthropologist remains explication, and typi-
cally the explication of lives distant and different from those of the intended 
reader. The conceptual framework of structural violence, which I explore in 
detail, provides an analytic foundation from which I work outward in scope 
and, to some degree, backward in time. From that foundation I peer at the 
decisions and contexts that brought the men and women I came to know 
from India to the Gulf, at their experiences upon arrival in Bahrain, and at 
the strategies they deploy against the diffi culties they face while abroad. I 
also examine the contours of the Bahraini state itself, the ongoing articula-
tion of a particular idea of modernity in the Gulf, and the intricacies of the 
concept of citizenship as they have evolved in dialectic with the extraordi-
nary fl ow of foreign labor to the island.
Perhaps the greatest danger with the thesis this book presents rests in its 
potential to fall in lockstep with the Orientalist punditry recently resurgent 
in Western public discourse. I am particularly concerned with potential 
misreadings of the theses presented here that suggest that the source of 
the structural violence I describe somehow inheres in the culture or char-
acter of the peoples of the Gulf. Instead, the political economic framework 
at the core of my analysis should make clear that although the structural 
violence I describe draws on the particular history and cultural framework 
of the Bahraini people, its ultimate source has more to do with the exten-
sion and expansion of a global labor market and neoliberal ideology to the 
Gulf states than with any particular qualities of Bahraini culture. The fact 
that structural violence seems to accompany the increasing proliferation 
of transnational movement should be a point familiar to scholars whose 
work concerns the United States’ southern border, or African migration 
to Europe, or the countless other movements that have come to typify the 
contemporary historical juncture.
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Ethnography and Structural Violence
For much of its early history, the discipline of anthropology was prin-
cipally concerned with the forces and social components that constructed 
and replicated harmonious and stable societies. For Émile Durkheim and 
other functionalists, the organic analogy provided the foundation for their 
understanding of society: particular aspects of society—religion, an educa-
tional system, family and kinship, and so forth—were viewed as analogous 
to organs of the body, working together to produce a static equilibrium. In 
functionalist analysis, each of those social components plays some particular 
role in the survival and replication of the social whole. Deviance, violence, 
and other nefarious social forces were seen as abnormal, as a breakdown in 
the status quo, or as circumstances produced by an unusual set of external 
conditions.
In that light, the shift of the anthropological lens to power and vi-
olence can be seen as the culmination of a disciplinary corrective, one 
that moves away from idealistic portraits of harmonious social forms and 
directly addresses the dilemmas, social problems, and rampant poverty 
observable in the contemporary world. The exertion of power and the re-
sulting violence that oftentimes accompanies it are no longer portrayed as 
strange or extraordinary circumstances but rather have become essential 
focal points in the analytic mission of contemporary anthropology. In ad-
dition to positing ruptures and social dissonance as a seemingly constant 
facet of human life, this corrective also challenged the underlying func-
tionalist premise that societies were best comprehended as unconnected, 
discrete social wholes. Eric Wolf, Sidney Mintz, and a strong cohort of 
other anthropologists working in the second half of the twentieth century 
built upon a political economic framework in arguing that change and 
interaction, often on a global scale, were central facets of the historical 
period. These approaches remain key in understanding the transnational 
context of the contemporary era.
Many of these ideas were distilled by William Roseberry, a scholar 
who envisioned an anthropology that manifests “an intellectual commit-
ment to the understanding, analysis, and explication of the relations and 
structures of power in, through, and against which ordinary people live 
their lives. . . . The routes toward an analysis of power can be various, 
from the political-economic analysis of the development of capitalism 
in a specifi c place, to the symbolic analysis of the exercise of power in 
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a colonial state, to a life history of a person who experiences power from 
a particular position, in a particular way” (Roseberry 1996, 6).
The concept of structural violence provides one of many possible path-
ways to these goals. First purveyed by Johan Galtung (1969) as a way of 
connecting the poverty and inequality experienced by legions in the world 
to the intricate mechanics of the global political economy, the concept’s key 
components remain in place today. That extreme poverty and social mar-
ginalization characterize the lives of those peoples traditionally found in 
the anthropological lens has been observed by Farmer (2004, 307) but was 
perhaps most eloquently stated by Bourgois when he said that, “with few 
exceptions, the traditional, noble, ‘exotic’ subjects of anthropology have 
today emerged as the most malnourished, politically repressed, economi-
cally exploited humans on earth” (1991, 113). As a conceptual framework, 
structural violence provides a tool for connecting the everyday violence of 
those conditions with their systematic and broad sources.
As Farmer states, the concept of structural violence is confi gured to 
examine the social machinery of oppression (2004, 307). Within this larger 
framework there are slight variations in focus. For Philippe Bourgois and 
Paul Farmer, the focus remains squarely upon the political economic re-
lations that render these structural, violent results. For Nancy Scheper-
Hughes, structural violence points to more discursive and ideological 
terrain—to the processes by which everyday violence is normalized and 
naturalized in public consciousness. She targets “the invisible social ma-
chinery of inequality that reproduce social relations of exclusion and mar-
ginalization via ideologies, stigmas, and dangerous discourses . . . attendant 
to race, class, sex, and other invidious distinctions” (Scheper-Hughes 
2004, 13). Alternatively, for Daniel Goldstein (2004) the violent lynchings 
he observed in Cochabamba City, Bolivia, were best understood through 
their performative function as public spectacles through which community 
and collectivity were delineated. In spite of these differences, these and the 
many other texts concerned with theorizing violence are a testament to the 
diverse paths to the analysis of power sketched by William Roseberry. All 
share a concern for power, inequality, and the backdrop of a global, capi-
talist political economy that renders a particular terrain of suffering.
Discussions of structural violence often elide Eric Wolf ’s contribution to 
the topic—a contribution that I fi nd particularly clear. In his fi nal book, Wolf 
described power in terms of four valences, or modalities, woven into social 
relations. The fi rst is the power that individuals bring to their interactions 
with other individuals in the world. The second is the “power manifested 
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in interactions and transactions among people and refers to the ability of 
an ego to impose its will in social action upon an alter” (Wolf 1999, 5). For 
Wolf, the third modality of power consists of the ability to manipulate and 
control the contexts and settings in which those interactions occur, a mode 
he refers to as organizational or tactical power. Working outward in scope, 
he concludes with a description of structural power, or “the power manifest 
in relationships that not only operates within settings and domains but also 
organizes and orchestrates the settings themselves” (5). It is this notion of 
power, and particularly the notion of a set of forces orchestrating relations 
between foreigners and citizens, that guides my analysis in this book.2
Wolf  ’s valenced conception of power provides the impetus for the theo-
retical revision I use in this book. For the progenitors of the concept, struc-
tural violence is typically distinguishable from other forms of violence, and 
particularly from the everyday, interpersonal violence that purportedly in-
heres more closely to the agency of those who deliver that violence. This ren-
dition of structural violence is entirely useful: it is adept at connecting broad 
structural forces and political economic conditions to the suffering that we 
increasingly encounter in the regions and places where many anthropolo-
gists work.3 The same rendition of structural violence helps delineate the 
forces that push many of the men and women described in this book out 
of India and across the Arabian Sea, for their journey and the suffering they 
often endure while abroad are, certainly, part of a coping strategy connected 
to forces well beyond the ambit of their everyday lives. But Wolf  ’s notion 
of the orchestration at work in this process also provides an opportunity 
to connect the everyday, interpersonal violence and suffering many of the 
foreign workers in the Gulf states endure with the structural arrangements 
that so intricately construct, limit, and govern their existence in the Gulf. 
This marriage of  Wolf  ’s notion of structural power with structural violence 
opens another path to examine “how power operates not only on the global 
scale but in the daily lives of the people with whom anthropologists work” 
(Green 2004, 319).
Social Research in the Gulf States
My interest in transnational migration fi rst bloomed during a two-week 
stay in Jeddah, the cosmopolitan hub of Saudi Arabia perched on the shores 
of the Red Sea. There I was the junior member of a team of ethnographers 
commissioned to examine the impact of the 1991–92 Iraqi confl ict on the 
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Bedouin nomads of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. When 
the team arrived in Jeddah, we discovered that the various bureaucracies 
overseeing our work had yet to procure the money and documents necessary 
for our trip to the remote deserts to the east. The government offi ces seemed 
to close around one in the afternoon—or at least the individuals we needed 
to speak with were absent after that—so in the afternoons I wandered the 
center of the city, strolling through the winding streets and alleys of the cen-
tral souk, or marketplace, and basked in the air-conditioned environs of the 
modern shopping malls that had arisen around the aging center of the city.
In those fi rst days in the Middle East, I was astounded by how infre-
quently I encountered Saudis in Saudi Arabia. In the stores of the souk I 
met Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi merchants; in the hotel the Filipino 
concierges greeted me in English. One evening, near the city center and in 
search of an Internet connection, I found my way to a large bowling alley 
and, just before the doors were locked for the evening prayer, I dodged 
inside. There I found myself amid the playoffs of a Filipino bowling league. 
By the time we left Jeddah for the deserts to the east, I had met men from 
a dozen different nations, all there to make a better life for themselves and 
their families back home. Yet my fi rst look into the world of Gulf migration 
hardly ended at the city limits. In the weeks that followed, we spent our 
days on the dirt tracks that lace all points of the eastern deserts together, 
building an ethnographic foundation for a project I later described in two 
articles (Gardner 2004; Gardner and Finan 2004). Here we found migrant 
laborers alone on the sands of the desert, enmeshed in the livelihood sys-
tems of the Bedouin nomads, tending herds of sheep, goats, or camels for 
Bedouin families now relocated to nearby towns.
It was a small set of memorable experiences—speaking with two 
Sudanese men alone at a gas station waypoint in the middle of the great 
eastern deserts of Arabia, and then again with a particular pair of Indian 
shopkeepers of central Jeddah—that fi rst spurred my interest in this fl ow 
of transnational labor. In its original form, the research proposal I con-
fi gured to the Fulbright Program proposed a project in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. After two or three months of work on the proposal, I began 
communicating with my professional contacts in the kingdom, and they 
rapidly noted the naiveté of the document I had constructed: they in-
formed me that the Saudi government would never allow this research to 
be conducted. Under the guidance of my advisers I reworked the proposal 
for Oman. Meanwhile, on the heels of two months of intensive language 
training in the United Arab Emirates, I prepared a second proposal to the 
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Wenner-Gren Foundation to conduct research in Dubai, the cosmopolitan 
and transnational apex of the contemporary Gulf (and a city where, accord-
ing to my contacts in Bahrain, expatriates outnumber citizens ten to one).
Despite the fact that my proposal was initially approved by the U.S. 
Fulbright Program, a month later I received word that the program’s re-
gional administrators were unable to fi nd an institution in Oman willing 
to sponsor this particular research. Rather than decline the proposal alto-
gether, a senior administrator had taken a personal interest in my project, 
and through her efforts the Fulbright Program “shopped” my proposal 
to the other petroleum-rich Gulf nations, all of which hosted large for-
eign communities. Two months before my slated departure—and amid 
my comprehensive exams—I was informed that although the University 
of Bahrain had also declined to sponsor my research, the director of the 
Bahrain Training Institute (a former Fulbrighter himself ) would provide 
institutional sponsorship for my study.4 In that same window of time, I 
received word from Wenner-Gren that they too had approved my proposal 
for research in the United Arab Emirates. After a brief discussion with them 
about the status of my Fulbright proposal, I reconfi gured the Wenner-Gren 
proposal to cover some of the ancillary operating costs and expenditures 
not covered by the Fulbright grant and secured their permission to con-
duct my research in Bahrain. With less than two months to spare, I began 
checking out books from the library about Bahrain and pored over the brief 
chapter on Bahrain in the Lonely Planet travel guide.
Although my literature review prior to departure was piecemeal, I was 
surprised to discover that I was not the fi rst to follow this circuitous path 
to Bahrain. In the early 1980s, Robert Lee Franklin, an anthropology stu-
dent at Harvard, confi gured a research project to be conducted in Iran. 
When the revolution broke out, he shifted his destination to Bahrain, a safe 
haven in the Gulf where he might study the large Shi’ite community, many 
of whose members continue to identify themselves as ethnically Persian. 
Amid the tensions between the Sunni leadership and the Shi’ite majority 
(ongoing to this day), the government of Bahrain deemed this topic too 
sensitive. Franklin reconfi gured his research project and emerged with 
“a study of the foreign communities in Bahrain, and of the Indian commu-
nity in particular” (1985, 1), producing what is to date the sole ethnographic 
portrait of the Indian community in the Kingdom of Bahrain.
It was only upon my return from the Gulf, and through the slow pro-
cess of preparing my conclusions, that I came to realize how the story of 
my own research project fi ts within the larger framework of the social 
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Figure 1.2. South Asian laborers fi ll the streets of Manama’s central souk on Friday 
afternoons. Photograph by Kristin Giordano.
sciences in the Gulf. This framework can be grasped as a set of three in-
terrelated factors that, together, are responsible for the dearth of ethno-
graphically informed literature concerning the transnational populations in 
the Gulf states (see also Dresch 2005, 1). First, many of the nations in the 
Gulf have a reputation, partly deserved, for being inhospitable to social 
science research. As my own experiences suggest, funding and support—
and particularly support from local institutions—remain relatively diffi cult 
to secure. Combined with the fact that few of the Gulf states release basic 
demographic data concerning the scope and constitution of the foreign 
populations at work there, the handful of scholars who remain focused on 
transnationalism in the region have struggled to construct a basic founda-
tion from which research might build.
Second, the nations of the contemporary Gulf have long been viewed 
as an exception to the norm of the Middle East. As wealthy, highly urban-
ized, and cosmopolitan global crossroads where transmigrant populations 
constitute a majority of the workforce and, in some instances, an absolute 
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majority of the population, the sociocultural matrix of the Gulf states fi ts 
poorly with the popular image of Middle Eastern heritage and culture, a 
portrayal that recycles Orientalist tropes through its typical focus on the 
rural Bedouin traditions of the region. The fact that the stagnant cultural 
images of camel herds, woolen tents, and coffee pots predominate in the 
way the Gulf states represent themselves only further confuses the issue 
and yields some insight into the processes of auto-Orientalism that accom-
pany Asia’s increasingly dense interconnections with the global system (see 
Mazzarella 2003, 138–45).5 Rather than view the contemporary Gulf as an 
opportunity to redirect Middle East studies, many scholars seem content 
with the ongoing marginalization of the Gulf states in the literature. Study 
of the Gulf states remains overshadowed by work on the Levant and North 
Africa, and what analyses of the Gulf do exist are dominated by political sci-
entists, economists, and security specialists, all to the exclusion of a robust 
and detailed analysis of everyday life in the cities of the Gulf.
Finally, the extraordinarily transnational character of Gulf societies has 
produced a unique set of diffi culties in the development of a cohesive social 
science literature. On the one hand, the foreign populations in the Gulf 
states are itinerant and rapidly shifting. Both these conditions quickly ren-
der synchronic portrayals of Gulf society obsolete, as the basic geography 
of the global labor supply streaming to the Gulf has continued to shift 
rapidly over the past decades. At the same time, ethnographic literature 
concerned with those populations at work in the Gulf is often distributed 
across the transnational divide. A small handful of scholars have explored 
the lived experiences of transnational laborers in the Gulf states (Longva 
1997; Nagy 1998; Khalaf and Alkobaisi 1999; Leonard 2002, 2003; Strobl 
2009). More common are ethnographically informed works that peer at the 
experiences of those in the Gulf from the communities and regions from 
which they come (e.g., Gamburd 2000; Osella and Osella 2000a, 2000b; 
Silvey 2004).
All of these factors have conspired to marginalize social scientifi c anal-
yses of the Gulf. The dearth of ethnographically informed work has also 
truncated its contribution to the burgeoning literature concerning trans-
nationalism and globalization. These latter topics have emerged as central 
in anthropology and related social sciences, yet the bulk of the ethnogra-
phies and case studies that inform that literature concern populations and 
processes with one endpoint in the developed and democratic states of 
the global north. For vast numbers of people in the contemporary world, 
however, the Gulf states represent the singular and most important 
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transnational node in their livelihood strategies. Estimates from 1997 
suggest that the Gulf Cooperation Council states host well over 10 mil-
lion foreign workers (Kapiszewski 2001, 39; 2006, 4). The transnational 
movement behind this number involves millions and millions of fami-
lies and countless communities in South Asia, Africa, and other points 
around the globe. Foreign labor constitutes a majority of the workforce in 
all the Gulf states, and an absolute majority of the population in Kuwait, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, the movement of people 
to and from the Gulf states was produced in dialectic with the processes 
and forces that have now lodged the cities of the Arabian coast as truly 
global cities—as central nodes in the Asian fi nancescape and as important 
locations in the production of global culture. Raising the profi le of the 
Gulf peoples and cities in the ongoing assembly of a literature concerned 
with transnationalism can be seen as another undergirding purpose of the 
ethnography presented here.
Language and Fieldwork in Bahrain
Seminal anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski’s call to render the “ver-
bal contour of native thought as precisely as possible” represented a wa-
tershed moment in the development of a codifi ed set of anthropological 
methods (1922, 23). Gone were the days of the armchair anthropologists 
and their theorizing, reliant as it was on the secondhand observations 
of missionaries and colonial emissaries. Soon the days of anthropology 
from the colonial verandah, an enterprise that brought only fl eeting con-
tact with the peoples anthropologists sought to study, would also end. 
Malinowski’s sentiment, reinforced by W. H. R. Rivers and Franz Boas, 
emerged as central to the journey anthropologists take, a journey outside 
the synergy of the anthropologist’s native language and thought, and into 
the mental worlds of those they wish to know. The conviction that lan-
guage is central to the sentiments, expressions, emotions, thoughts, and 
behavior of human beings remains a cornerstone to the discipline. The 
case of my work in Bahrain is a caveat to this tenet, but a challenge to 
its underlying premise—that the boundaries of language neatly coincide 
with the boundaries of culture. In Bahrain, a regional hub of transnational 
migratory conduits for centuries, complex and varied patterns of language 
use mark the island as a bellwether to linguistic shifts now endemic to 
capitalism’s expansion around the globe.
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The offi cial language of the Kingdom of Bahrain is Arabic. Although I 
was never fl uent, my own abilities in that language were at their zenith upon 
arrival on the island. Yet from my fi rst moments on the island, my greet-
ings in Arabic commonly drew an appreciative smile from locals, followed 
by a reply in English. In fact, English is commonly spoken in many of the 
transnational spaces and places where foreigners and citizens interact. The 
prevalence of English certainly owes much to the dominion of the British 
Empire, for Bahrain played a central role in what James Onley (2007) has 
described as British India’s “informal empire.” The bureaucratic hallways of 
the quasi-colonial apparatus brought English to the island. Furthermore, 
because Bahrain’s relations with the British Empire were managed through 
British India, Bahrain also drew colonial transmigrants from South Asia. 
Indians arrived to serve as clerks, accountants, quartermasters, and secu-
rity guards in the second wave of migration at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. The language of that bureaucracy and those early colonial transmi-
grants carried English to the streets of Manama.
In the 1950s and 1960s, as Bahrain parlayed its role as the nexus of re-
lations between the Gulf and the West into its position as the center of 
Gulf fi nance and management, the predominance of English was again re-
inforced. The nation’s movement into the English-speaking fi nancescapes 
of the now-global political economy coincided with the increasing reach 
of global mediascapes: English and American television programs, movies, 
and news permeated the lives of those on the island.6 Today, the impact of 
global culture on Bahrain is pervasive. In my year in Bahrain, the sounds of 
the street included Eminem’s Detroit-based rap and the mesmerizing buzz 
of British-born Panjabi MC’s “Mundian to Bach Ke,” featuring Brooklyn-
born Jay-Z and a prominent sample from the television show Knight Rider, 
the David Hasselhoff series that so captivated my younger brother in the 
early 1980s. LaserVision, the DVD store around the corner from my fl at, 
was widely known to have one of the best collections of new American 
movies, and at night cars from around the island blocked the narrow streets 
around its entrance as Bahrainis and expatriates selected the latest releases 
from the United States and other points abroad.
Although the predominance of English owes much to the historical 
processes I’ve described, perhaps the strongest argument rests in the trans-
national milieu itself. In a context in which nearly half the population are 
foreign-born expatriates, including Indians, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Sri 
Lankans, Filipinos, Indonesians, Nepalese, South Africans, Egyptians, 
Britishers (as they are called on the island), Americans, and countless 
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others, English is increasingly the basic means of communication among 
foreign communities. All members of the professional class of the Indian 
diaspora speak English, and its infl uence now reaches into the laboring 
class. Midway through my time in Bahrain, I volunteered to teach an 
introductory English course to Indian laborers as part of the community 
service organized by the Indian Ladies Association. Before the fi rst class 
was held, dozens of laborers had to be turned away, and for the eight-
week duration my classroom was always full.
At the same time, the predominance of English on the island should 
not eclipse the other important and interesting patterns of language use 
concurrent with the processes I’ve described. Bahrain, like all the states of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, is ruled by a Sunni elite.7 Only in Bahrain, 
however, does that Sunni elite rule over a Shi’ite majority, many of whom 
trace their familial heritage to Iran. Powerful Shi’ite families still foster their 
Persian identity, and Persian is widely spoken within this subcommunity. 
Moreover, the long-standing connections between Bahrain and the Indian 
Subcontinent have lodged both Hindi and Malayalam in the linguistic pal-
ette of contemporary Bahrain. The popularity of Hindi movies and other 
media, the historic presence of Hindi-speaking bureaucrats and merchants, 
and the presence of Hindi- or Malayalam-speaking housemaids and nannies 
in Bahraini households have pushed these languages to prominence as well.
Even within the expatriate labor camps (where the largest and poorest 
contingent of the Indian community lives), rapid changes and linguistic 
struggle seem to be characteristic. The majority of Indian laborers who 
arrived over the last two decades come from the southern state of Kerala, 
where Malayalam is the predominant language, and few of them are 
entirely fl uent in Hindi. Upon arrival, many begin to pick up bits of Arabic 
and English in order to communicate with sponsors, bosses, managers, and 
customers. Owing to the Keralites’ numerical prominence within the larger 
Indian community, those from other Indian states might begin to learn 
Malayalam. Malayalam is predominant enough that many Bahraini govern-
ment documents have been published in Arabic, English, and Malayalam.8
Among the elite classes of the Indian diaspora, altogether different 
forces are driving linguistic change. Unlike the transnational working class, 
most members of the diasporic elite arrive on the island with families in tow, 
and regardless of their state of origin their children are taught in English 
and Hindi at the various Indian schools on the island. Often their mother 
tongue is consciously spoken in the household—the only refuge from the 
confusing plurality of languages in the city outside. Conversely, a handful 
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of the most powerful Indian families have attempted to master Arabic as 
part of their attempt to secure Bahraini citizenship.9
In the complex linguistic terrain of the contemporary Gulf, I ended up 
conducting a majority of my interviews in English. If I used a translator, 
that translator was also Indian, so in the fi nal form all the interviews were 
recorded in some version of English. I toyed with the idea of cleaning up 
the grammar and syntax of these quotes to better fi t the American ear, but 
in the end I decided to reproduce the quotations much as I received them. 
Reading over the interviews, there are few junctures where the meaning is 
not clear, and with the larger topics of transnationalism and globalization 
lurking behind this ethnography, the point is this: the “verbal contour of 
native thought,” to again quote Malinowski, is in linguistic fl ux, a process 
wrought by the transnational processes described here. The inability to 
communicate, the struggle to learn the necessary bits and pieces of three 
or four different languages—these processes characterize the mental worlds 
of all inhabitants of the small island, and particularly those of the many 
diasporic communities that make their home in the city.
Research Methods
Like most anthropologists before me, those fi rst weeks in the fi eld were 
a bewildering experience. I spent many of my nights alone in my small 
fl at, or, alternatively, on long walks through the city. Peering into shop 
windows or restaurants, I saw men from around the world immersed in 
conversations, yelling and laughing, arguing, engaged in life. Outside that 
window I was not only outside their “culture,” but I was also beleaguered 
by my anthropological lens, whose gaze is at once on others and on oneself. 
By day I struggled with real dilemmas of conducting research in Bahrain: 
my visa status, arranged by the Fulbright Program and the Bahrain Training 
Institute (my host institution), was classifi ed as a tourist/visitor, forcing me 
periodically to fl y to Qatar and back for renewal. This situation was fi nally 
remedied after four trips to and from the airport in Doha. With nothing 
but a temporary visitor’s visa, I was unable to obtain the Central Population 
Register card, or CPR, the keystone to one’s bureaucratic identity on the 
island and necessary for day-to-day activities such as paying bills, purchas-
ing a mobile phone, and securing utilities.
All of these problems were eventually solved, and it was only then that 
I began to realize that the issues I had faced—the feelings of homesickness, 
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the struggles to work through the government’s bureaucracy, the feeling of 
being an outsider to the thousands of urban lives going on around me—
were actually an important form of participant observation unique to the 
transnational milieu I was studying. On an island like Bahrain, where hun-
dreds of laborers and professionals from around the world arrive and de-
part every day, the experience of fi nding one’s way into the cultures and 
communities of the island is as much a part of the transnational experience 
as actually “belonging.”
My participant observation included numerous other activities. Shortly 
after arriving on the island, I joined the Manama Toastmasters, a cosmo-
politan group of mostly professionals who sought to improve their 
“leadership skills, self-confi dence and communication through public 
speaking,” a journey they take in English.10 I also joined the Riffa chapter 
of the Lions Club, a group of mostly Muslim Indian and Pakistani men 
(and several women) committed to improving the health and welfare of 
those less fortunate. I spent countless hours at the many Indian social clubs 
on the island, including the fi rst and largest of them all, the Indian Club. I 
attended numerous parties and events organized by these clubs for the la-
borers, and in conjunction with the Indian Ladies Association I taught the 
aforementioned introductory English course to expatriate Indian laborers. 
Eventually, these associations and institutions emerged as one of the focal 
points of my research on the island.
I also got to know many of the expatriate instructors at the Bahrain 
Training Institute, who, in somewhat ironic fashion, serve on the frontlines 
of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs’ attempts to forge an educated 
and skilled workforce capable of replacing the large contingents of for-
eigners on the island. Through all these channels, I seemed to have an end-
less list of people to interview, most of whom belonged to the diaspora’s 
middle and upper class—the successful businessmen and, less frequently, 
professional women, as well as the merchant families with long-standing 
ties to the island. All of these interviews were conducted in English. In 
my fi rst visits with participants I used a semistructured interview format 
that explored a sequence of topics, including the basis of their decision 
to migrate, recollections of their arrival in Bahrain, a description of their 
participation and membership in social clubs and other organizations, the 
primary challenges they face, narratives about their experiences of periodic 
trips back to India, and their aspirations for the future. The bulk of the 
interviews I recorded were what Karen Leonard (1999, 45) calls “experi-
ence narratives,” emphasizing family and individual migration experiences. 
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Follow-up interviews were often unstructured and focused on particular 
gaps in my understanding of their individual and collective experiences.
My contact with the laboring class was much more diffi cult to achieve. 
At the beginning of my time in Bahrain, I spoke with several custodians 
and cafeteria staff at the Bahrain Training Institute. However, my failed 
attempts to befriend and interview Salma Bala, the maven of Indian expa-
triate activism on the island at that time, left me adrift for the better part of 
a month. Two months into my fi eldwork I met a young Tamil pharmacist 
named Santosh.11 Through his own ingenuity and desire, he had recon-
fi gured his elected position at one of the Indian social clubs on the island 
into a social service position. He spent many of his evenings visiting labor 
camps, dealing directly with the sorts of problems laborers encounter in 
the diffi cult environment of Bahrain. Our friendship rapidly bloomed, and 
once or twice a week I would accompany him to the labor camps. Here 
too I conducted interviews based on the “experience narratives” template, 
and I worked closely with Santosh to refi ne the interview guide we used in 
the camps. We met with these men in the evenings after they had returned, 
tired and hungry, from a long day of labor in the hot sun. Typically we sat 
with ten or twelve men, and after explaining the purpose of the project 
and reviewing our promise of confi dentiality, we sought one particular in-
dividual to interview. Upon returning to the same camp, we would occa-
sionally continue talking with the same individual; other times, we sought 
a new individual interested in sharing his migration experience. Typically 
many men would gather around us in the course of the conversation, and 
what often began as an individual interview would eventually end in the 
form of a focus group. All in all, few of these interviews were conducted in 
English: I relied on Santosh’s linguistic facility to work through the Tamil, 
Malayalam, Kannada, Hindi, and other languages we encountered in these 
trips. Although we offered no remuneration for participation in these inter-
views, we often brought a large bag of rice and two-dozen packets of fruit 
juice for the men as a token of our gratitude.
While most of my contact with the laboring class of the Indian diaspora 
drew upon Santosh’s network of contacts, I also had the chance to teach 
the aforementioned introductory English course, sponsored by the Indian 
Ladies Association, to approximately forty men and women who, roughly, 
fi t into the laboring class of the Indian community. My students—clerks, 
storekeepers, concierges, drivers, electricians—were economically one step 
above the manual laborers I encountered in the camps, and all were eager 
to improve their English. Any notion that teaching the course was a chore 
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was cast aside at our fi rst meeting. The students arrived in the evening, al-
ways punctual, and often after a ten- or twelve-hour workday. Our conver-
sations in class and afterward provided me with another set of perspectives 
on the dilemmas and tribulations of Indian transmigration.
Finally, I interviewed numerous Bahrainis during my time on the island. 
Some of these interviews were with government offi cials charged with 
some aspect of managing the bureaucratic structure of migration. Other 
interviews were with Bahrainis from all walks of life. I had a small group of 
Bahraini friends with whom I regularly spent time—we hung around the 
horse track on the weekend, meandered through the malls and markets of 
the island by evening, or wandered out to the southern deserts and beaches 
on Friday afternoons. Their perspectives on work and life on the island 
came to play a central role in my portrayal of the dilemmas faced by citizen-
youth (a topic explored at length in chap. 7). With most of these individu-
als, I employed unstructured interviews that explored their perspectives on 
the presence of such a large migrant population in their midst, their per-
ceptions of the effect of this population on Bahraini society and culture, 
and the government’s efforts to “localize” the workforce.
Most of the individuals with whom I spoke were men. The fl ow of 
transnational labor to the small island is far from gender balanced: the 
great majority of the arrivals from India are men, both single and married, 
who arrive with the idea of staying a few years, sending money home, and 
Figure 1.3. Interview at a labor camp. Photographer unknown.
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saving for a wedding, a business, farmland, or a sibling’s education. This is 
not to say that women do not arrive to work on the island, for many do. 
One of the largest occupational segments of the foreign female expatriate 
population is made up of domestic workers, estimated to number between 
30,000 and 50,000 in Bahrain (Strobl 2009). Although I spoke with and 
observed these women on several occasions, direct access to the population 
of domestic workers is diffi cult to secure, for their time and movements 
are the most strictly controlled. Some Indian women arrive on the island 
as professionals—employees like any other—and some arrive on a spou-
sal visa. Many members of these latter categories play powerful social and 
professional roles within the diaspora through their occupations, churches, 
temples, schools, social clubs, and voluntary associations. I also befriended 
and spoke with numerous second-generation Indian women, the daughters 
of families that had made their home on the island for decades or longer. 
My opportunities to meet and interview Bahraini women were few, al-
though through my contacts at the University of Bahrain I was able to meet 
a handful of female students. Our interactions fell short of public meetings, 
however; instead, we had long discussions over our mobile phones, taking 
advantage of the freedoms offered by this new technology.
Although many of the men and women I spoke with insisted that their 
comments were “on the record,” I have given them pseudonyms, with 
the exception of those holding offi cial posts at the various embassies and 
Bahraini government offi ces, or other public positions. In part, these pseud-
onyms are to protect the participants from potential repercussions, be it 
from their Bahraini sponsors, other members of the expatriate community, 
their employers, or, in some cases, their families and friends. This issue is 
particularly critical to the Indian laborers. A question to an Indian laborer 
regarding the problems encountered in the workplace, for example, would 
often be followed by silence, a furtive look over the shoulder to make sure 
no one outside their close circle of friends was present, and then an answer. 
The reasons for the clandestine character of the interviews should be evi-
dent well before the conclusion of this book: for many of these men, their 
livelihoods and those of their families hang by a thin thread and, more 
specifi cally, are heavily dependent on the goodwill of their citizen-sponsor. 
My presence in the labor camps was unusual, to say the least, and the ano-
nymity guaranteed to the men who shared their stories with me only partly 
redresses the risks they took in simply speaking with me.
In the fi nal accounting, I conducted a total of sixty-six formal, semi-
structured interviews. Eight of these were with women. Most were also 
20 City of Strangers
with individuals of Indian descent, although they may have possessed a 
Canadian, Bahraini, Australian, American, or other passport. Of the re-
mainder of that total, seven of these full interviews were with Bahraini 
citizens, and fi ve were with individuals from other transmigrant commu-
nities on the island. Together, these migration “experience narratives” are 
the foundation of my ethnographic data. I have also made signifi cant use 
of my fi eld notes, which include the details of interactions, conversations, 
and shorter interviews with hundreds of other individuals on the island. 
I regularly attended meetings and other social gatherings, and the minutiae 
of those experiences, also recorded in my fi eld notes, pervade this study. 
I maintained a set of clippings from two newspapers on the island, both 
of which provided a wealth of detail about the transmigrant experience. 
Finally, I have continued to correspond with many of the individuals I met 
during my stay on the island, and in that sense, I am still collecting data.
An Overview of the Chapters
In chapter 2, I posit the history of Asian transmigration to Bahrain as 
composed of three distinct periods. For centuries, South Asian merchants 
were well entrenched on the island, moving pearls (Bahrain’s principal pre-
oil export) eastward and various foodstuffs from the Subcontinent to the 
Gulf. Second, beginning in the late 1800s, the British colonial apparatus 
drew increasing numbers of Indian bureaucrats and, later, engineers to the 
island. Finally, following the OPEC embargo, Bahrain implemented a vast 
number of infrastructural modernization projects and drew labor from 
South Asia to complete these projects. Underpinning these changes and 
expansion of the conduits connecting South Asia and Bahrain is the conti-
nuity of the kafala system, a historic arrangement and practice that, while 
grounded in Islamic Law, was codifi ed through the practice of indentured 
servitude that typifi ed the pearling mode of production. Understanding the 
history of the kafala system helps us better comprehend its contemporary 
structure and expression—a story that takes up many of the following chap-
ters. The genealogy of the kafala also helps explain the emergence of the 
public sector as the domain of the citizenry and the private sector as the do-
main of the foreign population, a binary that recurs in my analysis of the 
machinery of structural violence in Bahrain.
Chapter 3 begins with another story of violence levied by citizens 
against the poorest of the Indian laborers. I use this story as a springboard 
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toward a more comprehensive portrayal of deportation and the production 
of “illegality” as both an everyday aspect of a foreign laborer’s life and also 
as an industry from which citizen-sponsors profi t. Deportation (and more 
specifi cally, deportability) also provides an entry point into the multifaceted 
and systemic aspects of the structure of dominance constructed by citizens 
and the state to govern the foreign population on the island. Using several 
more migration narratives, I map the machinery of the structural violence 
that shapes the experience of this transnational proletariat. That machinery 
includes the preestablished debts with which most transmigrants arrive, the 
sponsor’s control of the worker’s passport, the linguistic and cultural barri-
ers maintained by citizens and state, and the governance of workers’ move-
ment on the island.
Although the majority of the Indian population on the island work as 
manual laborers or low-level clerks (a transnational proletariat), there is a 
substantial and highly visible diasporic middle class as well. In chapter 4, 
I explore how the structural violence I have portrayed as shaping the lives 
of this transnational proletariat also shapes the lives of this middle class. 
I ask whether members of this latter group—who have more resources, 
more strategic options, and more cultural capital—are able to mitigate 
the impact of this dominance. Through a detailed presentation of the nar-
ratives I collected in Bahrain, I conclude that although members of the 
middle class face a different set of pressures, this diasporic elite also faces 
the structural violence endemic to the matrix of the kafala.
In the diffi cult context of Bahrain, foreign workers generally face a re-
pressive and fairly comprehensive form of dominance. Individually, of 
course, they strategically respond and challenge the limitations imposed on 
them. They also, however, work collectively. In chapter 5 I consider the role 
of the wide variety of diasporic social clubs and voluntary organizations in 
achieving these goals. Although outright political activity by the diasporic 
communities is prohibited, these various social clubs—regional clubs such 
as the Kerala Samjam, national clubs such as the Indian Club, and voluntary 
associations such as the Lions Club and Toastmasters—provide a basic so-
cial fabric for individuals to connect with other individuals, to collectively 
solve the various dilemmas they face, and to reach out to the poorest mem-
bers of the Indian transnational proletariat.
My analysis of those clubs and associations provides one angle on the 
complex public sphere rendered by the heterogeneous demographics and 
rapid change in the region. I continue mining that vein in chapter 6, a chap-
ter devoted to the English-language newspapers on the island. Citizens, 
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foreigners, and the state use the English-language newspapers as a public 
forum to promote a particular vision of Bahrain’s future, to establish and 
negotiate their own collective identities, and to assert particular frame-
works for understanding the dilemmas both foreigners and citizens face. 
These newspapers reveal the frictions generated by the complex and het-
erogeneous cultural space of contemporary Bahrain.
In chapter 7, the fi nal ethnographically informed chapter, I turn to an 
analysis of the Bahraini citizenry. Because I devote the bulk of this vol-
ume to the experiences of foreigners on the island, I risk leaving the reader 
with a shallow and undeserved portrayal of the Bahraini citizen as nothing 
more than the vessel through which this structural violence against foreign 
workers is deployed. In this chapter I examine that citizenry, principally 
along the lines of class and sect, in order to better understand who exactly 
is being served by the migration industry on the island. My examination 
proposes that the citizenry’s lives have been reshaped by the presence of a 
large transnational population in Bahrain. I conclude this chapter with an 
analysis that suggests that the long-standing association of the public sector 
with native workers and the private sector with foreign workers, along with 
the structural arrangements of the kafala system, can be understood as part 
of the nation’s struggle against and resistance to the calculus of globaliza-
tion. These arrangements, while certainly producing a systemic and struc-
tural violence that impacts foreigners on the island, are at the same time a 
mechanism that allows the state and its citizenry to host (and profi t from) 
the global economy without submitting to its logic.
Concluding Remarks
As an ethnographic text, this book focuses on a particular group of peo-
ple at a particular point in time. The core of my ethnographic data comes 
from 2002 and 2003. From that foundation, however, I incorporate events 
and occurrences from the years that followed my fi eldwork into my analy-
sis. I also use the experiences of these Indian men and women to examine 
and explore the structure of the Bahraini citizenry and state. At the current 
juncture, the most pressing need in the Gulf is for more research—more in-
vestigations into different communities and different aspects of the experi-
ences of transnational migrants in the region, more inquiry into the impact 
of the global economic downturn on these migration fl ows, more investi-
gation of the citizens’ attitudes about the foreign presence in the region. 
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Although there is still much work to be done, the experiences of the Indian 
men and women in Bahrain are strongly representative of the experiences 
of South Asians in all the Gulf Cooperation Council states. The stories I 
have heard from South Asian men and women in Saudi Arabia (2000), the 
United Arab Emirates (2002), and Qatar (2008–present) would fi t seam-
lessly into this book.
I am less secure with the argument that one might extrapolate the ex-
periences of these Indian transmigrants to populations from sending states 
outside of South Asia. In early 2009, for example, I began spending some 
of my weekends visiting a particular labor camp on the outskirts of Doha, 
Qatar. All the men in this camp work for a single company. Roughly half 
the men are Egyptian, whereas the other half are Asian—from Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. The friction between these 
two contingents is palpable, and my South Asian contacts in the camp 
have described at length the perceived advantages of foreign workers who 
share a language, religion, ethnicity, and (to some degree) culture with the 
citizens of the country. As my contacts report, the Egyptian men, all of 
whom work in the same positions as their South Asian counterparts, re-
ceive higher pay and more benefi ts, and enjoy more freedoms than their 
South Asian counterparts. To date there is little ethnographically grounded 
work to help us understand the experiences of these other communities, 
but anecdotal evidence suggests signifi cant differences in the experiences of 
other foreign contingents in the Gulf states. Even this anecdotal evidence, 
however, suggests a substantially different migration experience than that 
of the South Asian men and women described in this book.
Finally, Bahrain has recently announced its intention to dismantle 
portions of the sponsorship system. What has widely been reported as a 
wholesale scrapping of the sponsorship system seems, on closer inspec-
tion, to consist solely of a reallocation of the right to release workers from 
their contracted job from the sponsor himself to the state.12 Even so, this 
change will represent an important incremental step in restructuring the 
dynamics of the labor force in Bahrain. As the leading proponent of this 
change, Bahrain’s labor minister faces staunch resistance from the business 
community and other powerful groups on the island, and the debates sur-
rounding the proposed change are ongoing as this book goes to press. In 
the concluding chapter of this book, I explore these recent developments 
at more length.
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In setting out to explore the context of interactions between Indian 
transmigrants and citizen-hosts on the island of Bahrain, I begin with a 
quick overview of the history of the transnational conduits that, over hun-
dreds of years, have carried South Asians from their homes to the Gulf. In 
the remainder of the chapter I present a more in-depth analysis of Bahrain’s 
complex history. Still, the points I make in this chapter are fairly straight-
forward. First, the processes one might identify as transnational have a long 
history on the island—long enough that they precede the solidifi cation of 
the nation-state by many centuries.1 Second, although Bahrain shares much 
with the other petroleum-rich states of the Arabian Peninsula, that com-
monality should not obscure the particular history of the island’s place in 
the regional and global political economy. Finally, this particular history, 
and the social relations that comprise it, played an important role in shap-
ing the structure of contemporary relations among the peoples of Bahrain, 
including both citizen and foreigner.
Finally, a brief comment about some of the terminology that I use in 
describing particular components of the Indian community in Bahrain: as 
Sarah Mahler has observed, anthropologists concerned with people on the 
move need to remain attentive to the differential access individuals have, 
and their differential participation in, the transnational processes and so-
cial fi elds we study (1998, 81–82; see also George 2000, 148–49). The basic 
bifurcation between the working and professional classes, as described by 
Karen Leonard (2002, 214) in her work on the Indian diaspora in the United 
Arab Emirates, becomes the basis for my use of the terms diasporic elite and 
transnational proletariat, terms that I imagine are unfamiliar and perhaps 
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unwelcome additions to the growing lexicon of appellations used to de-
scribe people on the move. By transnational proletariat I mean the Indian 
foreign laborers in the working class, usually men, alone, with families be-
hind them in India. Their gaze remains fi xed on their home in India, and 
they are transnational in the sense that their social fi elds, collectively and in-
dividually, are spread between two nations but free of neither. Conversely, 
I switch to diasporic elite to describe the middle and upper classes of the 
Indian community on the island. These professionals, skilled workers, en-
gineers, educators, and merchants typically bring their families with them 
to Bahrain. Their tenure on the island may be short or long, but as a com-
munity their history is now centuries old. Their long-standing presence in 
Bahrain, and the disparate ties they maintain with points around the globe, 
doesn’t necessarily make them less transnational than their impoverished 
countrymen on the island, but it does conform to the basic pattern of a 
diasporic, if not cosmopolitan, existence. These terms, and the division they 
connote, are mentioned only in passing in this chapter, but they emerge as 
central to the structure of my analysis in the chapters to come.
An Overview of Transnational Labor in Bahrain
The Middle East is a major destination in the global migration of labor. 
The principal receptors of these migration fl ows are the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates, and Oman. Together, these states host a foreign population of 
well over 10 million men and women, a fi gure that must be gauged in com-
parison with a total population, including foreigners and citizens, of over 
30 million (Kapiszewski 2001, 39; 2006, 4). As these fi gures suggest, the 
petroleum-rich states of the Arabian Peninsula are an important juncture in 
the transnational migration of labor, a node in the transmigratory network 
that, looking outward from South Asia, certainly belongs in the same con-
stellation as western Europe and North America. These fi gures also sug-
gest a noteworthy and unique aspect about the migratory waypoints on 
the Arabian Peninsula, for the proportions of foreigners to citizens are as-
toundingly large. In all the GCC states, foreign labor comprises a majority 
of the total workforce, and in several states (Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, 
and Qatar) foreign workers comprise an absolute majority of the popula-
tion. As James Clifford observed well over a decade ago, diasporic culture 
and its language are beginning to challenge “the binary relation of minority 
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communities with majority societies” (1994, 311). In the cities of the Arabian 
littoral, that challenge is both discursive and demographic, for foreigners 
numerically predominate in many of the public spaces of the cities, they 
work behind the counters of businesses and shops at the foot of the tall 
glass skyscrapers of central Manama, and they crowd the narrow streets of 
the souk on Friday afternoon. The sheer scope of these foreign populations 
has fundamentally altered the social fabric of the urban agglomerations that 
dot the shores of the Gulf waters and has also shaped the social and political 
structures of all the Gulf states (Longva 1997, 2000, 2005; Louër 2008).
Although the sources of these migration fl ows, and hence the demogra-
phy of foreign labor in the Gulf states, have varied signifi cantly over time, 
since the 1970s South Asian transmigrants have come to dominate these 
Indian Ocean conduits. In general terms, the history of the South Asian 
presence in the Gulf can be divided into three overlapping periods. For 
much of known history, merchants from the Indian Subcontinent main-
tained a strong presence in the Gulf, moving cloth, rice, and other food-
stuffs, spices, and a variety of other materials westward to the Gulf, and 
sending pearls—the region’s primary export for many centuries—back along 
that same route (Palgrave 1982; al-Muraikhi 1991; Slot 1993; Buckingham 
1971; Carter 2005). Members of powerful South Asian merchant families, 
the vestiges of which still maintain a presence in the cities of the contem-
porary Gulf, often served as bankers and fi nanciers to the ruling families or 
strongest tribes in the region, and those Indian merchant families’ long-
standing presence in the region constituted the historical framework for the 
migratory conduits that today connect the Arabian Peninsula with the ports 
of the Indian Subcontinent.
The British presence in the region forged a larger and more sustained 
connection to the Indian Subcontinent, and hence forms the second of 
these three periods. After devastating several Gulf ports with its navy, 
Britain imposed the 1820 General Treaty of Peace, an event that gave inter-
national recognition to the Sunni rulers of Bahrain and what later became 
known as the Trucial States (now the United Arab Emirates). Although 
the island was never a formal colony, its eventual status as a British protec-
torate, combined with the tenor and scope of Britain’s relations with the 
island’s indigenous peoples, placed the island squarely in the ambit of the 
British Empire. For many decades, Britain’s relations with the region’s rulers 
and governors were administered via British India’s colonial bureaucracy. 
With each passing decade, the British Crown extended its involvement in 
the region, encouraging the rulers of Eastern Arabia to form government 
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departments and institutions modeled on the European state (customs, 
education, public works, municipalities, police, secular courts, hospitals, 
and the like). Many of these new departments and institutions were run or 
supervised by British colonial civil servants (often from India) in the private 
employ of the rulers. These new departments and institutions also drew 
increasing numbers of low-level Indian bureaucrats from the Subcontinent 
to the cities of the Gulf. British representatives in the Gulf also fostered the 
transmigration of private entrepreneurs to serve this growing population of 
quasi-colonial bureaucrats and to contribute to the ongoing construction 
of a Western-style private sector. In essence, then, the second wave of South 
Asian migrants arrived on the coattails of the British Crown. Many of the 
established families I came to know during my fi eldwork on the island—
members of the diasporic elite in Bahrain—arrived as part of this second 
migration fl ow. Their fathers or grandfathers crossed the Indian Ocean to 
work for the burgeoning number of government bureaucracies and insti-
tutions or, equally likely, to engage in various entrepreneurial activities in 
service of the increasingly wealthy population in the region.
The latest chapter in the history of migration from South Asia to the 
Arabian Peninsula began in the 1960s, gathered speed in the 1970s, and in 
many ways continues to this day. The development of the oil industry 
throughout the region, in conjunction with vast increases in the global de-
mand for that oil, fi lled government coffers and led all of the Gulf states to 
establish a variety of modernization plans, including infrastructural proj-
ects (new highways, bridges, buildings, museums, universities, mosques, 
and so forth) as well as new bureaucracies, expanded state apparatuses, and 
comprehensive welfare systems. Although the impetus for these projects 
was already in place at the end of the 1960s, the oil embargo of the 1970s, by 
increasing state wealth manifold, fueled a dramatic increase in the number 
and scope of these projects. At this historic juncture, South Asian migration 
to the Gulf grew rapidly. The type of South Asian passing through these 
migratory conduits also shifted. In the past, transmigrants to the Gulf were 
typically skilled workers or entrepreneurs. While the fl ow of these transmi-
grants continued, the new arrivals were predominantly unskilled laborers. 
These men fi lled new positions generated by the increasing number of in-
frastructural projects on the island.
These historical factors explain the increasing fl ow of transmigrants to 
the island, but scholars have provided a number of other explanations for 
why South Asia in particular came to play a predominant role in provid-
ing labor to the Gulf. South Asia contained a comparatively inexpensive 
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supply of educated and trained clerks, supervisors, and assistants (Holden 
1966; Kapiszewski 2001, 4, 62; Azhar 1999, 101; Weiner 1986), and many of 
them spoke, read, and wrote English—the language of the growing trans-
national private sector. In addition, and in comparison with the established 
fl ows of Arab migrants to the Gulf, South Asian laborers usually arrived 
unaccompanied by families, and hence the costs of reproducing that labor 
supply were largely borne by the sending states. As other scholars have sug-
gested, the fact that many South Asian transmigrants were neither Arab nor 
Muslim also made for a more pliable and docile workforce (Nakhleh 1976, 
77; Weiner 1986, 53–54), or, from another angle, a population that the citi-
zenry was more willing to exploit. Through this confl uence of forces, and 
building on long-established connections generated through both mercan-
tile and imperial relations, the South Asian presence in the GCC states grew 
rapidly over the last decades of the twentieth century. Although remnants 
of the fi rst two periods of the South Asian migration to the island can still 
be discerned today, it is this last component—the transnational proletariat—
that has come to numerically dominate the South Asian populations in the 
cities of the Gulf.
My own ethnographic work, combined with that of the handful of 
other scholars with experience investigating one or both ends of the mi-
gratory conduits that connect the Gulf states to South Asia and points 
farther abroad, suggests a series of patterns that characterize the trans-
migrant experience in the GCC states (Longva 1997, 2000, 2005; Nagy 
1998; Leonard 2002, 2003; Khalaf and Alkobaisi 1999; Gamburd 2000). 
Foremost, these are “guest worker” populations. Although there are a few 
notable exceptions, naturalization is neither encouraged nor readily pos-
sible.2 Both discursively and practically, Gulf states and Gulf citizens alike 
reinforce the temporary nature of these transmigrants’ tenure in the GCC 
states, even though many foreigners stay for years, for a lifetime, or in the 
case of some families, for generations. In spite of both the size and long 
tenure of many foreign populations in the Gulf states, South Asians forge 
lives largely separate from the host society: in Bahrain, for example, the 
transnational proletariat dwell in decrepit apartment buildings in the cen-
tral urban slums now largely abandoned by the citizenry, or bunk in labor 
camps on the semi-industrial periphery of the city. Families of the diasporic 
elite send their children to separate schools (e.g., the Indian School, the 
New Indian School, the Pakistani School) and join social clubs specifi c to 
their home nations or regions (e.g., the Young Goans Club, the Pakistani 
Club). Intermarriage between citizens and noncitizens is uncommon, and 
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many of the elite Indian families I spoke with—families that, in some cases, 
have been in Bahrain for several generations—had never been invited to a 
Bahraini house. As Longva (1997) remarks in her acute analysis of relations 
in Kuwait, interactions in these plural societies are largely confi ned to the 
arena of work.
Another pattern that characterizes the transmigrant experience pertains 
to the kafala system. Excepting those who arrive illegally—a point I examine 
in detail in the coming chapters—all South Asian workers arrive through 
the kafala (sponsorship) system, the framework by which trans national mi-
gration in the GCC states is organized and controlled.3 Through the kafala 
system, individual foreign workers are linked to a particular job and, more 
importantly, to a particular citizen or corporate sponsor (a kafeel). This re-
lationship has a contractual facet in the sense that the men and women who 
cross the Indian Ocean to work in the Gulf sign contracts that oblige them 
to work, typically, for two years at a set level of pay. These contracts also 
oblige the sponsors to pay a certain rate, to cover travel costs, to provide 
a vacation period, and so forth. As I argue in the following chapters, by 
binding foreign workers to individual citizens, the kafala system is the key-
stone in the systemic and structural violence levied against foreign workers 
in the Gulf. At the current juncture, it suffi ces to say that the kafala rela-
tion represents a central concern in the lifeworlds of most of the foreign 
Figure 2.1. Luggage on its way from the airport to a labor camp. Photograph by 
Andrew Gardner.
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workers I interviewed, and as such it plays a predominant role in patterning 
their experience abroad. At the same time, there are signifi cant and substan-
tial changes on the near horizon in Bahrain, for the kingdom has recently 
announced plans to dismantle portions of the sponsorship system. These 
changes are discussed in the fi nal chapter of this book.
There are also gendered, ethnic, national, regional, linguistic, and reli-
gious patterns to the migratory conduits between South Asia and the Gulf. 
The vast majority of transmigrants in the Gulf states are men. Indeed, on 
a Friday afternoon, when many foreign workers have at least some por-
tion of the day free, the central streets of Manama are overtaken by South 
Asian men. Female transmigrants, both fewer in number and less visible, 
are also present in the Gulf. The largest contingent serves as domestic work-
ers, a vocation generally seen as one of the poorest paid and most vulner-
able components of the foreign population (Longva 1997, 70; Kapiszewski 
2001, 181–82; Strobl 2009).4 At the other end of the socioeconomic spec-
trum, many professional women arrive from Asia to work in various capaci-
ties for the transnational corporations that serve the region; other women 
arrive on a family visa reserved for foreign workers meeting the minimum 
income threshold.5
The various national and ethnic groups that migrate to the island fi nd 
their way—or are slotted—into particular types of work: Indians, Pakistanis, 
and Bangladeshis work in construction and the service sector, Filipinos 
work as concierges and run beauty parlors, whereas Indonesian and Sri 
Lankan women work as housemaids. In part, the association of particular 
national and ethnic groups with particular sorts of work can be explained 
by chain migration and the labor brokerage system: brokers serving one 
portion of the workforce utilize connections they’ve established in particu-
lar regions of South Asia. At the same time, chain migration—the process 
by which one transmigrant from one particular place uses his or her knowl-
edge and contacts to pave the way for additional transmigrants—also struc-
tures the workforce in this manner. Finally, and perhaps as a result of these 
processes, employers in the region come to believe that particular sorts of 
people—specifi c ethnicities or nationalities—are “naturally” better for cer-
tain sorts of positions and hire accordingly. Altogether, these interlocked 
processes have forged a workforce deeply patterned by ethnicity and na-
tionality. These patterns, and the processes undergirding them, characterize 
all the states of the GCC.6
What I have omitted in this chapter are the historical factors and socio-
economic processes that have generated this abundant and willing labor 
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force in South Asia. In comparison to the ethnographic literature con-
cerned with foreign workers in the Gulf, this literature is relatively large 
(Gamburd 2000; Osella and Osella 2000a, 2000b; Kurien 2002; Silvey 
2004; Pertierra 1994; Sekhar 1996; Nair 1999; Nambiar 1995; Brochmann 
1993; Eelens, Schampers, and Speckman 1992). I have also omitted the 
growing literature that traces the complicity of the United States and west-
ern Europe in maintaining these Gulf regimes and, hence, in maintaining 
the particular order that shapes the lives of foreigners and citizens alike. 
Holloway (1994), for example, argues that the nature of the contemporary 
state requires understanding its particular place in global capitalist relations 
(see also Sharma and Gupta 2006). Although these factors are certainly es-
sential in providing a complete map of the structural forces that produce 
the episodic violence foreign workers face in Bahrain, they are beyond the 
scope of the analysis I provide here.
Early History
The state of Bahrain is a collection of low, geographically unremark-
able islands off the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia.7 The two largest islands, 
Awal and the smaller Muharraq, are separated by a shallow bay that was 
once traversable by human and donkey at low tide. For millennia Bahrain 
served as an entrepôt on the maritime trade routes between Asia and the 
continents to the west. In the third millennium BC the island was known 
as Dilmun. Its strategic location on the route between Mesopotamia and 
the Indus Valley, combined with an abundance of freshwater springs 
found on the island and in the shallow waters that surround it, enhanced 
the island’s mythos—it is Edenic Bahrain to which wise men and heroes 
are transported to live out an eternity in the epic of Gilgamesh. The island 
was also known to the Greek Empire: an admiral under the command 
of Alexander the Great purportedly visited Tylos (the Greek name for 
Bahrain), and Pliny made note of the island’s renowned pearl beds. Islam 
arrived in 640 AD, but the religious continuity that followed did little to 
steady the fate of the small island, which, at the fringes of various empires, 
continued to change hands in the passing centuries.
The Omanis, building on their strategic location at the mouth of the 
Gulf, captured the islands in the fi fteenth century, and they are respon-
sible for Arad Fort, a large fortress that today has been refurbished as a 
national and iconic emblem of Bahrain’s long history. The next century 
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belonged to the Portuguese. Their fl eets conquered ports from the Strait 
of Hormuz north to those on the southern fringe of the Mesopotamian 
delta. Historians have remarked on the peculiarity of Portuguese control—
noteworthy for how little infl uence these outposts had upon the people, 
culture, artwork, and architecture beyond the fortress walls (Khuri 1980, 16). 
Perhaps as a result of this insularity, the Portuguese were driven from the 
island in 1602 by the indigenous population, and the rebellion’s merchant-
leader appealed to the Persian Empire for protection (Lorimer 1908, 836; 
Khuri 1980, 17).8
The Persian grasp on the island was not fi rm, and the Omani fl eet re-
gained control of the islands for a brief period in the eighteenth century. The 
Persians returned in 1753, but they did so amid a climate of relative chaos. 
The Arabian Gulf was a notoriously diffi cult, if lucrative, mercantile venue. 
Caught on the seams of empires, the ports on the Arabian side of the Gulf 
often functioned as maritime city-states—as important trading bazaars 
connecting the inland tribes with the production of the East, and also as 
sovereign entities capable of collecting fees from passing boats. By the eigh-
teenth century, the English had expanded eastward into Asia, but the Gulf 
remained beyond their sphere of control. The primary arm of their imperial 
enterprise, the English East India Company, had become aware of Bahrain 
and its riches from Portuguese deserters as early as 1613, but had been unable 
to locate the island and its surrounding pearl beds (Lorimer 1908, 838).
In 1782, perceiving weakness in Persia’s position in Bahrain, the ¨Utub 
(a maritime Arab tribal confederation from Zubara in western Qatar and 
Kuwait) descended on Bahrain by sea. The ¨Utubi combatants defeated the 
Persian forces in the fi eld, and those of the local sheikh’s forces still alive 
retreated to the fort. The ¨Utub plundered the market town of Manama, 
and after taking possession of a Persian vessel, they retired en masse to their 
home port on the Qatari coast. After a failed counterattack by the Persian 
fl eet, the Kuwaiti ¨Utub intercepted a Persian messenger upon the seas, 
and they turned south to assist their tribal brethren. This time, upon ar-
riving in Manama, they seized the town and burned it. The Persian troops 
retreated to the citadel, where they withstood a two-month siege by the 
¨Utubi forces, which now included the Zubara contingent as well. The 
 citadel—and Bahrain as a whole—eventually fell to this Zubara clan, other-
wise known as the Khalifa family (Lorimer 1908, 839).
The island that the Khalifa branch of the ¨Utub came to rule was already 
a transnational hodgepodge of peoples. The axes of difference among these 
various groups recur throughout this book; perhaps the most important 
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to our purposes here are the sectarian differences. The ¨Utub, and more 
specifi cally the Khalifa, were a Sunni conglomeration of extended families 
that maintained a strong tribal ethos, in stark contrast to the nontribal Shi’a 
they came to rule.9 As a mercantile hub for the region, Bahrain also in-
cluded signifi cant populations of Persians (also, for the most part, Shi’ite), 
Basra Arabs, Hindus, and Jews. In many ways, the arrival of the Khalifa 
seemed merely another chapter in the island’s long and tumultuous politi-
cal history. The arrival of the British, however, brought this era of changing 
political control to an end.
One fi nal note on Bahrain’s early history: on the outskirts of contempo-
rary Manama, the capital city and international hub that has spread south 
to encompass nearly all of the hinterland villages of the island, one can still 
see the remnants of the famous Bahraini burial mounds, or tumili—fi elds of 
small dirt hillocks stretching as far as the eye can see. Although many of these 
graveyards have been destroyed by construction projects, estimates as to their 
original number reach 150,000 (Clarke 1981, 69). Even today, the vast scope 
of these remains suggests something unfamiliar to those of us from the New 
World, for they yield a clue as to the sheer number of lives that have been 
lived on the small island. That many of those lives were connected to other 
places along the Gulf littoral, the Arabian Sea, and the northeastern reaches 
of Africa is diffi cult to gauge against the permanence of their rest in the 
southern plains of the small island. The early historical sources we have for 
Bahrain, however, clearly portray a city, people, and marketplace intricately 
connected to the emergent global system. And for much of the island’s 
history, the lives that passed on the island intersected with the lucrative 
trade wrought by the pearl beds surrounding the island.
Pearls in the Global Ecumene
That the fates of entire peoples, communities, and states might be buf-
feted by a single commodity was a point clearly developed by Sidney Mintz 
(1985) in his exploration of the intricate connections among sugar, nascent 
capitalism, and the colonization of the New World, and reinforced by 
Wolf ’s (1982) more expansive consideration of the development of a world 
system. Bahrain, under a variety of designations, appears in the numerous 
historical documents that chart the earliest years of Eric Wolf  ’s revision of 
world system theory,10 and the islands’ mythic notoriety had much to do 
with the rich pearl beds that surround it. Greek accounts noted the presence 
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of “fi sh eyes,” as pearls were known, and later accounts mark their presence 
in the markets of Manama.11 By the nineteenth century, when the small 
island had become thoroughly enmeshed in the mercantile trade routes of 
the Indian Ocean world, Bahrain emerged as the principal pearl market in 
the Arabian Gulf (Lorimer 1908, 245). The pearls of the Gulf were consid-
ered higher in quality than those of Ceylon (Buckingham 1971, 456), and 
they made their way to markets on several continents. Many of the earliest 
historical accounts spend time describing the minutiae of this livelihood 
(Buckingham 1971, 454–57; see also al-Muraikhi 1991, 77–90).
During the period after the Persian defeat in Bahrain, pearling vessels 
were principally controlled by the Sunni tribesmen of the island—members 
of the ruling al-Khalifa clan as well as the handful of other Sunni tribes that 
made their home on the island (Khuri 1980, 36; Franklin 1985, 75). The 
Khalifa rulers extracted revenue through a system of levies on the industry 
(Farah 1985, 5). Boats plied the waters around the islands, and the pearling 
crews, composed of both Arabs and slaves of African origin, worked the 
bottom of the sea in depths exceeding seventy feet.12 Work was seasonal: the 
boats spent just over four months on the seas around Bahrain, beginning in 
June when the sea is hot and calm. Working vessels returned to the island 
only occasionally to replenish supplies. At the conclusion of the pearling sea-
son, crews passed the winter months in idle anticipation of the next season 
(Buckingham 1971, 456–57). Divers shared in the profi ts obtained by the sale 
of pearls, each receiving an advance at the beginning of the season and a 
second advance during the off-season. Both payments were debited against 
future earnings, oftentimes forging a growing chasm of debt and servitude 
into which future generations of the laboring class were born.
The work of pearling itself was diffi cult. A typical pearling dhow held 
a crew of sixty, including the divers, pullers, ship’s boys, captain’s mate, 
and captain (Jenner 1984, 27).13 The captain sailed the dhow to the chosen 
location, and the anchor was lowered. Divers quickly descended to the 
bottom, accompanied by two ropes, one with a stone weight, the other 
with a collection bag. After collecting ten or twelve oysters from the sea 
bottom, the diver surfaced while the pullers retrieved the haul. The divers 
worked in shifts, and after a sequence of ten dives, the diver warmed him-
self by the fi re while another took his shift. The pearl merchant’s vessel 
traveled among the dhows of his fl eet, and the merchant courted buyers 
one at a time on the deck of his vessel.
The importance of the pearl industry precedes available historical ac-
counts. By the eighteenth century, Bahrain was a central hub in regional 
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commerce. The pearl trade was certainly the cornerstone of the island’s 
position, but the gleam of the pearl often obscures other important attrac-
tions of the island. Bahrain functioned as a source of fresh water for passing 
ships. The islands contained numerous freshwater springs, and the shallow 
waters around the island also bubbled with fresh water, for which the local 
population confi gured technologies for extracting the fresh water from sa-
line (Buckingham 1971, 456–57). The interior of Bahrain, by all accounts, 
was a veritable garden. In his trip to Bahrain in the early nineteenth century, 
Buckingham observed “no less than three hundred villages scattered over 
the small island, and every portion of the soil is cultivated; producing dates, 
fi gs, citrons, peaches, and a species of almond, called loazi, the outer husk of 
which is eaten as well as the kernel” (452).
Agricultural production was, for the most part, a Shi’ite activity, and 
although their interior villages were connected to the booming port of 
Manama by trade, they were disconnected from the wealth derived from 
the pearl industry (Khuri 1980, 36). Palgrave, in the colonial discourse typi-
cal of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, states that the “fi fty or sixty 
hamlets that lie scattered in its interior [do not] keep up much commu-
nication with the thriving emporium on the north-west, and hence their 
inhabitants bear an almost savage look, indicative of an uncultivated mind, 
the result of isolation” (1982, 210). These “uncultivated” minds were re-
sponsible for much of the agricultural production on the island and were 
hence part of the reason that the emporium to the northwest thrived in its 
role as a gateway to the populations of the eastern peninsula.
The Sunni inhabitants of the island controlled the production of pearls, 
but the distribution of this commodity brought diverse populations to the 
island. In the seventeenth century, Venetians, Jews from Aleppo, and Banias 
from Gujarat were the chief exporters of Gulf pearls (Slot 1993, 498). By the 
early 1800s, however, the bulk found their way to the markets of the Indian 
Subcontinent (Buckingham 1971, 454). As pearls reached the markets of 
India, products of the Subcontinent fl owed back to the markets of Bahrain 
along the same lines of trade; a short list included “cotton and silk fabrics, 
embroideries, rice, spices, coffee, sugar and tea, fi ber ropes, timber, metals, 
iron and sundry gewgaws all coming from India” (al-Muraikhi 1991, 106). 
With a reliable mercantile connection to the Subcontinent, Bahrain rose 
from an important entrepôt to the preeminent emporium of the western 
Gulf (Lorimer 1908, 245). The success of the Indian merchants in this equa-
tion enhanced their power on the island. By the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, they controlled the customs port and served as personal bankers to the 
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ruling family. From the 1890s to 1965, the Indian rupee served as Bahrain’s 
principal currency.
After many centuries at the crossroads of regional trade routes, and with 
its increasingly solidifi ed mercantile connections to the Indian Subconti-
nent and to the Arabian Peninsula’s interior, the port of Manama was widely 
recognized as a heterogeneous and multicultural trading hub. As Palgrave 
ably noted in his 1862–63 travel diary,
The arrival of strangers, many or few, from north or south, is an 
every hour occurrence here; and a passing look, or a chance “good 
morrow,” was all the notice taken of us by the many who thronged 
the landing place. . . . Mixed with the indigenous population are nu-
merous strangers and settlers, some of whom have been established 
here for many generations back, attracted from other lands either by 
the profi ts of commerce or of the pearl fi shery, and still retaining more 
or less of the physiognomy and garb of their native countries. Thus 
the gay-coloured close-cut dress of the southern Persian, the saffron-
stained vest of ‘Oman, the white robe of the Nejd, and the striped 
gown of Baghdad, are often to be seen mingling with the light gar-
ments of Bahreyn, its blue and red turban, its white silk-fringed cloth 
worn Banian fashion round the waist, and its frock-like overall; while 
a small but unmistakable colony of Indians, merchants by profession, 
and mainly from Guzerat, Cutch, and their vicinity, keep up here all 
their peculiarities of costume and manner, and live among the motley 
crowd, “among them, but not of them.” (Palgrave 1982, 205–12)
The historical record repeatedly remarks on the heterogeneous character 
of the island. Certainly a plethora of different cultural and ethnic groups 
made their home on the island. Some arrived by choice, such as the Indian 
merchants, and others by force, such as the African slaves who worked the 
sea bottom for the bounty of pearls. Moreover, the indigenous population, 
if one can even be delineated, included a variety of groups demarcated not 
only by the Sunni/Shi’a schism but also by regional affi liation, such as those 
with a genealogical connection to Persia or the eastern districts of Saudi 
Arabia. In most cases, the pluralism of the social milieu did not extend 
to the local level: villages were homogeneous, and within the port city of 
Manama, specifi c quarters became the home of particular groups.
Nor should this portrait of premodern Bahrain be conceived as a sort of 
static social arrangement. The booming pearl industry of the late nineteenth 
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century reshaped society on the island. As the connections to the pearl mar-
kets of India solidifi ed, agricultural land in the hinterlands of the main is-
land was abandoned. “Production for internal consumption continued,” 
Nelida Fuccaro states, but the “export of agricultural produce, especially 
dates, decreased considerably as the local agricultural workforce increas-
ingly became absorbed in fi shing and pearling controlled by the new tribal 
elites” (2000, 54). The industry thrived as the market for pearls and other 
luxury goods expanded in the decade following the First World War.14
In 1893, however, in Japan, Kokichi Mikimoto, the son of a noodle ven-
dor, patented a process for cultivating pearls. After he spent another twelve 
years perfecting the process, cultured pearls began to make their way into 
the global market as Japan’s fi rst successful export. In Bahrain, the impact of 
this technological shift was slow, and the industry continued to thrive in the 
1920s. When the U.S. stock market collapsed in 1929, however, demand for 
luxury goods dwindled, and in the early 1930s, with the global prominence 
of the cultured pearl, the Bahrain industry collapsed (Zahlan 1989, 22).
Although the pearl trade in Bahrain all but vanished in the decades 
that followed the global collapse of the industry, the legacy of the rela-
tions of pearl production established over the course of centuries lingered 
on. Like the pearl beds, petroleum provided the basis for an essentially 
extractive industry; the tributary relations between the Sunni royal fam-
ily and the captains of the pearling dhows were in some sense replicated 
with oil production, albeit under the guise of legitimacy provided by the 
quasi-colonial bureaucracy now present on the island. Furthermore, the 
indentured servitude and circle of debt that characterized relations be-
tween pearl boat captains and the divers constituted an early rendition 
of the contemporary kafala system. Like the pearl divers of the last cen-
tury, transmigrant laborers today arrive with a burden of debt that is 
diffi cult to escape. Finally, for many centuries Bahrain’s lucrative pearl 
industry drew foreign traders, merchants, and laborers to the island. The 
petroleum era, while drawing new groups of individuals from afar, was 
nonetheless only the latest chapter in a long history of transregional 
migration through Bahrain.
The Arrival of British Imperialism
The British entry into the Gulf region, premised upon the strength of 
their maritime forces, was a gradual one. The arrival of the Khalifa Arabs 
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to Bahrain, of course, marked a signifi cant milestone in Bahraini history, 
but in the larger context of the Gulf their arrival was but one chapter in 
the history of tribal relations in the region—a set of relations carried from 
desert to sea. With the long-standing presence of the Persians, the ¨Utubi 
Arabs, the Omanis, and the famous “pirates” of the lower Gulf (the tribes 
of what today are the United Arab Emirates), the Arabian Gulf of the eigh-
teenth century has been characterized as a veritable “free-for-all attack and 
counterattack, alliance and counter-alliance” in which ports and territory 
frequently shifted hands (Franklin 1985, 64).
In entering this regional stage, the British sought legitimacy through 
the eradication of these attacks and counterattacks, or of “piracy,” the no-
menclature used by the Europeans to describe the fi ercely competitive 
economic warfare waged by the various ports of the Gulf (Franklin 1985, 
61; Onley 2004, 31, 36–37). Piracy, although often portrayed as a guerilla 
response to the encroachment of the Portuguese, French, English, and 
Dutch, also relates to the gradual erosion of the Persian Empire and the 
stability it granted to mercantile activity in the region, to the increasing 
volume of trade in the region, to the rise of the fundamentalist Wahhabis 
(Saudis), who waged war on Indian shipping during 1797–1819, and most 
importantly, to the fact that British defi nitions of piracy often included the 
Arab enforcement of a “protection fee” system that mirrored the relation-
ship between caravan routes and tribal homelands on the peninsula (Khuri 
1980, 19–21; Onley 2004, 36–37, 42–43).
The British, after devastating several ports through naval attacks in 
December 1819, imposed an antipiracy treaty on the rulers of what came 
to be known as the Trucial States (now the United Arab Emirates) in early 
1820, to which Bahrain was admitted at its ruler's request. The local rulers 
promised to abstain from all forms of maritime raiding, including piracy, in 
return for Britain’s promise to protect them from this raiding and arbitrate 
any disputes arising from it (Onley 2004, 31, 36). This treaty, known as the 
General Treaty of Peace, yielded international recognition to the rulers and 
their families, and thereby reinforced their positions as the hereditary lead-
ers of their respective sheikhdoms (Zahlan 1989, 7–8; Onley 2004, 66).15 
Responsibility for the enforcement of this and subsequent treaties was 
given to Britain’s Gulf Resident in Bushehr, who took his orders from 
the government of India (Onley 2007, 14–20). The Gulf Resident main-
tained a representative in Bahrain who reported to him on a regular basis. 
In the nineteenth century, this man was a locally recruited Indian or Arab 
merchant with the title of Native Agent, whereas in the twentieth century 
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he was a Briton with the title of Political Agent (Onley 2007, 136–88). 
Through this agency, Bahrain emerged as a vital node in what Onley calls 
British India’s “informal empire.”
A calculated move by many accounts, the presence of the British 
Residents and Agents in the Gulf served multiple ends. Britain’s growing 
involvement in the region was ostensibly based on the protection of trade 
routes to India and the East. In practice, the British political presence also 
enabled a British company, the British India Steam Navigation Company, 
to dominate the vital long-distance trade between India and Gulf ports, 
particularly Basra, Bahrain, Dubai, and Muscat (Landen 1967, 99–101). 
Furthermore, the stabilization of borders and regimes in the region turned 
group competition inward rather than outward (Franklin 1985, 66).
Through exclusive agreements signed between the local rulers and the 
government of India in the late nineteenth century, Britain took control 
of the external relations of the Gulf sheikhdoms, turning them into British 
“protected states” (Onley 2007, 21–29). This move would become the win-
dow for Britain’s increasing involvement in the internal affairs of the port 
cities and their surrounding territories. The British concerns expanded to 
include “port facilities, pearl production, exports and imports, and a gen-
eral political order that stimulated international trade” (Khuri 1980, 86). In 
Bahrain, direct connections to the markets of India and other ports far afi eld 
drew increasing numbers of merchants and traders to the city: Germans, 
other Europeans, and a contingent of fi fty Jewish pearl merchants who had 
arrived in the 1890s sought the protection of the British Agent on the is-
land (Khuri 1980, 86).16 The Agent’s extraterritorial jurisdiction in Bahrain, 
granted by the Exclusive Agreements of 1880 and 1892, allowed him to try 
all legal cases involving foreigners in Bahrain and to try with a Bahraini 
judge all cases between foreigners and Bahrainis (Onley 2007, 119–27). The 
former were tried in the British Agency Court, whereas the latter were tried 
in the Joint Court. Over a century ago, then, we can see traces of the dual 
system that continues to characterize the arrangements in all of the contem-
porary Gulf nations.
As the jurisdiction of the British Resident and his Agents expanded, 
power was centralized in the court system. The British Agency Court was 
formally established in 1919, with the Joint Court being established soon 
after. A secular court for Bahrainis was also established in the 1920s, run by 
a British colonial civil servant privately employed by the ruler of Bahrain: 
Sir Charles Belgrave, who oversaw the creation of the modern government 
of Bahrain, with its departments and institutions, between 1926 and 1957 
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(Khuri 1980, 89–90). Councils and governing bodies were established, 
eclipsing the indigenous institutions of leadership.17 The degree of involve-
ment by the British in Bahrain outpaced British efforts among the other 
fl edgling states of the western Arabian Gulf. In Bahrain, the British became 
involved in the minutiae of everyday internal affairs, and in 1946, the politi-
cal residency—the locus of the British Empire’s regional presence—moved 
from Bushehr to Bahrain. British air force, naval, and army bases were es-
tablished on the island in 1932, 1935, and 1961, respectively, and numerous 
British commercial fi rms located their regional headquarters in Manama 
(Franklin 1985, 86; Zahlan 1989, 49).
Petroleum and the Global Political Economy
In his comprehensive analysis of the Gulf region during the British era, 
Lorimer explains Bahrain’s strategic importance to the British imperial in-
terests in the region. He also spends some effort describing the pearl indus-
try and concludes by stating that should the pearl beds fail, “the Shaikhdom 
would shortly be reduced to comparative insignifi cance” (1908, 245). Some 
twenty-two years after his book was published, the pearl market did col-
lapse. The veracity of the argument underlying Lorimer’s prediction, how-
ever, remains in question, for the international collapse of the pearl market 
neatly coincided with the discovery of oil in Bahrain.
In October 1931, Bahrain’s fi rst oil well was drilled at Jebel al-Dukhan, 
the sole mountain on the main island. Seven months later, the well began 
to produce 9,000 barrels of oil a day, and the region’s petroleum era was 
under way (Zahlan 1989, 51). Larger discoveries followed, but few of them 
were in Bahrain. Nonetheless, with a suffi cient supply of petroleum, as 
well as the economic benefi ts of its stature as the epicenter of the British 
presence in the Gulf, Bahrain boomed in the decades that followed the 
discovery of oil. In fact, for much of the twentieth century, Bahrain paced 
modernization in the Arabian Gulf even as the coffers of nearby nations 
began to surpass its own.18
The British, who by then were managing all external affairs of the 
small island nation (as well as a sizable portion of the internal affairs), 
granted one-third of the oil royalties to the Khalifa leadership (Franklin 
1985, 87). These monies, and the jobs produced by the growth of the oil 
industry, stimulated the local economy and wrought fundamental changes 
in Bahraini society. To sketch a basic outline of the impact, one can point 
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to the physical relocation of many families out of the central districts and 
into the newly constructed suburbs of Manama; one can note the educa-
tion of women, as well as their entry into the labor market; one can point 
to the government’s construction of universities, hospitals, schools, roads, 
palaces, mosques, and other infrastructural components that, together, 
conditioned fundamental changes in the day-to-day activity of most 
Bahrainis, and, furthermore, changed the locations of that activity; one 
can also note that more frequent travel by Bahrainis, for both work and 
pleasure, increased contact between Bahrainis and foreigners.
At the same time, many Bahrainis had diffi culty accessing the wealth 
generated by the industry. Most of the jobs in the oil industry, particularly 
in its earliest decades, went to foreigners, and often to Indian nationals 
(Franklin 1985, 88). As already described, Indians had been on the island 
in signifi cant numbers for centuries. With the rapid development of the 
petroleum industry, and with the continuing expansion of the British-
managed government bureaucracy, the need for trained professionals and 
the assorted clerks, supervisors, and assistants who spoke English far sur-
passed the supply of educated and trained Bahrainis (Holden 1966, 176; 
Kapiszewski 2001, 4).19 Moreover, those citizens who did gain a foot-
hold in the industries on the island often departed for other pursuits. As 
Seccombe and Lawless (1986, 111–12) state, many of the Bahrainis who 
gained formal or informal training under the foreign-run industries on 
the island quickly found their way to other alternatives—establishing their 
own businesses, working in the private sector, or themselves migrating to 
work in nearby countries. As a result of this confl uence of factors, the fl ow 
of foreign labor to the island increased steadily over the middle decades of 
the twentieth century, and the wealth generated by Bahrain’s petroleum 
industry coexisted with signifi cant periods of unemployment for citizens.
In 1971, the year Britain withdrew its military from the Gulf and termi-
nated its nineteenth-century treaties with the Gulf rulers, Bahrain declared 
its independence from Britain. Two years later, the OPEC embargo re-
sulted in the overnight quadrupling of the income generated by petroleum 
(Zahlan 1989, 61–62). Independent and instantly wealthy, Bahrain experi-
enced a quickening in its pace of development. At this juncture in history 
the fl ow of labor to the region reached unforeseen highs: between 1971 
and 1981, the population of non-Bahrainis jumped from 37,885 to 112,378 
(Directorate of Statistics 1999, 16). Put another way, in 1971 one out of every 
fi ve individuals on the island was a noncitizen foreigner. Ten years later, one 
out of every three individuals on the island was a foreign worker.
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Not only did the number of foreigners working in Bahrain grow but the 
sources of that labor shifted rapidly in the 1970s. In particular, inter-Arab 
labor migration was rapidly eclipsed by the arrival of South Asian labor-
ers from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and nu-
merous other nations of the Indian Ocean. This shift in labor is frequently 
linked to the OPEC embargo, an event that, as noted, multiplied the island 
nation’s income practically overnight and hastened the establishment of 
large development projects, and hence fueled a demand for labor that the 
citizenry itself could not meet (Azhar 1999, 101; Weiner 1986). Although the 
laborers arriving from South Asia in the 1970s were certainly fi lling posi-
tions that Bahrainis were unwilling or unable to take, the simple correlation 
between this fl ow of transnational labor and the demand in the Gulf labor 
markets has been closely examined and challenged by other scholars. Emile 
Nakhleh, for example, observes that six years after its inception, the Bahrain 
Petroleum Company began to extensively employ Indians and Iranians in 
response to the 1938 labor strike by citizen-employees (1976, 77). Other 
research suggests that the British government precariously balanced its in-
terests in maintaining good relations with the royal family, minimizing or 
altogether excluding foreign interests from gaining a foothold, and fi nd-
ing a productive and capable workforce for developing oil production and 
other related industries on the island (Seccombe and Lawless 1986, 94–96). 
Labor from the Indian Subcontinent threaded the complexities of these de-
mands: beyond providing a capable, trained, and inexpensive labor force, 
Indian laborers were already British subjects and, from the perspective of 
the island’s Sunni leadership, less politically volatile than Arab or Persian 
labor (Seccombe and Lawless 1986). The idea that these new labor forces 
were politically docile and less culturally troublesome than non-Bahraini 
Arab laborers is a recurring theme in analyses of the historical context of 
transmigration to the Gulf (Nakhleh 1976, 77; Weiner 1986, 53–54).
Although the petroleum reserves in Bahrain were, in the end, the small-
est in the Gulf, Bahrain continues to rely on oil for a substantial portion 
of its national income. Estimates vary signifi cantly, from 50 percent to 
77 percent of the state’s total income (Seikaly 2001, 179; Wright 2008; 
Ali 2009), but even these fi gures fail to convey the intricacy of this de-
pendency, for many of the island nation’s diversifi cation projects depend 
heavily on petroleum and gas in their productive capacities. Nonetheless, 
the Kingdom of Bahrain has arrived in the twenty-fi rst century with a 
collection of economic strategies aimed at diversifying its economy. The 
nation’s commercial and fi nancial sectors, while increasingly eclipsed by 
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the metropolis of Dubai to the south, continue to draw global corporate 
entities to the island. The nation’s bureaucracy—itself a complex nego-
tiation of the island’s quasi-colonial legacy and the vested interests of the 
ruling Sunni sect—continues to keep pace with change and reform in the 
Gulf. The stellar wealth of nearby nations is absent in Bahrain, however, 
and the harsh reality of a diminishing resource base, the “golden bubble” 
that fi nanced the rapid changes of the past century, is better known in 
Bahrain than in any of the petroleum nations of the Gulf littoral.
Bahrain in a Regional Context
Much of the scholarship concerned with the petroleum states of the 
Arabian Gulf portrays them as a fairly homogeneous set of neighbors. 
Ample evidence supports this fact. The Sunni ruling families of several of 
these modern states share an overlapping genealogy, and even the com-
mon folk of today’s Gulf states trace familial connections across multiple 
national borders. Five of the six nations of the GCC are Sunni-ruled, but 
only in Bahrain does that Sunni leadership rule over a Shi’ite majority.20 In 
her seminal attack against the Orientalist portrayal of the “Islamic” city as 
a conglomeration of particular morphological features, Janet Abu-Lughod 
(1987) describes the “feel” of the cities of the Middle East—the spatial and 
personal semiotics indicative of the divide between public and semiprivate 
urban space (169). One might easily add to this rendering the sound of calls 
to prayer, the smell of sheesha, the tight winding streets of the older quar-
ters, or the minarets that reach from low neighborhoods to the sky. The 
cities of the Gulf littoral also have a common feel to them, with long wa-
terfront corniches, modern highways connecting the rhizome-like network 
of traffi c circles, each with a monument at its center. The cities themselves 
are a testament to these similarities: all of these neighboring nations are 
principally urban, with great majorities of the population dwelling in and 
around the cities of the region.
All of these cities are highly transnational. In all the nations of the GCC, 
foreigners constitute a majority of the total workforce. In Kuwait, Qatar, 
and the United Arab Emirates they constitute an absolute majority of the 
population. Dubai, the cosmopolitan hub of the United Arab Emirates, is 
now 90 percent foreign. The cities of the Gulf are busy with development. 
Suburbs sprawl into the desert, and the airports hum with international 
traffi c. Monumental architecture proliferates: the world’s tallest building 
44 City of Strangers
(Burj Dubai) now stands in the Emirates, and newly constructed luxury 
neighborhoods in the shape of palm trees (and visible from space) have 
emerged off the coast of Dubai. Bahrain, like its GCC neighbors, peri-
odically announces plans for astonishingly massive new developments and 
projects. Throughout the Gulf, gleaming new buildings appear with great 
frequency, and the sound of construction is a constant backdrop to life in 
the cities of the GCC nations.
All of the Gulf states possess signifi cant reserves of petroleum and hence 
signifi cant sources of wealth. On the coasts of Saudi are cities of iron that 
reach out to the sea. Refi neries dot the western shores of the Arabian Gulf, 
and for every stratotanker that rounds the Strait of Hormuz and passes 
into the open ocean, millions of dollars fl ow into the countries of the Gulf. 
Beginning with the discovery of oil beside Jebel al-Dukhan, the “mountain 
of smoke” south of Manama, and gaining momentum in the 1970s when 
the embargo quadrupled petroleum income overnight, the pace of change 
in the Gulf has shaped similar societies with similar results. The Sunni 
leadership of these nations invested heavily in the public sector. Although 
great portions of the private sector came to depend on human capital from 
abroad, the hallways of the expanding government bureaucracy became the 
bastion of the citizenry. This particular relation to the state, described at 
length in the penultimate chapter of this book, is a bond shared by the 
citizens of all the petroleum-rich nations of the GCC.
There is also a connection among Gulf Arabs—a bounded, mutual iden-
tity shared by those who dwell in the oil-rich nations of the Gulf, a com-
munal identity more localized than the often-noted bond of the umma, or 
Muslim world. The boundaries of that communality basically fi t al-khaleej, 
or the Gulf Arab states (Dresch 2005, 1). Beyond the domain of lineage 
shared by some members of the Gulf society, this affi liation is built on 
the parallel economies of the region. The citizenry of these Gulf nations 
have, together, undergone massive transformations in the past decades. 
The wealth derived from the oil reserves forged large public sectors: ed-
ucational opportunities were expanded, housing programs were created, 
health systems to serve all citizens were constructed. Although the diverse 
components of the Gulf states’ citizenry have benefi ted unequally from 
these developments, the large public sectors and the entitlements they pro-
vide are widely recognized as essential components of the ruling families’ 
ability to maintain their hegemony through the distribution of wealth via 
the conduits of the state (Champion 1999; Kapiszewski 2001, 5–9; Longva 
1997, 46–52). This set of relations—of tribal relations organized within the 
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bureaucracy of the state—is one facet of the shared experience of the citi-
zenry of the Gulf states.
The fl ow of foreign labor to the Gulf began during the British era, but 
the wealth produced by rising oil prices in the 1970s expedited moderniza-
tion plans, and in all the nations of the Gulf foreigners arrived in huge 
numbers to perform the myriad tasks of building “modern” nations. This 
large foreign workforce, then, is another aspect of the shared experience of 
the Gulf nations. Indigenousness and nationalism, the strange bedfellows 
of the contemporary Gulf, exist in dialectic with the highly transnational 
demographics of the region. In the urban milieu of the Gulf, citizens are 
often minorities in their own land. In Longva’s ethnography of citizen/
foreigner relations in contemporary Kuwait, one informant described his 
feelings as follows: “Imagine seeing strangers everywhere around you, in-
cluding in your own homes. We used to know all the Kuwaitis, and to trust 
each other. In the old days, when someone made a promise, you knew he 
would keep it. We are like a big family. Now, everyone is a stranger. You 
don’t know whom to trust anymore” (1997, 124–25). This feeling of a so-
ciety besieged by rapid, external change is another condition shared by all 
the petroleum-rich GCC nations, and the sense of belonging to the state 
incorporates ethnic, racial, religious, and tribal boundaries under the rubric 
of citizenship.
The similarities among Gulf nations are substantial, and the components 
I describe here are the basis for some mutuality in the identities purveyed by 
the inhabitants of the region. There are, however, many noteworthy differ-
ences. Perhaps most important, oil was discovered fi rst in Bahrain. Hence, 
the benefi ts of that wealth—including a variety of social programs, job 
opportunities within a large state bureaucracy, low-cost loans for houses, 
land grants, and much more—began to accrue in Bahrain fi rst. The fi rst 
schools in the Gulf region were created in Bahrain, and the citizenry has 
long prided itself on its position as a beacon of modernization in the Gulf. 
Its position in relation to the other Gulf states as the primary hub for British 
imperial activity and transnational corporations facilitated its position at the 
forefront of the region’s integration with the global political economy.
The island’s declining oil reserves (and hence its declining wealth) have 
in some ways undermined Bahrain’s role as pacesetter for modernization in 
the region. In Dubai to the south, taller buildings rise by the month, more 
wealth courses through the economy, and unlike Bahrain and the other 
smaller urban conglomerations of the Gulf littoral, Dubai has emerged as 
a true global city in the region.21 Yet Bahrain’s declining resources have 
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forced the nation to cope with the diffi cult task of economic diversifi cation, 
and in this sense the small island nation again sets the pace in the Gulf, for 
the Bahraini state today faces a set of conditions that all the nations of the 
GCC will sooner or later share. In terms of the policy environment forged 
during and after the British era, Bahrain again led the other Gulf nations 
in devising alternatives to petroleum dependency. These projects resulted 
in the refi nery, the aluminum industry, and other industrial production, as 
well as a booming fi nancial sector. More recently, Bahrain has instigated a 
set of labor reform policies that again place it at the forefront of change in 
the Gulf.
This attempt to turn away from direct dependence on petroleum, while 
not fully successful to date, depended heavily on the island’s experience as 
the hub for the quasi-colonial activity in the region. The British constructed 
an air force base on Muharraq, a naval base in Jufair (southeast of Manama), 
and an army base in Hamala (in western Bahrain), in addition to multiple 
other projects; the construction of Awali, an “American”-style compound 
on the island, only enhanced the island’s position as expatriate friendly. As 
Gulf-wide oil production increased, Bahrain emerged as a service center to 
the activities of the surrounding nations: the relative security and openness 
of Bahrain attracted a wide variety of fi nancial, administrative, and service 
offi ces to the island.22 In the parlance of al-khaleej, the Bahrainis are the 
“beggars of the Gulf, ” a sentiment that is often also commonly phrased as 
the “Indians of the Gulf. ” The lessons learned as both beggars and hand-
maidens to the British imperialists, however, proved essential to Bahrainis 
in developing their nation as the service and fi nancial hub to the more con-
servative surrounding nations (see Zahlan 1989, 83).
In the twenty-fi rst century, Bahrain retains its reputation as one of the 
most hospitable of the Gulf nations. The foreigners with whom I spoke—
many of whom had experience in the other nearby Arab countries— 
repeatedly said that Bahrain was the easiest adjustment for expatriates: 
you can wear shorts in public without fear of the mutaween (the religious 
police of Saudi Arabia), one man remarked; you can practice your religion 
at one of the handful of churches and temples discreetly tucked about the 
city, others stated. In general, my informants reported, the Bahrainis are 
particularly worldly and educated. Hindi music booms from the passing 
cars fi lled with Bahraini teenagers, observed a friend as we walked down a 
busy boulevard, and the audience of the Bollywood fi lms I attended was 
an even mix of Indians and Bahrainis. And, as other expatriates noted, 
you can get a drink at one of the many bars on the island.
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This liberalism is peculiar to Bahrain. On weekends, teenagers and fami-
lies from nearby countries stream into Bahrain over the causeway that con-
nects the island to the mainland. Bahrain is a weekend destination for those 
from more conservative environs: the hotel bars fi ll with European expatri-
ates, Indians and Filipinos, Saudi men, Bahrainis, and individuals from all 
the other regions of the globe who visit, live, or work in this transnational 
city-state. International corporations (many of which do business in Saudi 
Arabia) often choose to locate their regional headquarters in Bahrain. The 
island’s relative liberalism, wrought by its long transnational history and 
its intricate connection to Britain, is the primary attraction. Yet it is an un-
easy liberalism—both a lifeline to the nation’s economy and a target for the 
more conservative and disenfranchised elements of Bahraini society.
Transnational Bahrain
To the claim that Bahrain has a long history of hosting the processes 
now called transnationalism is the obvious response that much of this 
history preceded the existence of the nation-state. As in other regions of 
the globe, here nations were something quickly constructed and, in many 
senses, something foreign and imperial imposed on the more geographi-
cally fl uid tribal structure characteristic of the Arabian Peninsula. There are 
good arguments to this end: that the lines drawn by colonial powers were 
mostly a matter of convenience, part of the predilection of a bureaucratic 
empire that needed to organize the people and terrain it encountered, and 
to do so in a particular fashion before it could proceed to conquer and ex-
ploit. Or one could convolute the terms of the argument and instead take 
the ebb and fl ow of peoples and powers across Bahrain’s shores—from the 
Mesopotamian chapter lost to history, through the arrival of the Greeks, of 
Islam, of the Portuguese, of the Omanis, of the Ottomans, of the Persians, 
and of the maritime Arab tribes of the Gulf ’s western shores—as evidence 
enough that change, rather than stability, was the norm for islands between 
two seas. Instead, the arrival of the British, the legitimacy they conferred 
on the Khalifa family, and the continuity of those provisions suggest that 
it was the constancy of change that came to an end with Britain’s Treaty 
of Peace.
What has come to be called transnationalism in the contemporary lit-
erature casts one eye to the role of the nation-state and the corporations, 
economies, and cultural fl ows that transcend them. The other eye—and 
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this is the métier of the anthropologist—sifts through the contextual factors 
of these individuals whose lives are stretched between two or more states, 
and in this context I fi nd the basis for the argument presented in this chap-
ter: that the historic relations of production confi gured in the past provided 
a template for managing the dramatically large fl ows of foreign labor to the 
island. The shape of the Bahraini state, the expectations of the citizenry, 
and the experience of Indian foreign workers on the island today echo the 
island’s experience of British imperialism, the tribal legacy of its leadership, 
its role as a maritime mercantile hub, and the relations of production forged 
by the exploitation of the pearl beds surrounding the island.
The processes underlying the contemporary transnational movement of 
peoples around the globe are not new. For much of known history, Bahrain 
functioned as an important node in regional and Indian Ocean circuits. 
Although never a true empire, it was often an important jewel in others’ 
crowns. At particular junctures in history, Bahrain stood alone, or func-
tioned as a mercantile city-state for the seafarers of the Gulf. Throughout 
this history, the mix of peoples that composed the island’s population re-
fl ected the heterogeneity of these long-distance connections. In the chap-
ters that follow, I turn to the Indian diaspora—the largest of the foreign 
populations working on the island today. This Indian community, outsid-
ers to the tribal relations of the Arab leadership, is nonetheless one of the 
most historically important populations in the kingdom. Their lives on this 
island have been shaped by the complex history of interactions between 
foreigner and citizen—a history in which the agency of the Sunni leader-
ship, as well as the Shi’ite population, forged a particular set of relations 
with the global political economy of oil production, with the quasi-colonial 
administration long present on the island, and with the nearby nations of 
the Gulf.
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During the fi nal weeks of my time in Bahrain, I visited a labor 
camp in the distant reaches of outer Muharraq, beyond the airport and 
just a short walk from the waters of the Gulf. Here amid the dirt streets 
and walled compounds of the lower- and middle-class Bahrainis was a ma-
sonry tile factory. A group of thirty or forty transnational laborers, mostly 
Indian, lived and worked on the job site, where they prepared large fl at 
bricks for some of the myriad construction projects on the island. On our 
arrival, we knocked at the large metal gate and were quickly ushered in-
side, while the men furtively glanced up and down the street. As the inter-
view progressed, the men eventually described their problems with their 
Bahraini neighbors. Over the last two years, they said, they had curtailed 
their trips to the small “cold store” (island nomenclature for a convenience 
store) on the corner. The store itself was only a fi ve-minute walk from the 
compound, but over the previous months teenagers in the neighborhood 
had repeatedly attacked the men on their walk to the store, and more re-
cently they had begun to throw bricks and stones over the high wall of the 
workers’ compound. The men’s descriptions of these violent encounters 
resonated with descriptions from other camps, where men had described 
roving gangs of Bahrainis burgling their camps, stealing air conditioners 
and other valuables, and threatening them with violence. Indeed, everyday 
violence seemed characteristic of many of the men’s existence in Bahrain.
An article in the English-language newspaper, appearing some months 
later, reported a similar incident in great detail:
Fire damaged part of a labour camp, in Naim, after three Bahraini 
teenagers burst in and set fi re to the workers’ clothes. It was the third 
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time that they had raided the same building in one night. When 
the youths broke in the fi rst time they beat up one of the workers, 
who required hospital treatment for his injuries. They returned half- 
an-hour later and stole the labourers’ safety shoes. However, when 
they went back the third time they piled up the workers’ clothes, 
doused the pile in kerosene and set it on fi re. The labourers man-
aged to put out the blaze, but only after it had destroyed their air-
conditioner, refrigerator and carpets.
 “It all started when the Bahrainis barged in the labourers’ resi-
dence at 10 pm,” said Bangladeshi mechanic Mubarak Muslim Mia, 
27, who lives in the building. “They entered one of the rooms ex-
claiming that they are Bahrainis and have a right to be anywhere they 
want to be. One of the residents asked them what they wanted, barg-
ing in so late at night, but the Bahrainis shouted at him and beat him 
up really bad. We rushed him off to the hospital to get treatment for 
cuts in his hand.”
Almost 100 Indian and Bangladeshi workers live in the build-
ing. They work for various companies, but split the cost of the rent 
amongst themselves. However, they did not immediately report the 
matter to the police to avoid a confrontation with nearby residents. 
They even kept quiet when the teenagers came back 30 minutes later 
and stole their safety shoes. “Each shoe costs around BD7 or BD8—
this might not be much, but it is a fortune for people like us,” said 
Mr. Mia. “We did not want to go to the police right then because we 
thought that it would stop there. We did not want to get in trouble 
with the people from the neighborhood.”
However, half-an-hour later the culprits re-entered the building 
and took workers’ clothes out of a cupboard before soaking them 
with kerosene normally used for cooking. They then set the pile on 
fi re. “We fought to extinguish the fi re, but our clothes were fully 
charred,” said Mr. Mia. “The air-conditioner, refrigerator and carpets 
were all lost to the fl ames and we immediately went to the police.”
The incident happened last Tuesday, but the workers are still with-
out air-conditioning and a refrigerator while summer temperatures 
hit 40C. It is understood that three youths were arrested, but have 
since been released from custody. “We are poor people, it is not easy 
for us to gather enough money to buy new equipment,” said Mr. Mia. 
“The air conditioner costs BD120, fridge BD70 and our clothes al-
most the same amount. We are at the end of the month and are left 
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with no money at all. We do not know why these people treat us like 
this. We never harmed them, why would they harm us?”1
Why indeed? Why might teenage boys from the neighborhood harbor a 
grudge against the impoverished foreign workers who make the tiles that 
pave the sidewalks and courts of the modern city? And what circumstances 
conspire to allow three young men to fearlessly confront and abuse a group 
of nearly a hundred able-bodied laborers? And if these conditions are com-
mon to transnational laborers on the island, why does the fl ow of this labor 
to Gulf states continue unabated? At the outset of this book, I argued that 
the concept of structural violence provided a key analytic tool for under-
standing the lives of foreign workers in Bahrain. As that concept suggests, 
the idea of these Bahraini teenagers as individual agents of violence is merely 
a starting point for an expansive analysis of the social, cultural, political, 
and economic forces that are complicit in the production of this violence. 
In this chapter, I begin to examine the mechanics of the structural violence 
endured by the transnational proletariat. That violence, and its structural 
properties, can be conceived in terms of the forces, policies, arrangements, 
and ideas that together orchestrate the interactions between foreign work-
ers and citizens.
Describing that set of arrangements—a complex and multifaceted set of 
forces that are systemic in nature—poses some diffi culty. Somewhat arbi-
trarily, I begin with a critical analysis of illegality. I seek to demonstrate how 
deportation, and the threat of deportation, becomes a principal fulcrum in 
the systemic abuse and exploitation of foreign workers in Bahrain. Drawing 
heavily on the ethnographic data I collected from Indian members of this 
transnational proletariat, I pay close attention to the production of ille-
gality—in other words, how the arrangements and norms of this system 
produce illegal workers. In turn, my analysis of illegality and the threat of 
deportation becomes one component of a larger explication of the kafala, 
or the sponsorship system that plays an instrumental role in orchestrating 
the experiences of foreign labor on the island.
Illegality and Deportation in Bahrain
The study of illegality, deportation, and removal can be seen as part of 
the ongoing articulation of an anthropology attentive to transnational pro-
cesses. Transnationalism is a broad concept that incorporates analysis of 
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the movement of people, capital, and culture across the boundaries of the 
nation-state. For well over a century, the Western tradition portrayed the 
nation-state as a fundamental and intrinsic component of contemporary 
social organization. Transnational theorists, however, assume no absolute 
permanency or a priori status to the nation-state as an organizational form; 
rather, amid the contemporary era of global interconnection, these theo-
rists envision nation-states as engaged in an ongoing struggle to assert the 
predominance that was once assumed. States are seen as agents jostling for 
position amid the global fl ows of people, capital, and culture. Attention to 
illegality, deportation, and removal focuses the anthropological lens on the 
processes by which states seek to control the movement of people in par-
ticular. In the contemporary world, and by the logic of the nation-state, 
many people transgress the contemporary order—they are not where they 
belong. Illegality, deportation, and other forms of removal are tools the 
state uses to control and govern the transnational movement of people. 
The ethnographic examination of these processes provides new perspec-
tives on the changing power of the state and the lived experience of people 
on the move.
The portrait of an “illegal” worker one perceives through the public dis-
course in Bahrain is strikingly similar to that purveyed here in the United 
States: an individual somehow fi nds his or her way across a discrete border 
of the nation and fi nds employment in the country. In doing so, the person 
avoids visa fees, documentation, and, more generally, the purview of the 
state. In Bahrain, this portrait of the illegal worker meshes with the sectar-
ian imbalance of power on the island, for these workers are also portrayed 
as taking jobs from the underemployed Bahrainis, who are typically Shi’ite. 
This characterization confounds the government’s attempts to persuade or 
compel its citizens to enter the private-sector workforce (a set of policies 
and directives collectively referred to as Bahrainization). Moreover, as an 
individual outside the systemic controls of the kafala, an illegal laborer is 
also seen as a cultural threat, for he (or she) is outside the purview of the 
citizen-sponsor. Although the purported threat of the large foreign popula-
tion to the cultural integrity of the Bahraini nation is of much interest and 
debate on the island, the common portrayal of an “illegal” foreign worker 
that I have presented is largely a fi ction. In part, it represents a projection of 
European and American norms on the Gulf migration discourse. It also re-
fl ects the situation in neighboring Saudi Arabia, where an unknown num-
ber of individuals arrive on a hajj visa (for religious pilgrimage to Mecca) 
and stay illegally to work. Both of these explanations—sneaking across 
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the border or arriving under false pretenses—elide the circumstances that 
broadly produce illegal workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council states. 
For most transmigrant laborers in Bahrain, the path to illegality is a stra-
tegic response to the systemic abuse enabled, if not codifi ed, by the kafala. 
Furthermore, this path is largely contingent on the passivity of the state in 
enforcing existing labor laws.
All the illegal Indian laborers I encountered in Bahrain described an al-
most identical set of circumstances. This uniformity became apparent to 
me midway through my time on the island. With the help of a network 
of friends I had assembled in my fi rst months in Bahrain, I arranged an 
interview with a group of struggling Indian laborers, several of whom were 
illegal. We sat in their living quarters, an unfi nished cinder-block garage 
belonging to the men’s employer. The men lived six to a room. Rats scur-
ried across the rafters overhead, and a sick Indian laborer—now unable 
to work—coughed in the back bunk-room. One of the men described his 
path to illegality for me: “I came here as a mason, but the company that 
took my visa, they didn’t pay me. The other workers approached the Labor 
Department . . . and they [the workers] complained about the company, but 
by that point they hadn’t received any salary for fi ve months. Me and him 
[pointing to another man] didn’t wait that long—we left the company and 
found work here. The other workers never did get their money. Since we left 
early, we were illegal, and now we’re afraid to approach the Labor Ministry.” 
Several weeks later I journeyed to the back of the souk for another set of 
interviews. Behind the dense maze in the souk, crowds of South Asian men 
moved through the streets, in and out of doorways, and disappeared down 
the small alleys that lead to apartments out of view. The neighborhood, 
now largely abandoned by the Bahrainis, is widely known as an urban locus 
for illegal transmigrants. Santosh and I found our way to the apartment we 
sought, and there I heard another version of the same story:
I came to Bahrain as a welder in a car carriage repair shop. For four 
and a half months, I received no salary, so I fi led a case. Then I fi nally 
left the company. My case is now in the courts—I fi led a case against 
my sponsor. The case states that he did not pay me four and a half 
months’ salary. I fi led the case in the beginning of 1998, and there has 
been no progress [as of July 2003]. . . . As an illegal worker, I do have 
worries. I have a paper that I received from the court, and now I am 
afraid to go to the police about this paper. I don’t want to have to go 
to jail for being an illegal worker, and that is why I can’t go to the 
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courts anymore or ask the police for help. I will wait for amnesty. If 
amnesty came tomorrow, I would go.
Over the years, some of the standard companies would employ me 
regularly for some period of time. With those standard companies, 
there was no problem with the payment—they never withheld my 
salary. Some companies hired me for a week, some hired me for six 
months. Others hired me for two months. The standard companies 
hire for the longest period, and they pay regularly. Some of the other 
companies pay during the early stages, but then they stop. They pay 
for the fi rst four months or so, then for the last two months they stop. 
They cheat us. Of all twenty companies, only fi ve were good to the 
workers the entire time. The other fi fteen cheated me, cheated us.
Building on his long stay on the island, this transmigrant was able to put 
his most recent experiences in context. His description points directly to 
the process by which illegality is produced—most commonly, by a spon-
sor simply refusing to pay the wages contractually specifi ed, and the sub-
sequent departure of the transmigrant from the sole job at which he may 
legally work. His experience also suggests the systemic character of this 
abuse. Over and over again, this transmigrant faced the same dilemma: 
should he continue to work in the hopes of eventually receiving his wages 
from the sponsor, or should he depart the sole job at which he can legally 
work for employment in the black market? He now awaits an “amnesty,” 
one of the periods in which monetary penalties and jail time associated 
with illegality are temporarily suspended in the hopes that illegal workers 
will voluntarily return home.2 His experiences establish many of the central 
experiential points that recur throughout this chapter: the kafala locks indi-
viduals to a particular job and a particular sponsor—to the very person who 
profi ts from the transmigrant’s labor on the island. This aspect of the kafala 
is the cornerstone of the orchestration of the extremely unequal relations 
between foreigners and citizens, and hence a cornerstone in the mechanics 
of structural violence observable in Bahrain.
These vignettes focus on the relationship between foreign workers and 
their sponsor, or kafeel, in the creation of illegal workers. In terms of struc-
tural violence, the experiences of the workers reveal the systemic pressures 
in operation on the island—an interconnected set of factors that over-
determine the violence and abuse I identifi ed at the beginning of the chap-
ter. These men also speak to the ever-present fear and vulnerability caused 
by their illegal status, a lived experience of vulnerability connected to 
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the everyday surveillance of public spaces by citizen-sponsors (De Genova 
2002, 438; Willen 2007). The next narrative moves beyond the complex 
relationship between foreign worker and sponsor, and begins to look at the 
complicity of the state itself, the arrangement of labor, and other contextual 
factors that orchestrate the experiences of foreigners on the island.
I met Vijay near the end of my fi eldwork in Bahrain. Santosh, my friend 
and translator for many of my forays to the labor camps, had been assisting 
Vijay in working through his dilemmas with the Bahraini court system and 
the immigration offi ce, as well as with the other related problems described 
here. The three of us sat in a squalid, cramped room in a central neighbor-
hood that, over the previous decades, had been abandoned by the Bahrainis 
to the legion of foreign laborers who arrive daily to work on the island. My 
notes from the interview capture the central thread of Vijay’s experience 
abroad:
Vijay told me that he had been a tailor in Pondicherry, India. Actually, 
he was a master tailor, he clarifi ed—the supervisor of the showroom. 
It was a good job. But then some of his friends left for the Persian 
Gulf, for places like Dubai, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jeddah. Then some 
of them came back. They had lots of money. More than that, they 
were respected. People on the street, people at the teashop—they 
looked upon these return-migrants in a particular way. Vijay wanted 
that respect.
His friends suggested he call a labor broker in Madras, and he did. 
After some discussion, he agreed to pay 45,000 rupees—that’s about 
US$1,000—for a visa and a job at a garment factory. He was going to 
Bahrain. It was a two-year contract, and he’d earn 45 dinars a month 
(about $120). He noted that he didn’t really know what a dinar was 
worth when he made the deal, but the fi gure was close to what his 
friends had reported from their own experiences. He would be out 
of debt in a year [considering the size of the debt he had just incurred 
and the monthly wages promised by the contract he had just signed], 
and then he could start to make some real money.
Coming up with the 45,000 rupees wasn’t easy. He had a little bit 
saved. He borrowed some with interest from a moneylender. He got 
a little bit from his father. To make up for what was left, the family 
pawned his mother’s jewelry. Then he got on a plane—his fi rst ever.
He realized something was wrong right away. He arrived at the air-
port in Bahrain at two in the afternoon, but no one was there to pick 
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him up. So he just sat and waited. The airport was air-conditioned, 
and he was cold. He had no food and no money. Someone from the 
company fi nally came for him at midnight and took Vijay straight to 
the garment factory. The rest of the workers were just getting off their 
shift, so he rode to the camp with them. He had a cot in a small bed-
room. There were six other men in the room. They gathered around 
him and asked him why he came to Bahrain. They told him that the 
company was very bad, that they had to work until midnight, that the 
company didn’t always pay their wages, and that they certainly didn’t 
receive overtime pay.
He called his father, and his father told him to weather the diffi cul-
ties. It wasn’t a lifetime, said his father—just two years. He couldn’t 
understand a lot of what was going on around him, because he only 
spoke two South Indian languages. He tried to learn some Arabic and 
Hindi at night at the camp. He began to meet others in the camp, and 
he discovered the other men faced a similar set of dilemmas [in that 
they were trapped in these circumstances with a debt held by a labor 
broker in their home country]. When the plant manager would come 
around, they’d argue with him. The manager was also an Indian—a 
Gujarati, Vijay noted. None of the workers were allowed to talk di-
rectly to the Bahraini sponsor, and their arguments with the manager 
went nowhere.
So they decided to wait until they had paid off their debts. They 
worked long hours, well into the night, and they received no addi-
tional pay. A year went by, and most of the workers had paid off their 
visa-related debts. They began to slow down production on the fl oor. 
As a result, the Bahraini boss fi red the Indian manager. On the day 
he was dismissed, the manager gathered all the workers together and 
told them that if they went on strike they might be able to get their 
overtime money and back pay. They walked out at midnight the next 
day, pooled their money, and rented a bus. There were 180 of them. 
The group from the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh decided to back 
out. Then there were 110. The next morning they went to the Ministry 
of Labor and stood outside.3
A man fi nally came out and gave them a piece of paper. The writing 
was in Arabic, and none of the men could read it, but the man told 
them to bring it back to the company and they would get their salary 
and overtime. They showed it to the company man the next day, but 
he called the police. Although frightened by the arrival of the police, 
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the men were told that the offi cers only wanted to arrest the manager. 
The manager escaped by fl ying back to India the next day. The com-
pany gave the men their back salary, but not their overtime, and they 
worked for fi ve more months. Three weeks before the Ramadan holi-
days, the new manager told them that there wouldn’t be any holiday 
for them. He said they would have to work every day.
They struck again and went back to the Ministry of Labor. The 
Ministry offi cials were upset, and they made them return to the camp. 
The men waited at the camp for two days. Then the company closed 
the canteen. They had no food. The company turned off the electric-
ity, so they had no air-conditioning. Then the company turned off 
the water. A Ministry offi cial came on the fourth day, and he told the 
men that this was now a matter for the courts. Then a Bahraini lawyer 
came. She took 1,200 dinars from them—that’s $3,000, or 10 dinars 
from each man.
The men were only allowed to go to the court in small groups. 
The judge asked them if they wanted to go on with the case. If they 
did, they had to keep working for the company. If they dropped the 
case, they could get papers to fi nd another job. The company owner 
returned the passports to the men who dropped the case. Vijay de-
cided not to drop the case. The factory closed. He no longer had a 
source of income. He became an “illegal” worker. He has no ticket 
home, but he found a job installing air-conditioning ducts. It’s under 
the table, as we say in the United States. If he crosses paths with the 
police, however, he’ll have to go to jail and pay a fi ne of 10 dinars 
per month—that’s about US$25. He’s stuck. He heard rumors that a 
government-sponsored amnesty period might be granted next year. If 
he’s able to save enough money, he’ll buy a ticket home then.
With Vijay’s story, we have an abundance of detail that allows us to bet-
ter explicate the forces at work in the production of illegality in Bahrain. In 
addition to the fundamental fact that Vijay was exploited and underpaid, 
consider the multiple other issues with which he struggled: before his so-
journ in the Gulf, Vijay had no clear idea about the exchange rate; the debt 
he incurred for travel to the Gulf was borne by his family as a whole, and 
the pressure to stay in place came, in part, from his own family (“His father 
told him to weather the diffi culties”). Vijay was unable to communicate 
with many of the other workers in the camp, and he could not speak Arabic. 
He was unable to parse the documents and court orders, and unable to 
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understand the court proceedings. He had no direct access to his sponsor, 
and dissent was channeled through a foreign manager. The court system 
and police force did little to resolve the situation, and in the fi nal account-
ing the state was seemingly complicit in the making of his circumstances. 
By the end of the narrative, Vijay is an illegal worker. Although his relation-
ship with his sponsor was central to this condition, numerous other forces 
conspired to produce these circumstances.
Mapping the Structure of Violence
To recapitulate, the kafala is the Gulf-wide sponsorship system by which 
the large transnational populations at work in the Gulf states are organized, 
managed, and controlled. The kafala is the sponsorship system itself; kafeel 
is the Arabic singular noun for the individual sponsor with whom each 
arriving foreign worker is associated. To continue building my argument 
that the kafala itself is key to understanding the structural violence levied 
against foreign workers in Bahrain, I analyze three aspects of the kafala: 
its connection to the larger global political economy, the practical and in-
strumental underpinnings of the kafala itself, and the slippage between the 
kafala as a cultural practice and as a legal arrangement. I then describe four 
facets of this system of exploitation and control that surfaced repeatedly in 
my interviews with Indian men and women on the island: the transnational 
character of the contracts and debt incurred in their sojourn to the Gulf; 
the control of the foreign workers’ passports by the kafeel; the linguistic 
and cultural barriers that limit their strategic responses to the dilemmas 
they face; and the spatial aspects of this system of dominance. As a com-
prehensive system for controlling foreign workers on the island, the kafala 
clearly resembles what Bales (2004, 2005) has called “contract slavery.” 
I sketch the connections between the kafala and the new slavery that Bales 
has ably described.
First, in calling the systemic control levied against foreign workers in 
Bahrain a form of structural violence, I point to the global political/eco-
nomic forces and, more specifi cally, the poverty, economic marginalization, 
and environmental degradation that push men and women from India to 
the Gulf. The stories from my ethnographic data—of farmland drying up, 
of the inability of poor Indian families to pay for the education or marriage 
of sons and daughters—constitute one piece of the puzzle posed by calling 
this control a form of structural violence. Furthermore, in seeking a remedy 
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through employment abroad, Indian laborers and their families typically 
pay thousands of dollars for the right to work in the Gulf; the fi rst two or 
three years of labor are often devoted simply to paying back the debts they 
and their families incurred. Although signifi cant portions of these payments 
move across the transnational divide to the kafeel, or sponsor, the debt 
itself remains in India and, typically, with the transmigrant’s family. The 
transnational character of this debt becomes a fulcrum for abuse: a labor 
strike or individual resistance to the conditions of employment in Bahrain 
puts distant Indian families and key productive resources at great risk.
Second, I point to a variety of practical and instrumental aspects that en-
able this structural violence against foreign workers. The vast majority of the 
transnational manual laborers I spoke with had yielded their passports to 
their sponsor upon arrival. Hence their ability to physically leave the island 
as one potential response to violence and exploitation is controlled by the 
kafeel, who is, at the same time, the individual or entity positioned to profi t 
from the workers’ presence. Moreover, under the terms of recent edicts, 
only sponsors or their citizen-proxies can deal with the critical paperwork 
at the variety of government offi ces that contribute to the management 
and regulation of the large foreign populations. And although English is 
the language of the booming private sector on the island, all government 
agencies, including the court system, operate in Arabic. Combined with the 
fact that most laborers reside in labor camps located in the distant urban 
periphery and thus are far from the government offi ces and embassies to 
which they might appeal in times of diffi culty, Indian transmigrants are 
systematically handicapped from challenging the dilemmas and problems 
they encounter in Bahrain.
Finally, the kafala is a system only partly codifi ed in law. As the anthro-
pologist Ahn Longva has observed, in the Gulf nations the kafala emerged 
in the twentieth century as an outgrowth of a cultural practice used to or-
ganize labor on the pearling dhows that plied the waters of the Persian 
Gulf (1997, 106 – 7). Enmeshed in this notion of the kafala as a cultural 
practice, citizens often balance the systemic abuse levied against foreign 
workers with notions of the kafeel’s responsibility for potential moral and 
cultural transgressions that the sponsored foreigner might commit, a no-
tion that posits foreign workers as a polluting presence (Peutz 2006, 223, 
231; Douglas 2002). These vague interconnections also suggest links among 
deportation, illegality, and the welfare state, for citizens are not just protect-
ing their cultural traditions, or even a certain set of political rights (Isin 
2002)—they are also protecting a citizenship that confers an abundance of 
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material benefi ts (Walters 2002, 279). Although the underlying moral dis-
course is frequently cited by citizen-sponsors as a balancing factor in their 
relationships with foreigners, I echo Longva in remarking that I know of 
no cases that demonstrate detrimental results to sponsors for the cultural or 
moral infractions of sponsored foreign workers.
Power and Transnational Debt
The foundations for the imbalance of power between citizen-sponsor 
and foreign worker in the Gulf are constructed well before the worker 
sets foot in Arabia. Over the last twenty to thirty years, the work visa that 
allows the foreigner to work in the petroleum-rich nations of the Arabian 
Peninsula has evolved from a minor aspect of the bureaucratic system—
what one of my informants called a “mere formality” upon his arrival in 
the 1970s—to a valued commodity on the global market.4 Whereas the 
men and women who arrived before the 1980s reported paying little or 
nothing for these visas, the men I interviewed in 2002 and 2003 often 
had paid well over $2,000 for the right to come to Bahrain and work. 
Furthermore, the dramatic rise in the market price of these visas coin-
cided with a steady decline in the monthly wages paid to foreign unskilled 
laborers. Near the end of my time on the island, I began to encounter 
new arrivals at the labor camps who had paid thousands of dollars for 
a two-year work visa permitting them to work for BD30–40 a month 
(approximately $100)—well below the BD60–90 considered standard for 
manual laborers upon my arrival in 2002. Excluding calculations for the 
interest charged by moneylenders, and even minimizing expenditures on 
food, phone calls home, and other incidentals, these men cannot turn a 
profi t until the end of their second year abroad. The risk, of course, is that 
the contract will not be honored—or that the laborers will not be paid at 
all. The sliver of potential profi t that rests in the back end of these calcula-
tions depends on the goodwill and honor of the kafeel.
In gauging the structural forces that shape and condition the foreign 
worker’s experience in the Gulf states, my interests are twofold. First, the 
sums of money needed to acquire these work visas are large. Vijay, for ex-
ample, described a combination of sources for the sum he paid: he drew 
on his personal savings and borrowed some from moneylenders. His 
family, and more specifi cally his mother, pawned her gold jewelry, and 
Vijay borrowed the remainder from family and friends. Another young 
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laborer described his situation: “My father is very old, and he can no 
longer work. My older brother is very lazy, and he’s not working either. 
He’s not smart, and he’s not taking care with his life. He only earns 1,500 
rupees [about $34] a month. . . . My family had some paddy land, but to 
come here we had to sell the land. There wasn’t enough water in the well 
anyway, and the harvests were smaller and smaller each year. So that’s 
why we decided to sell the land, and that’s why I came here.”
Nearly all members of the transnational proletariat described similar 
scenarios, sometimes with additional facets. Households may decide, for 
strategic fi nancial reasons, to end one child’s education so that he or she can 
enter the workforce and help with the burden of debt incurred by anoth-
er’s trip to the Gulf. Farmland and other productive resources are put up 
as collateral for the loans described by these laborers. The overall portrait 
emerging from my interviews suggests that the individual laborer is deeply 
enmeshed in a complex web of household relations and dependencies: he 
arrives in Bahrain as an emissary of a household-level strategy that places 
the well-being of the extended family before the transmigrant’s individual 
interests.5 In essence, most of the men I encountered clearly articulated that 
the fate of an extended family hangs in the balance. Together, these typical 
aspects of Gulf migration forge unequal relations between foreign workers 
and their sponsors, for in their actions foreign workers risk not only their 
own lives, well-being, and future, but also those of their families in India.
Second, not only is the balance of power between foreign worker and 
kafeel tipped by the simple fact that the laborer enters the relationship with 
a large and family-held debt; it is also tipped by the transnational character 
of that debt. The details of the system for moving both money and people 
east to the Gulf states have been well described by other scholars (Gamburd 
2000; Fuglerud 1999; Kurien 2002). The $2,000 or $3,000 paid for the 
right to work in the Gulf is, most commonly, paid to a labor broker or agent 
in the sending country. That agent is entitled to some portion of the funds, 
but the bulk makes its way across the transnational divide to the citizen-
sponsor. The citizen-sponsor pays the various fees to regularize the work 
visa, typically approximating $800 at the time this research was conducted. 
Although the money has, for the most part, moved to the Gulf, the debt 
itself remains in South Asia. Should a problem arise between the kafeel and 
foreign worker, that money remains off the bargaining table: productive 
land and familial savings remain at risk, and the laborer is thousands of 
miles away from the agent with whom he or she originally negotiated the 
contract to work in the Gulf.
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The basic premises of the relationship help explain why the threat of 
removal is so effective. For Vijay and the other men who described their 
experiences to me, returning home is more than a poor solution to their 
problems: it is potentially a cataclysmic fi nancial event. They return home 
to families stripped of key productive resources and burdened by the ad-
ditional debt incurred in sending them to the Gulf in the fi rst place. These 
forces compel the foreign worker to stay in place, to endure the suffering at 
the hands of exploitative and abusive sponsors, or to fl ee those scenarios in 
search of work as an illegal laborer.
Control of the Passport
Although the debt accrued in exchange for the right to work abroad 
builds the unequal basis for the relationship between foreign laborers and 
their citizen-sponsors, the widespread practice of confi scating a foreign 
worker’s passport also plays a predominant role in shaping the outcome of 
many confl icts. Bahraini law explicitly forbids confi scating foreign work-
ers’ passports, yet the practice is common: all except one of the laborers I 
encountered had relinquished their passports to their sponsors upon ar-
rival. And, as Vijay’s narrative makes clear, this illegal practice is indirectly 
supported by the state. Consider again this portion of Vijay’s story: “The 
men were only allowed to go to the court in small groups. The judge asked 
them if they wanted to go on with the case. If they did, they had to keep 
working for the company. If they dropped the case, they could get papers 
to fi nd another job. The company owner returned the passports to the men 
that dropped the case.”
In the most practical sense, the sponsor’s possession of the passport pre-
vents the laborer from departing the island: no matter how diffi cult the 
working conditions, and no matter how focused the abuse, the laborer is 
beholden to his or her original sponsor. Although the practice of a sponsor 
retaining a worker’s passport is expressly forbidden by law, in Vijay’s case 
the court ordered that the men who dropped the case against the citizen-
sponsor would have their passports returned. Such an order is evidence, if 
not of the state’s complicity in establishing the parameters of this structural 
violence, then at least of what Heyman and Smart describe as “some variety 
of symbiosis” between the state and illegal practices (1999, 1), for the court 
seemed content to allow the sponsor to retain the passports of those men 
who would not drop the case.
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More than merely a mechanism for preventing labor from fl eeing, control 
of the foreign worker’s passport becomes a key mechanism for deriving ad-
ditional profi t from the transnational proletariat. In times of diffi culty or in 
legal imbroglios, foreign workers are often forced to buy back their passports 
from their original sponsors. As an example, for several weeks I attended the 
meetings of the Ecumenical Council of Charity, one of the many diasporic 
voluntary associations that informally assist foreign workers in crisis. In 
January 2003 the group made contact with a Sri Lankan domestic worker, 
recently diagnosed with breast cancer, who was languishing in the hospital. 
The woman hoped to return to Sri Lanka for treatment, but her kafeel re-
fused to release her passport until she paid him BD300 ($800). Members of 
the charity group spent ten minutes considering how much money the group 
would donate to this end. These sorts of scenarios recur in the interviews I 
conducted on the island, and although some workers, like Vijay, bring their 
cases before the court, most transmigrants end up relying on their savings, 
personal networks, and the charity of these informal organizations to pay off 
sponsors and regain their passports in time of distress. More commonly—
and as was the case with Vijay’s compatriots—foreign workers receive their 
passports only after forfeiting any claims against their original sponsor.
Linguistic and Cultural Barriers
Linguistic and cultural barriers are another set of limits to the agency 
of foreign workers and hence structure inequities in the workers’ relations 
with sponsors. Consider Vijay’s description of the many nights he spent 
trying to learn Arabic and Hindi as part of his attempt to increase his abil-
ity to understand and interrogate the system in which he was enmeshed. 
Although large transmigrant workforces may be made up entirely of South 
Asians, that is no guarantee that the laborers can speak with one another. 
Bahrain and the other Gulf states draw heavily from South Indian states 
where Hindi is not widely spoken. As one construction manager noted, 
most companies are careful to draw labor from a variety of different regions, 
for these linguistic, national, cultural, and ethnic differences help build a 
more fragmented and docile workforce—a workforce with less ability to 
organize and strike. For example, in the labor strike described by Vijay the 
entire contingent of laborers from the state of Andhra Pradesh broke from 
the strike. That these men constituted a discrete linguistic group within the 
camp played an instrumental role in their decision to abandon the strike.
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The relative powerlessness of the transmigrant laborer is further rein-
forced by the policies and procedures that situate the sponsor as “mediator 
between the state and individual migrant” (Longva 1997, 103). As Vijay de-
scribed, transmigrants often lack direct access to their offi cial sponsor and 
must instead deal with proxies—often other expatriate laborers in mana-
gerial positions—in contesting their working conditions, pay, and hours. 
The power of the sponsor is buttressed by the inability of Indian laborers 
to directly interface with the state and its multiple bureaucracies: renewing 
a visa or switching sponsors requires the intervention and approval of the 
kafeel. Beyond the fact that most of these government ministries operate in 
Arabic, my informants remarked that by policy many of the immigration 
bureaucracies in the government now only serve Bahrainis, and that expa-
triates can no longer bring issues directly to the various ministries but must 
instead rely on citizen-intermediaries.6 As one laborer described, “Twice 
over my ten years here my sponsor got 550 dinars [$1,460] from me for 
visa renewal. Both times he didn’t even regularize my visa. So I paid 1,300 
dinars [$3,450] to come to Bahrain, I paid 1,100 dinars [$2,920] and then 
450 dinars [$1,195] recently. So that’s . . . 2,950 dinars . . . nearly 3,000 dinars 
[$7,960] for six years. Did I even earn this much? I don’t know!”
Upon arrival in Bahrain, the transnational laborer enters a linguistic and 
cultural context in which his capacity as an agent is severely constrained. As 
Vijay described, many of these laborers have diffi culty even speaking with 
their own countrymen. While Malayalam, Hindi, or English may serve them 
in the public spaces of the country, it is Arabic that predominates in the hall-
ways and offi ces of the state bureaucracy, a fact that further fetters their ability 
to address the dilemmas and hurdles they face on the island. Furthermore, 
a set of entrenched policies and practices channel power to the kafeel: he is 
the foreign worker’s offi cial representative to the state and also the person 
who profi ts from his labor. Together, these arrangements and practices com-
prise another facet of the structural violence foreign workers encounter in 
Bahrain: by constraining their ability to assert their rights, to take collective 
action, or to put their case before the state, these policies and practices enable 
the violence these workers endure in their everyday lives.
Geographies and Temporalities of Dominance
In the course of conducting ethnographic interviews with members of 
the Indian transnational proletariat, I focused on their explanations of the 
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dilemmas and tribulations they faced in the crucible of the kafala. Much 
of the information they conveyed to me concerned the conditions of their 
workplace, the economics of their sojourn in the Gulf, and the strategies 
they confi gured to cope with problems and challenges. In the interstices of 
these migration narratives, however, I began to realize how their physical 
location in the city, as well as the tight management of their time, played a 
signifi cant role in curtailing their strategic responses to the systemic pres-
sures they faced.
Daily life in the labor camps begins at an early hour. Men typically rise 
at four or fi ve in the morning to prepare food for the day. Their “duty,” as 
it is commonly called, typically begins at 6:00 a.m., and they work until 
noon with a short break somewhere in that period. During the half-hour 
break at noon, many eat the lunch they have prepared for themselves; those 
without kitchen facilities at their camp (or those who don’t prepare their 
own lunch) purchase meals from the “chiapati cars” that make the rounds 
of the larger work sites during the lunch hour. After their short lunch 
break, the men continue working until 4:30 or 5:00 in the afternoon, at 
which time they are transported back to the camp. In the congested streets 
of urban Manama, transportation to and from the work site can occupy 
thirty minutes or more. Arriving back at camp around 6:00 in the evening, 
the men cook, eat, wash, and relax. They are often asleep by 10:00 p.m. 
Figure 3.1. Men preparing to depart camp for their work site. Photograph by Andrew 
Gardner.
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Although these “normal” schedules typify the days of countless laborers on 
the island, many work different hours, and many others work even longer 
hours, as Vijay noted regarding his own experience in the garment factory.
The laborers work six days a week on such schedules. Friday, the second 
day of the weekend in Bahrain during my time there, is usually the men’s 
day off.7 Many of the laborers I spoke with had the entire day off; oth-
ers worked a portion of that day, sometimes for overtime pay, sometimes 
as part of their regular duties. For those laborers who had some portion 
of the day free, hours were spent preparing for the coming week, washing 
clothing, writing letters and recording cassettes for loved ones in India, 
and watching VCR or DVD recordings of Indian movies. Others would 
journey to the souk, the central market area, where on Fridays the streets 
fi ll with laborers from around the globe. An afternoon in the souk provides 
a chance to visit friends and relatives, to share a leisurely stroll with co-
workers, and to purchase inexpensive necessities from the many shops in 
the central district.
The majority of the camps I visited were far from the center of the city. 
Typically they were located in light industrial districts with few services, 
such as grocery stores, Internet cafes, hardware stores, and restaurants. 
These camps were poorly served by public transportation, making life all 
the more diffi cult for laborers. Some workers were unable to make the 
long journey to town on their day off, and many others curtailed their 
movements around the neighborhoods outside their compounds for fear 
of confl ict with the predominantly Shi’ite populations that share these less 
desirable locations in the city. Their geographical isolation on the periphery 
of the city and the culture of fear that characterizes their presence in many 
of these neighborhoods constrained their ability to take their dilemmas 
to the Indian embassy, government offi ces, medical facilities, or the social 
clubs and other diasporic institutions that provide some modicum of assis-
tance to foreign workers in crisis. Like domestic workers—many of whom 
are literally locked inside for much of their stay in Bahrain—members of 
the Indian transnational proletariat have little contact with the world out-
side their labor camp and workplace.8
As the daily schedule of the typical worker suggests, time also constrains 
transmigrant laborers. Work occupies most of the day, and what free time 
the laborer has typically occurs in the evening or the weekend—hours when 
all government agencies and many other services are closed. Together, then, 
these spatial and temporal factors prevent communication among foreign 
workers, mitigate their ability to cope with confl icts with sponsors, and 
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generally limit the strategies they bring to bear against the diffi cult circum-
stances of laboring in the Gulf. In that sense, these factors actively contrib-
ute to the framework of the structural violence encountered by the laboring 
class of foreign workers on the island.
Labor Contracts, Structural Violence, and New Slavery
Kevin Bales argues that in the modern world, labor contracts often mask 
contemporary forms of slavery: “Contracts are offered that guarantee em-
ployment, perhaps in a workshop or factory, but when the workers are 
taken to their place of work they fi nd themselves enslaved. The contract is 
used as an enticement to trick an individual into slavery, as well as a way 
Figure 3.2. South Asian laborers at work. Photograph by Andrew Gardner.
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of making the slavery look legitimate” (2004, 20). This contract slavery, he 
argues, is one facet of a “new slavery,” a contemporary form of slavery in 
which legal ownership is avoided, purchase costs are low, profi ts are high, 
there is a glut of potential slaves, the relationship between owner and slave 
is typically short, the slaves are disposable, and ethnic differences are less 
important than in traditional slavery (15). To some degree or another, all 
these descriptors resonate with the experiences of the transnational pro-
letariat in the Gulf. Bales’s defi nition of slavery hinges on control: “it is 
not about owning people in the traditional sense of old slavery, but about 
controlling them completely” (4).
Like Bales’s explication of new slavery, the relationship between Bahraini 
citizens and the foreign workers they sponsor is about control. Thinking 
about this control in structural terms—and in terms of structural violence—
has pushed me to increase my scope of inquiry: What are the arrangements, 
both local and transnational, that foster these forms of dominance? On 
what aspects of the complex arrangements of transmigration to the Gulf 
is this dominance contingent? Unpacking the complexities of control has 
been my principal task here, but that task should not eclipse the fact that 
this structure of dominance, and the violence it encourages, has a purpose. 
That purpose is, of course, profi t. When a poor Indian family mortgages 
its productive assets, pulls children from school, and pawns the mother’s 
jewelry to come up with the thousands of dollars it takes to send a son to 
the Gulf, only to have him face month after month of no pay and, fi nally, 
be relegated to scrounging for illegal work, it may seem a tragic story for 
that family. When viewed systemically, however, this scenario suggests that 
we move beyond simply thinking about what services these transmigrants 
supply to citizens, as De Genova suggests (2002, 422). Rather, we can see 
the outline of what William Walters calls a “deportation industry” (2002, 
266). Walters uses this concept to suggest that deportation, viewed holis-
tically, is a “system that implicates all manner of agents—not just police 
and immigration offi cials, but airline executives, pilots, stewards, and other 
passengers” (266). In Bahrain, and through the mechanism of the kafala, 
the list of agents must also include the multitude of individual citizen-
sponsors on the island, all of whom operate under the tragic logic of the 
kafala: although there is profi t for sponsors who do regularly pay their for-
eign workers (after all, they are capturing the surplus labor of these trans-
migrants), there is even more profi t for those sponsors who fail to pay the 
men and women they bring to Bahrain. Looking at certain strata of the 
foreign laboring population, one can perceive this system as a vast transfer 
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of wealth—one whereby thousands of families in South Asia are separated 
from what little wealth they have accrued, through equity or debt. That 
wealth is then transferred to the labor brokers, sponsors, and the state, 
who, in tandem, perpetuate and maintain the deportability of the laborers 
they bring to the island.9
Removal and Deportation in the Gulf Transmigrant Experience
With no path to assimilation, the Indian transnational proletariat in 
Bahrain is the largest component of a foreign workforce confi gured and 
controlled to buoy Bahrain’s place in the booming transnational economy 
of the contemporary Gulf. As a system, the kafala has emerged as a fulcrum 
of abuse to which racial, cultural, gender, and religious bigotry cling. By 
vesting power in individual citizens through the kafala, the Bahraini state 
enables these vectors of abuse. Currently a variety of informal church orga-
nizations, voluntary associations, and other informal institutions function 
as the primary means by which the foreign communities address this abuse: 
informal and ephemeral diasporic institutions pay for the plane tickets to 
send the bodies of deceased workers home, to help individuals make pay-
offs to sponsors for releasing them to return to India, and to help publicize 
the most dramatic confrontations between sponsors and foreign workers. 
Plans are under way to dismantle certain aspects of the sponsorship system. 
These proposed plans face signifi cant resistance, despite the fact that they 
are an incremental change at best.
What can we conclude about the role of deportation in the lives of 
these Indian transmigrants? It is certainly true that Bahrain and its Gulf 
Cooperation Council neighbors are atypical migratory waypoints, particu-
larly when compared with the European and North American migratory 
conduits that predominate in the literature on transnationalism and mi-
gration. The patterns that characterize transmigrants’ experiences in the 
Gulf, signifi cantly different from those of immigrants to North America 
and western Europe, reinforce De Genova’s emphatic call for research that 
avoids any claims of an overarching, generic immigrant experience (De 
Genova 2002, 424). Nonetheless, as Peutz (2006) and De Genova (2002) 
suggest, removal, deportation, and the threat of deportation remain inte-
gral aspects in the Gulf migrant’s experience abroad. Viewing the many 
facets of the transmigrants’ experiences through the lens of structural 
violence, however, demonstrates, in theoretical terms, the importance of 
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contextualizing removal, deportation, and the threat of deportation in the 
larger arena of power relations that shape the migrant and transmigrant 
experience. Removal, deportation, and the threat of deportation provide 
a fi ne starting point for an analysis of the complex and interrelated fac-
tors that produce vulnerability among the Indian laboring community in 
Bahrain, but together they represent but one facet in a complex structure of 
dominance that shapes the experiences and systematizes the exploitation of 
foreign workers in the Gulf.
What is unique in the case of the Gulf is the distribution of the power 
in the machinery confi gured to manage Gulf migration. Although the state 
certainly plays a central role, the kafala nonetheless distributes much of the 
power traditionally seen as belonging to the state and its various appara-
tuses to individual citizens, to what Walters calls “private authorities” (2002, 
268). The production of illegality, the threat of deportation, and the act of 
removal are powers and processes generated in the relations between indi-
vidual sponsors and the foreign workers they bring to the island, processes 
disembedded from the “contemporary administrative practice of Western 
states” (Walters 2002, 266). It is this arrangement, vesting citizens with the 
power and responsibility to manage and control the foreign population, 
that encourages the sort of violence I describe throughout this book.
As should be clear, these cases of violence are far from anecdotal, and 
although the discursive scope of the international human rights movement 
has certainly reached the shores of Bahrain, the power of the foreign worker 
to secure basic human rights is, ironically, decreasing. Sadly, throughout the 
Gulf, the violence and abuse I describe have become increasingly normal-
ized and in many ways exacerbated by the recent global economic down-
turn. As Nancy Scheper-Hughes argues, this normalization is a key aspect 
of structural violence (2004, 14). Her attention, and that of other schol-
ars interested in identifying and describing structural violence, frequently 
draws on the discursive terrain that produces this normalization—on the 
ideas and beliefs that guide, permit, and condone individual acts of vio-
lence (Scheper-Hughes 2004; Holmes 2007). These issues are dealt with 
at length in the later chapters of this book. Here I focused primarily on 
the machinery of inequality—on the arrangement of relations between citi-
zen and foreigner that produces these beliefs and ideas, and produces the 
violence I have described. These arrangements are essential to understand-
ing the lived experience of the hundreds of thousands of men and women 
who depart for the Gulf in search of a better life for themselves and their 
families.
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While the previous chapter described the lifeworlds of the poorest 
segments of the Indian community, this chapter explores the experiences of 
the Indian elite in Bahrain. The size of this segment of the diasporic commu-
nity is diffi cult to gauge, but my estimates suggest approximately 30,000 indi-
viduals.1 As merchants, accountants, bankers, doctors, advertising executives, 
and other well-paid professionals—accompanied to Bahrain by their spouses 
and children—these men and women work in the skyscrapers their impover-
ished countrymen have built. As one might expect, members of this diasporic 
elite lead lives signifi cantly different in character from those of the Indian trans-
national proletariat. Yet is the Indian diasporic elite subject to the same struc-
tural violence that characterizes the experience of the transnational proletariat 
in Bahrain, or do the signifi cant resources they bring to bear (in terms of social, 
cultural, and economic capital) mitigate their vulnerability to this structural 
violence? Albeit with certain caveats, the ethnographic data I collected suggest 
that the diasporic elite do fi nd themselves enmeshed in webs of dominance 
that appear strikingly similar to those of their impoverished countrymen and 
countrywomen on the island. I conclude the chapter with a description of the 
strategic transnationalism that makes up the diasporic elite’s principal response 
to the vulnerabilities they face during their sojourn on the island.
Transnational Theory and the Gulf States
In constructing a theoretical lens through which the social sciences 
might begin to unpack the complex social fi elds wrought by the increasing 
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mobility of labor, social scientists have focused almost to exclusion on 
transmigrant populations spread across particular geographical polarities. 
Like the Indian laborers described in the previous chapter—most of whom, 
even while abroad, remain fi xed on their home communities in India—the 
case studies that inform transnational theory typically examine lives spread 
across two nations. In their seminal collection, Basch, Glick, and Szanton 
Blanc (1994), for example, look at the institutions constructed by vari-
ous groups of Caribbean and Filipino transmigrants in the United States, 
mostly within the greater New York City area; Smith and Guarnizo’s collec-
tion (1998), while geographically diverse, nonetheless relies almost exclu-
sively on case studies of populations with a transmigratory endpoint in the 
United States; Goldring (1998) examines the social fi elds that encompass 
Las Animas, Mexico, and the transmigrant community in the Bay Area; 
Smith (1998) describes the formidable conduits between Ticuani, Mexico, 
and the burgeoning Ticuanense community in Brooklyn, New York; and 
Matthei and Smith (1998) chart the transfer of Los Angeles gang structures 
through the transnational conduits binding south central Los Angeles to the 
Garifuna communities of the Belizean coast. Ongoing contributions to this 
empirical foundation, most of which are focused on these south-to-north 
conduits, arrive in ever-greater numbers. From this springboard, social sci-
entists have hypothesized processes that strain or erode the foundations of 
the nation-state (Appadurai 1996; Kearney 1991; Hobsbawm 1990, 182–83; 
Ong 1999, 214), explored the social fi elds that cross national boundaries 
(Basch, Glick, and Szanton Blanc 1994; Goldring 1998), delineated a “cul-
tural bifocality” endemic to contemporary transmigrants (Rouse 1992, 41), 
and periodically assessed the viability of anthropology’s territorialized no-
tion of culture (Hannerz 1996, 19 –22; King 1991, 6).
In ascertaining how the case presented here fi ts within this larger lit-
erature on the transnational movement of people through the circuits of 
global capitalism, one can certainly delineate parallels between the case 
of the Indian transnational proletariat in Bahrain and the case studies un-
derpinning much of the theoretical production of transnational theory. 
Yet in the previous chapter I described a structure of dominance rooted 
in the state and manifest in the habitus confi guring everyday interactions 
between transmigrants and citizens. As a system, this structure binds and 
constrains transmigrant agency in particular ways: this transnational pro-
letariat’s movement back and forth across the Indian Ocean, for example, 
is fettered by the systemic controls exerted by a sponsorship system that 
ties transmigrants to an individual sponsor; their ability to move about the 
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island and to meet, organize, and communicate with other transmigrants is 
strictly monitored and controlled; their status on the island holds no prom-
ise of permanency or assimilation; and their inability to engage the Bahraini 
legal system hampers recourse in the many dilemmas they encounter. An 
accounting of these differences points to a principal pattern in the trans-
national literature: although most of the case studies fi t the polar model 
of home and away, most also focus on migration from the global south 
to the global north, and therefore to particular types of states—wealthy, 
democratic, and nominally open societies, some of which (like the United 
States) have articulated an identity ostensibly based on the assimilation and 
incorporation of difference.
What about populations migrating to other sorts of destinations? A 
handful of ethnographers have begun to explore the transmigration experi-
ences of those moving outside the Western conduits that predominate in 
the literature. Leichtman, for example, presents the case of the Lebanese 
diaspora in Senegal, arguing that the transnational canon fails to appro-
priately gauge the “important role colonialism has played in infl uencing 
transnational processes in other parts of the world,” an infl uence she de-
scribes as shaping the destinations of transmigrants, promoting particular 
economic hierarchies, encouraging racism, and offering or withdrawing 
the protections implicit in citizenship (2005, 666, 681).2 Aihwa Ong, in 
her well-known work (1999), describes the fl exible positions negotiated by 
cosmopolitan individuals tethered to multiple locations around the Pacifi c 
Rim, including (but not limited to) endpoints in North America. More 
specifi c to transnationalism on the Arabian Peninsula, Anh Longva (2000, 
2005) argues that the large transnational populations in the Gulf states have 
played an integral role in forging the fundamental structure and logic of 
the state, a logic she sees as ethnocratic in nature. Gamburd’s ethnogra-
phy (2000) of Sri Lankan domestic workers and their time in the Gulf 
details the panoptic control exerted by host families over the women they 
hire, as well as the fl eeting and contingent avenues by which these women 
exert agency. As ethnographers have begun to examine transnational popu-
lations moving outside the global north, analysis has charted alternative 
forms of the state, other regimes of repression and control, and new con-
fi gurations of dominance over the trans-status subjects moving between 
nations. These works suggest that the ability of men and women to forge 
transnational lives can, under particular confi gurations of state and culture, 
be signifi cantly more constrained than the models emanating from analyses 
of transnational fl ows with an endpoint in the global north. In this sense, 
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then, the case study presented here is meant to join those looking at trans-
national movement outside the West (Leichtman 2005; Willen 2007; Ong 
1999; Sarker and De 2002), and following Ong (1999, 214–15), to further 
illuminate the processes by which governance is extended over the mobility 
endemic to transnational populations in the contemporary milieu.3
Although this chapter is meant to complement the literature concerned 
with transmigration to endpoints outside the global north, I also use the 
data I collected to address the fundamental geographical polarity underly-
ing much of transnational theory. Unlike the transmigrants portrayed in the 
vast majority of the literature, and unlike the Indian laborers described at 
the outset of this chapter, the Indian diasporic elite in Bahrain are, gener-
ally speaking, not caught between two places: their struggle has little to do 
with the dilemmas of maintaining a social fi eld spanning Bahrain and India. 
Rather, members of the Indian diasporic elite build and maintain social 
fi elds that are rhizomic, stretching from Bahrain back to India, certainly, 
but also reaching to numerous other points around the globe. Although 
this model bears some resemblance to Ong’s notion of fl exible citizen-
ship, it is the “citizenship” portion of that concept that becomes particu-
larly problematic in the Gulf states, for members of the Indian diaspora in 
Bahrain rarely fi nd sanctuary in Bahraini citizenship. Rather, they maintain 
social relations and an identity that are, at best, moored in the Gulf states.
The Lure of the Gulf
On a warm spring day in 2003, I found myself lost in the traffi c circles 
of Saar, one of Manama’s many burgeoning suburbs. I had arranged a fi ve 
o’clock appointment with George, a busy manager at a dairy plant and a fel-
low member of the Manama Toastmasters, the international club I had re-
cently joined. After circling the nondescript factory several times, I noticed 
the small sign on the side of the building, and passing through the security 
gate, I arrived ten minutes late for the interview. George’s offi ce was piled 
high with paperwork and fi les from his daily responsibilities, and after a 
long discussion about the impact of Gulf migration on his home state of 
Kerala, George described his own motivations for coming to Bahrain:
I’d been working in India, in different parts of India, for about three 
years. And I had been working with one of the best companies, one of 
the best paying companies in all of India. In spite of all my hard work 
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and struggle when I was younger, I could only make . . . not more 
than 100 dinars [$265] a month. One hundred dinars, that used to be 
my salary, and I would work 16 hours [a day] sometimes, 20 hours, 
whatever it is. I was in sales, moving to different places, traveling 
and touring. It’s a big, vast country. In sales, you have to get from 
one place to another, so there’s a lot of travel. So my salary over that 
period, take the average, was about 100 dinars. Now when you come 
here to Bahrain, if you’re lucky you can make two, three times that.
Six weeks later, at a manufacturing warehouse on the opposite side of town, 
I spoke with Deepali, a young professional, about her experience working 
in India:
So I started working in American Express in Delhi, and it was quite 
good, an international company and all that. But the money was so 
bad! . . . The pay there was equivalent to 50 dinars [$133] a month, and 
I was like, “what is this?” So I realized that I was living, but I was not 
happy. I would be sulking the whole day. I had to get up at 5:30, and 
change two buses to be in the offi ce by 8:00. I’d fi nish at 5:00, again 
two buses, and reach home by 8:30, 9:00.
As George and Deepali make clear, the petroleum-rich nations of the 
Arabian Peninsula continue to provide economic opportunities that sur-
pass readily available positions in India. The relative pay scales of Gulf-
based and Indian-based jobs are common knowledge in professional circles 
and fi gure prominently in the long-term career strategies of many of the 
individuals with whom I spoke. Furthermore, the lure of the Gulf draws 
individuals at many different points of their career: for every young pro-
fessional recently arrived on the island, I met others near the end of their 
career. For example, as a former offi cer of the Indian navy explained, he and 
his wife, a radiologist, saw a sojourn in Bahrain as a stepping stone to retire-
ment: “In two years, we could save what would take us seven or eight years 
in India.” Another Indian who originally left India for Oman on the eve of 
the 1991 Gulf War noted that, at the time, “for every dollar you earned in 
India you could earn six here in the Middle East.”
Karen Leonard recently concluded that “market forces rather than indi-
vidual agency are driving the expatriate workers in the Gulf” (2003, 156). 
As Deepali and George suggest, market forces play a key role in many 
decisions to come to the Gulf. Yet in the interviews I conducted with 
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professionals and other members of the diasporic elite, other justifi cations 
for the move abroad also fi gured prominently in the decision process. In 
general, many were seeking jobs more connected to global fi nance, insur-
ance, business, and other related arenas, all in the domain of what Appadurai 
(1996) calls the global fi nancescape. The oil wealth of the Gulf has fostered 
the growth of these sectors, and Bahrain, as the regional hub for signifi cant 
portions of the Gulf ’s fi nancial and service industry, is one avenue into the 
world of transnational business. The economic gain associated with occu-
pations in the sectors of the fi nancescape is complemented by the possibil-
ity of transfers to other, more desirable locations (typically Europe, North 
America, Australia, and New Zealand). In this sense, Gulf destinations serve 
as a catalyst for even greater diasporic displacements (Leonard 2003, 131).
Other reasons cited by the professionals and skilled laborers I inter-
viewed fall entirely outside the economic calculus often bound to migration. 
Take the case of Shahzeb, an administrator in an educational institution on 
the island. The son of a Pakistani (and Muslim) diplomat, Shahzeb grew 
up in India, where he fell in love with a young Indian (and Hindu) woman. 
After their controversial marriage, the young couple began to look beyond 
the borders of Pakistan or India for a place to begin again. The diffi culties 
of life in either of those places, with all the incumbent pressures of a cross-
national and cross-religious marriage, were in their estimation too formi-
dable. As they described it to me, Bahrain “represented a sort of neutral 
ground for us. With the diffi culties between Indian and Pakistan, neither 
place seemed ideal for settling down. Bahrain represented such a place—a 
neutral ground where we could begin our life anew.” Another successful 
Indian administrator, Mariam, echoed this sentiment: “I came to Bahrain 
in 1981. I came not because I wanted to work—I just needed a change of 
scene. This is my second marriage. My fi rst husband died in India. In India, 
when you get married . . . a widow is never looked on in the same fashion 
as a normal person.” For Mariam, whose story I explore in more detail 
later in this chapter, Bahrain represented a new start beyond the pressures 
and confi nes of the socially constructed role of the Indian widow.
Along these same lines, the recent rise of the Hindu/fundamentalist BJP, 
a political party intertwined with the increasingly polemical relations be-
tween the Muslim and Hindu populations in India, has also pushed Muslim 
Indians out of India. As a wealthy Indian corporate executive described, 
“Hyderabad . . . no, India in general, is no longer a safe place for Muslims. 
Every year things are changing, and for Muslims it is getting worse.” Like 
many members of the Indian diasporic elite, he is looking westward for 
Strategic Transnationalism 77
his future: he had established residency in Chicago and, at the time of my 
research, was preparing to move his family in the coming year. Moreover, 
he was no longer maintaining a household in India.
Finally, many members of this professional class were born in Bahrain. 
Many of these second- and third-generation Indian transnationals are part 
of the historic subcommunities of the Indian diaspora in Bahrain. The larg-
est and most infl uential are the Bhatias, the Hindu portion of the Sindh 
community, cast from their homeland in Karachi after partition. Building 
upon mercantile linkages already established in the Gulf, many members of 
the Sindh community eventually moved families and resources to Bahrain, 
Dubai, and other urban ports of the region. Other Indian groups with a 
long-standing presence in Bahrain include the Gujarati businessmen whose 
enterprises historically centered on the sale of gold; the Bohra community, 
an Indian Muslim sect with a belief system particularly confi gured around 
business (see Blank 2001); and the Dhobi community of laundrymen. Over 
the last two decades, these historic components of the diasporic community 
have been joined by the sons and daughters of the generation of engineers 
and professionals who arrived in the 1960s and 1970s. Together they are 
children between, if not without, national allegiance. As one young woman, 
the daughter of a construction manager, answered my questions about her 
“home”: “Where am I from? It’s a very tough question. Sometimes I felt as 
if I was a kite, blowing between countries, from nowhere.”
To recapitulate, while Leonard suggests the centrality of market forces 
in the “push” factors that encourage transmigration from South Asia to 
the Gulf, the purported centrality of those economic calculations must be 
gauged against the wide variety of other reasons that factor in decision pro-
cesses. Following Mahler’s call (1998, 82–83) to disaggregate the transmi-
grant populations by class, I suggest that these noneconomic factors often 
play a larger role in the transmigratory calculus of the diasporic elite than 
in the decision processes of the transnational proletariat (see also Gamburd 
2000) and, as such, serve as a marker of class. Whereas the members of the 
transnational proletariat by and large arrive for solely economic reasons, 
members of the diasporic elite fi nd themselves in Bahrain for a panoply of 
reasons, including—but not limited to—those of an economic nature.
In analyzing the structural violence levied against the transnational pro-
letariat, I have argued that the economic compulsions—and the transna-
tional debts incurred by members of this proletariat in securing work in the 
Gulf—are keystones in the structure of dominance that permits and even 
encourages episodic violence against foreign laborers in the Gulf. If we keep 
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in mind that economic factors are only one facet of the calculus that brings 
members of the diasporic elite to the petroleum-rich nations of the Arabian 
peninsula, then the question becomes this: Are the members of the diasporic 
elite free from the vulnerabilities rendered by this structure of dominance? 
Put another way, do the variety of compulsions, both economic and non-
economic, that push members of the diasporic elite out of India correlate 
with a degree of freedom from the structural violence their impoverished 
countrymen encounter in the Gulf? In the next section I explore this issue 
and suggest that although the diasporic elite’s reasons for coming to Bahrain 
are diverse, once ashore their encounters with the citizenry and state are 
strikingly parallel to those of the transnational proletariat.
Everyday Encounters and the Exertion of Dominance
I collected the following story from Anhil, a third-generation merchant 
at the apex of the Indian diaspora in Bahrain:
Walking down the street, if I see fi ve or six Bahraini guys coming 
toward me, I take the other road. I just don’t want to go through 
them—it’s to that point here. If you see fi ve or six of them coming 
in a group, you go around the corner and come back later . . . things 
have happened to me once or twice. I’ve gotten into physical fi ghts. 
One time I was parking my car, and this guy wanted to park in the 
same spot. He tells me to move my car, and this led to an altercation. 
He hit me. I hit him back. And all of the sudden his friends come, 
and there are ten of them. And then I thought, if I keep hitting this 
guy back, then ten guys are going to hit me. So I just left, and he hit 
me a couple of more times as I was getting away. When I got home, 
I realized that this was the stupidest thing I did, because I was in an 
alley, and these guys have no respect for—I hate to say this—but they 
have no respect for their lives.
Another time, I used to have an offi ce downstairs here. And this 
road, it’s all expat store owners—Indians, Filipinos. And what hap-
pens is this: we double park, and everybody knows everybody, they 
just come and ask us, and we just move the cars. So this Bahraini 
guy comes for the fi rst time to the road, and my car was blocking 
the street. Normally a guy would come in and ask me to move it. 
He comes into my offi ce, storms right past my secretary, and bangs 
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his hand on my desk telling me to move my car. And I just lost it —I 
told him not to bang the table. And the next thing you know, it’s a 
big thing, and he’s called the cops. The fi rst thing the cop asks me is 
this: what nationality are you? I asked him what that had to do with 
anything. Finally I said that I was Indian, and he took my license. 
Then it became another big thing. I had to get my license back, and 
I had to pay fi nes for double-parking my car, which under normal 
circumstances in Bahrain isn’t anything. I was technically wrong, but 
it’s a law that’s never enforced in Bahrain.
Incidents like this reinforce to me that the less interaction you have 
with Bahrainis the better.
In laying out a strategy for transnational anthropology, Aihwa Ong argues 
that “the anthropology of the present should analyze people’s everyday ac-
tions as a form of cultural politics embedded in specifi c power contexts” 
(1999, 4). In the next two sections, I follow Ong’s advice by portraying 
these everyday interactions between citizen and foreigner as a means of de-
scribing the “specifi c power contexts” that members of the Indian diaspora 
encounter as they move about the island. The character of these interac-
tions, where violence is always possible and recourse by the transmigrant to 
legal and institutional frameworks is diffi cult, is part of what Franklin called 
the “informal nature of domination” that transmigrants face in Bahrain 
(1985, 104). Like Gupta, however, I see the division between the formal and 
informal venues as problematic: rather, through an analysis of these every-
day interactions we can see the state “implicated in the minute texture of 
everyday life” (Gupta 2006, 211). The pattern of these everyday interactions 
reveals the deployment of two contradictory logics that are key to under-
standing the systemic violence levied against foreigners of all classes.
Elite members of the Indian diaspora, whether recent arrivals or the 
children of transmigrants, envision themselves as components of the trans-
national fi nancescape, a term deployed by Appadurai to describe the mys-
terious and rapid disposition of global capital in the contemporary world 
(1996, 34). As highly trained human capital, elite members of the Indian 
diaspora contribute to key sectors of the Bahraini economy as engineers, 
doctors, managers, fi nanciers, and advertising executives, and in countless 
other positions that the undertrained citizenry are incapable or unwilling 
to fi ll (Khalaf and Alkobaisi 1999, 284; al-Rasheed 2005, 1). In doing so, 
members of the diasporic elite fi nd themselves in cadence with the version 
of Bahraini nationalism widely purveyed by the state and its citizenry, a 
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blueprint that envisions Bahrain as the progressive hub of fi nance and ser-
vice industries in the Gulf, a beacon of modernity in the region, and a tour-
ist attraction constructed around the city as a site of consumption. Yet the 
hierarchical logic of this global fi nancescape—the logic that, in many cases, 
drew the diasporic elite from their homeland to Bahrain—coexists with 
a contradictory set of power relations codifi ed in the state and manifest 
in the everyday interactions between foreigner and citizen-host. In these 
everyday interactions, even the lowliest citizen holds power over the edu-
cated and successful transmigrant. The friction of these two competing vi-
sions is evident in a continuation of the interview with Anhil, the merchant 
quoted earlier. In exasperation, he appealed to the neoliberal logic edifi ed in 
Bahrain’s national vision: “I mean, I have a business. I run things! I import 
things into this country! I pay taxes! I export things! And there are very few 
Bahrainis who actually do that—I actually purchase things made in Bahrain 
and export them to other countries, and earn an income for Bahrain!”
Bourdieu (1987) uses the concept of habitus to describe the learned dis-
positions individuals bring to bear in social interactions. In describing the 
interactions between citizens and noncitizens in the petroleum-rich states of 
the contemporary Gulf, scholars have connected this habitus to a “master-
servant mentality” (Leonard 2003, 144), often stretching back to the partic-
ular confi guration of the pearling industry’s indentured servitude or to the 
tribal structure of the Bedouin peoples (Beaugé 1986, as quoted in Longva 
1997, 78). Others have connected the citizenry’s habitus to the explosive 
period of modernization wrought by the discovery of oil, a particular con-
fi guration that Champion argues has resulted in a “mudir syndrome,” using 
the Arabic word for “boss,” where every citizen sees him or herself as en-
titled to a position of authority and command over the legions of foreigners 
at work in the Gulf states (1999, 5). These explanations may provide some 
perspective on the genealogy of power relations in the contemporary Gulf, 
but as contemporary expressions of inequality these relations are more than 
simply vestiges of the past: they illustrate modern forms of dominance and 
governance. More acutely, this structure of dominance substitutes nation-
ality, ethnicity, religion, and citizenship for the class logic wrought by the 
neoliberal model, a model that is at once essential to the predominant na-
tional vision promoted by the state and, at the same time, antithetical to the 
ethnocratic and sectarian order of the Bahraini state.
On an individual level, transmigrants encounter these particular forms 
of governance as a daily matter of course: at traffi c stops and accidents—
alarmingly common on the island—police commonly request the nationality 
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of those involved as the fi rst order of business. Several of my informants 
remarked that altercations often devolved into citizens shouting, “ I ’m a 
Bahraini!” Newspaper articles ubiquitously list the nationality of individu-
als in the course of reporting: “A Pakistani barber was reportedly deported 
last night after stabbing a former employer”; “A Bahraini was stabbed in 
the back in a clash between two groups of men”; “A Moroccan woman was 
attacked after accepting an offer of a lift home to Juffair from a Manama 
hotel.”4 In everyday interactions and in the discursive terrain of the media, 
individuals are described in terms that locate their relationship to the state 
by way of their ethnicity and nationality, thereby reinforcing the bonds be-
tween what Longva (2005), in her analysis of the Kuwaiti state, describes as 
the ethnocratic basis of state power and meaning of citizenship. Or, as Neha 
Vora (2008) has aptly argued, middle-class Indians quickly develop a racial 
consciousness during their time in the Gulf.
The governance of the transmigrant, in the Foucauldian sense of both 
direct governmental control and, more obliquely, a regime of order, disci-
pline, and organization, is constantly reinforced in these daily interactions. 
The effects of this governance take shape in the residential patterns that 
characterize life on the island. Whereas poor and middle-class members 
of the diaspora often live in urban enclaves—in particular neighborhoods, 
once Bahraini, and now abandoned to the foreign underclass—the upper 
segments of the diaspora often dwell in the upscale mixed neighborhoods 
peripheral to the city. In these locations, most of my informants stated, they 
had little to no interaction with Bahraini neighbors. As an Indian construc-
tion manager with an older villa in the suburb of Riffa remarked, “We have 
never made any Bahraini friends. I’ve lived in Bahrain for so many years—
twenty-three, twenty-four years—but I haven’t made any Bahraini friends. I 
don’t visit their families, and I don’t go to their festivals.” The social activi-
ties of Indian nationals are largely confi ned to Indian restaurants, the many 
clubs and voluntary organizations dominated by the Indian diaspora, and 
the temples, mosques, and churches of the expatriate elite.
These separate social worlds are characteristic of the Gulf, and the gover-
nance that produces this separation helps explain the function of exclusion 
and dominance in a plural society (Longva 1997; Nagy 1998, 84–85; Vora 
2008). In this section, however, I have also sought to connect the habitus 
deployed by citizens in everyday encounters to the Bahraini national proj-
ect. That national project channels a neoliberal logic and is manifest in both 
the discursive terrain, where Bahrain is perceived and projected as a site of 
global consumption, a boomtown, and the fi nancial and service hub of the 
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Gulf, and also in the material realm, where shopping malls and skyscrapers 
rise along the low shores of the island, and educated and trained human 
capital streams to the island in service of this vision. Yet in the everyday in-
teractions between citizens and foreigners, the basic class logic of this neo-
liberal model is mitigated by the logic of citizenship, itself the conceptual 
nexus for racial, ethnic, religious, and gendered vectors. Understanding the 
terms of this contradiction, I argue, is key to understanding the everyday 
violence foreigners encounter on the island.
Encounters with Power: The Diasporic Elite and the Kafala
The habitus deployed by citizens in their everyday interactions with 
noncitizen transmigrants represents a key force in the subjectifi cation of 
members of the Indian diaspora—both working class and elite—as servants 
of the Bahraini state and its citizenry. In Wolf ’s multivalenced notion of 
power, this roughly corresponds to interactional power, manifest in rela-
tions between individuals, and embodied power, in the Nietzschean sense, 
that draws “attention to how persons enter into a play of power” (1999, 5). 
Through the deployment of this power, as an expression of habitus, the 
achieved differences and hierarchies wrought by the neoliberal logic of 
global capitalism are eclipsed by the citizen/noncitizen dichotomy: whereas 
impoverished laborers complained of being constantly pelted with stones 
on their journey between their decrepit labor camp and the small grocery 
store a block away, Indian men of signifi cant worth and accomplishment 
avoid Bahrainis on the street, endure constant ethnic slurs, and avoid any 
public or direct confrontation with citizens.
In his analysis of the state, Foucault noted that “relations of power, and 
hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond 
the limits of the state. In two senses: fi rst of all because the state, for all the 
omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole 
fi eld of actual power relations, and further because the state can only oper-
ate on the basis of other, already existing power relations. The state is su-
perstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the 
body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth” 
(1985, 64). Without denying the certain, interlocking relationship between 
everyday practice and the relations of power codifi ed in the state, in the case 
of Bahrain we can also delineate the opposite of Foucault’s point: the ha-
bitus deployed by citizens in their everyday interactions with transmigrant 
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foreigners depends on a state apparatus confi gured to reinforce the hege-
mony of citizen over noncitizen. In other words, the habitus that citizens 
bring to their everyday interactions with noncitizens, and in that sense, the 
governance exercised over the diaspora as a whole, is itself premised on a se-
ries of structural arrangements, codifi ed in the state, that formally reinforce 
the power of the citizenry over the transmigrants on the island.
As should be clear from the earlier chapters of this book, the risks and 
uncertainties of life in Bahrain often coalesce around the kafala, or spon-
sorship system. Unlike the working class, most members of the diasporic 
elite retain control of their passport. Their kafeel, however, whether an in-
dividual or a corporate entity, still mediates their relationship to the state. 
The power of the kafeel is invested in a series of procedures and docu-
ments, including the work contract, which specifi es a particular period of 
time (typically two or three years) at a particular salary; a no-objection cer-
tifi cate, which clears the transmigrant to enter the country and take a job; 
and a residence permit, which is associated with a particular employer and 
a particular job. These contractual, legal, and bureaucratic aspects of the 
kafala are essential components by which the asymmetrical relationships 
between citizens and foreign workers are constructed. In essence, they 
channel power to the kafeel.
The following letter to the editor of one of the English newspapers in 
Bahrain illustrates some of the practical and bureaucratic dilemmas faced by 
the professional and elite members of the Indian diaspora:
I have been working at a local further education institute as a se-
nior lecturer in travel and tourism for almost fi fteen years. During 
this period I am happy and proud to state that I played a pivotal 
role in training hundreds of Bahrainis sponsored by the Labour 
Ministry to take up jobs in various airlines and travel agencies.5 
On December 30, 2003, I was asked by the owner to sign a docu-
ment stating that I received all my dues from the institute since 
my date of joining in February 1989. Since I refused, my salary for 
December 2003 was not paid. I threatened to take the matter to 
court. This type of tactic has been tried several times on me but 
I never succumbed to the owner’s coercion.
On December 30, 2003, at 6 pm the owner convened a meeting 
where he verbally and in writing promised to pay BD2,000 [$5,306] 
immediately and BD1,000 [$2,656] by mid-2004. This amount, 
being only one-tenth of what I should receive, was turned down. On 
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December 31, 2003, I lodged a complaint at the Labour Ministry and 
since no settlement was reached, they passed the dispute on to the 
courts. On January 6, 2004, the owner sent me two invoices to the 
tune of BD16,800 [$44,576] being sponsorship charges. A grave vio-
lation. All these matters were brought to the attention of the Indian 
Embassy.
The act was merely to intimidate me to sign the document. Six 
months have passed and I am without a job. My family is here and 
my daughter goes to school. I am living by begging and borrowing. 
Many institutes have come forward to hire my services. They all do 
have valid work permits and are willing to change my sponsorship. 
The major impediment, I need permission to work. When I approach 
the Labour Ministry with this request, they have directed me to the 
Ministry of Justice and on approaching the Ministry of Justice, I am 
directed to the Labour Ministry. So between these ministries I am 
being sandwiched for no fault of mine. I will be more than happy to 
leave the island if my dues are settled in full according to the labour 
laws for the private sector.
I strongly feel that only the press can play a role in bringing 
my plight to the attention of concerned authorities. Signed, Jacob 
Samuel6
Jacob’s dilemma points to the vulnerabilities even well-placed individuals 
face in the diffi cult working environment of contemporary Bahrain. If we 
take his calculations at face value, his employer had accumulated a debt to 
Jacob of nearly $80,000. After resisting his employer’s attempts to erase this 
debt, he appealed to the bureaucratic institutions of the state. My informants 
on the island were clear about the Indian embassy’s inability or unwilling-
ness to negotiate these sorts of dilemmas with the Bahraini government, 
and like several of my informants, Jacob found himself “sandwiched” be-
tween the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Justice. Although a hand-
ful of my informants had carried cases through the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs to the courts, none had found success in this venture.7 As 
one Indian individual told me, “nobody I know has ever received a good 
judgment from the court.” Longva, who spent many hours of her fi eld-
work in the courthouses of Kuwait, concluded that “non-Kuwaitis, fi nally, 
had no absolute legal autonomy. They were all subordinate to their Kuwait 
employers/sponsors in what was to them one of the most important as-
pects of their lives, namely, work” (1997, 129). This conclusion matches the 
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perception of the Indian community I encountered in Bahrain, and it is this 
perception—as much as the reality of the situation—that keeps noncitizens 
from engaging the extant legal framework on the island.
In his letter, Jacob also mentions that “many other institutes have come 
forward to hire my services.” As this statement suggests, the kafala structures 
a labor market that is not free. Transmigrants are bound to particular jobs, 
and their ability to switch jobs depends on the goodwill and acquiescence 
of their kafeel. In essence, the foreign workers, whether laborers or pro-
fessionals, are bonded labor, and the structural arrangement of the kafala 
fetters their ability to act as free agents on the labor market or, put another 
way, to escape the dominion and exploitation of particular sponsors.
The power of the sponsor to prevent foreign workers from departing 
the exploitative conditions of a particular job, however, is only one facet 
of the systemic control the diasporic elite face. Many of the professionals 
arrive alone—in the parlance of the diaspora, they are “in front” of fami-
lies whose members await the necessary paperwork and visas in order to 
join them in Bahrain. Individuals seeking a “family visa” must, again, work 
through their kafeel to obtain such permission, and several of my infor-
mants reported this requirement as another fulcrum of abuse. They must 
prove that they earn over 250 dinars ($664) per month, the state-mandated 
minimum for those wishing to bring their families to Bahrain, and a fi gure 
barely large enough to cover the expenses of maintaining a family there, 
which typically includes the cost of the Indian diasporic community’s pri-
vate schools. They also need the sponsor to sign off on the paperwork that 
will allow their families to reside on the island.
Wives, sons, and daughters also face numerous diffi culties in obtaining 
employment on the island. As another letter to the Gulf Daily News de-
scribed the situation:
My wife has both an NOC [no-objection certifi cate] from my sponsor 
as well as a job offer from a company who is providing sponsorship. 
We do not have any children. But unfortunately after dozens of visits 
to Immigration by the company’s [representative] the transfer from 
my family visa to my wife’s potential employer’s visa is rejected. The 
reason specifi ed was “Transfer from family to work is only possible if 
position in work permit is teacher, executive secretary or nurse.” My 
wife’s occupation does not fall in either of these categories. I would 
like to have GDNPR [General Directorate of Nationality, Passports 
and Residence] opinion on above as this is a crucial phase of life for 
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my wife. She has excellent qualifi cations and experience and the law 
saying she cannot work even if she gets a job and sponsorship will 
shatter her dreams. I would like to know if this is really a law?
The GDNPR spokesperson replied as follows: “We thank the reader for his 
complimentary comments. We would like to confi rm that transfers from 
a family visa to a work visa are only possible through GDNPR if the job 
category is teacher, nurse or executive secretary. The only possible alterna-
tive for the reader’s wife is for her prospective employer to approach the 
Ministry of Labour for a Local Transfer as it may be possible for her to 
transfer directly from one sponsor to another on a local transfer.”8 Although 
it is of interest that the opportunities for transmigrants’ wives and daugh-
ters reveal the gendered aspects of the foreign workforce on the island, the 
key issue here is that obtaining the family visa, as well as obtaining a “local 
transfer,” is contingent upon the goodwill of the sponsor (successful in this 
case). Hence the power invested in the kafala extends beyond the labor of 
an individual foreigner: the kafeel also has power over the very presence of 
a foreigner’s spouse and children.
Both the diasporic elite and the transnational proletariat face similar, sys-
temic vulnerabilities under the kafala. Because the transnational proletariat 
cannot bring family members to the island, however, the vectors of vulner-
ability surrounding foreign workers’ families are unique to the diasporic 
elite. Yet these are not the only vulnerabilities unique to this class of for-
eign workers: members of the diasporic elite, and particularly merchants 
and business owners, face another distinct set of risks unique to their eco-
nomic position. Bahraini law requires that all business ventures have at least 
one Bahraini owner. This rule has resulted in the formation of a class of 
“silent” or “sleeping” partners among the Bahraini citizenry—individuals 
who lend their name to the business registrations of foreign-born entre-
preneurs. Leonard, working with the Indian population in Kuwait and the 
Emirates, says that “these working relationships are typically quite nomi-
nal, with sponsors taking commissions from many foreigners annually but 
not participating in the business” (2003, 138). In my discussions with the 
professional and entrepreneurial community, the established rate for this 
relationship was BD100 ($265) per month. Unlike the conditions reported 
by Leonard in the United Arab Emirates, however, in Bahrain these rela-
tionships are prone to abuse, and many Indian entrepreneurs I met related 
stories of fi nancial disaster resulting from the silent partner relationship. 
Ahmed, an Indian Muslim, briefl y described his own experience with a 
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Bahraini partner: “I started a business here a few years back, but it collapsed. 
Once it became successful, the sleeping partner stole it out from under me. 
Once he saw that the money was being made through my efforts, he took 
it from me.” As these comments suggest, the relationship is inherently 
fraught with complications wrought by the citizen/noncitizen polarity, and 
the vulnerability foreign entrepreneurs face is reinforced by the diffi culty 
they encounter in both accessing and utilizing the legal system.
A small number of individuals in the diaspora escape some portion of 
these vulnerabilities through gaining citizenship, which makes Bahrain ex-
ceptional in relation to the rest of the Gulf, where generally transmigrants 
(and particularly non-Arab transmigrants) can never become citizens (see 
Falzon 2003, 675; Leonard 2003, 139).9 Bahrain has recently opened chan-
nels to allow applications for citizenship, and a small number of promi-
nent foreign businessmen with long-standing ties in the kingdom have 
successfully applied. The explicit requirements include twenty-fi ve years of 
residence (or fi fteen years for those of Arab descent), although many of my 
contacts in the Indian community noted that some of the prominent busi-
nessmen who had achieved citizenship did not meet this requirement.10 The 
application itself is followed by a series of interviews in which applicants are 
expected to demonstrate a facility with Arabic. Individuals also reported 
that large fees are involved, although the amounts described to me varied 
from BD20,000 ($53,000) to upward of BD70,000 ($186,000). Long de-
lays are also the norm. As one individual stated, “I began the application 
process three years ago. They called me for interviews—they’ve interviewed 
me twice. The last one was a year ago, and they said they’d call me again. 
They haven’t called since, so I’m just waiting.” Another prosperous Indian 
merchant described his experience: after beginning the application process, 
they requested his passport. With a business that required constant travel 
back and forth to India, he rescinded his application after three months, as 
he needed his passport to travel.
Although Bahraini citizenship decreases the vulnerability of foreigner-
born entrepreneurs and merchants to the kafala, it is a path only available 
to the wealthy. Moreover, it does little to address the lived experience of 
the diasporic elite on the island, a fact intricately related to the ethnocratic 
underpinnings of the concept of citizenship prevalent in the Gulf region. 
As one Indian merchant observed, “For the Muslims, maybe citizenship is 
a possibility, but for the rest of us, it’s a different ballgame. . . . If I go to the 
market, to the souk and I see you [the author], I know you’re a Westerner. 
If somebody sees me, he says, okay, an Indian. If I take a Bahraini passport, 
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my face says that I’m an Indian. The people will still not take me as a 
Bahraini. They will treat me as an Indian.”
My well-placed informants among the Indian community reported that 
the number of Indian nationals who successfully obtained citizenship could 
be counted on one hand. Although the number of Bahraini citizens of 
Indian origin is very small, many of the older families on the island possess 
a certifi cate of residence. Obtained before the 1950s, these permanent resi-
dence permits allow members of the Indian diaspora to be “self-sponsored” 
and thereby escape the power-laden relationship with a citizen-kafeel. For 
the remaining great majority, however, negotiating the complexities of 
residence permits, work permits, permits for family members, and contract 
renewals is a constant struggle.
In this section I have attempted to illuminate the Indian diasporic elite’s 
experience with the kafala. I have focused specifi cally on the visa regulations, 
residence permits, business licenses, and other bureaucratic requirements 
that, en suite, channel power to the citizen-kafeel. Unlike the working-class 
Indians described in the previous chapter, members of the diasporic elite 
face less comprehensive risks in coming to Bahrain. Although the actual 
amount of debt involved may be much larger than that incurred by mem-
bers of the transnational proletariat, few members of the diasporic elite 
incur debts of the relative magnitude of the working class. The vulnerabili-
ties of the diasporic elite are typically confi ned to the businesses they have 
built on the island and the fi nancial well-being of their nuclear family. As I 
illustrated in earlier chapters, the vulnerabilities of the Indian transnational 
proletariat encompass the productive assets of the extended family and, in 
a more poignant sense, their basic ability to survive.
Nonetheless, members of the Indian diasporic elite in Bahrain are sus-
ceptible to the power and inequities of a foreign system, a fact directly tied 
to their trans-status. Although they may bring a variety of strategies to 
the table, none overcomes the subjectifi cation wrought by the citizenry’s 
habitus—the set of learned dispositions that exert the citizen’s dominance 
over foreigners, that reinforce the logic of race, ethnicity, nationality, reli-
gion, and culture over that of class; a habitus that continually asserts the 
dominance of citizens in a nation heavily dependent on the contribution 
of educated and professional foreigners. The fettered agency the diasporic 
elite brings to bear against the vulnerabilities of this system is often insuf-
fi cient, and insecurity about the future in Bahrain is a common trope in 
their conversation. As a result, members of the diasporic elite commonly 
forge contingency plans as a response to the uncertain future. In the next 
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section, I explore these contingency plans—themselves another form of 
agency—in depth.
Strategic Transnationalism
In one sense, the kafala can be conceived as a system for managing and 
controlling the fl ow of labor to the petroleum-rich states of the Arabian 
Peninsula. Through an examination of the practical and everyday experi-
ence of this system, I have sought to portray the kafala in terms of the 
power it channels and codifi es—a system that not only manages the fl ow of 
transmigrants to the island, but also one that seeks to manage and control 
these foreign workers during their time on the island. I have argued that we 
can see these power relations in the everyday interactions between foreign 
workers and citizen-hosts, conceived in terms of habitus, and in the struc-
tural, bureaucratic practices and policies that underpin those interactions. 
In this section, I portray the agency deployed by Indian diasporic elite in 
reaction to the dominance they face in Bahrain.
In part, this agency may be viewed as a response to the diffi cult con-
ditions and problematic, everyday relations codifi ed by the kafala. This 
agency, however, can also be seen as a response to more general condi-
tions—conditions outside the bounds of the everyday interactions I have 
described. Those conditions include a chronic uncertainty about the future. 
As noncitizens, the great majority of the diasporic elite live by the whims of 
the state and the citizenry: their tenure on the island is always under threat 
of revocation; the positions they hold are subject to their individual spon-
sors and to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which can, as its pur-
view, revoke or fail to renew residence and work permits. Together, these 
more general vulnerabilities coalesce under the concept of Bahrainization.
In its simplest reading, Bahrainization is the nomenclature of the king-
dom’s efforts to replace foreign workers with citizens. The rudiments of 
this collection of policies were in place in the early 1970s. At the same time, 
Bahrainization is an ever-evolving set of policies and directives, often con-
tradictory, that mandate particular ratios of citizen employees to trans-
migrants, often in particular sectors of the economy. For example, in the 
mid-1990s the state mandated that all taxi drivers on the island must be 
Bahraini nationals. During my fi eldwork on the island, business owners re-
ported that in many sectors one must hire one citizen for every transmigrant 
employed; hotels track their citizen-to-noncitizen employee ratios, and 
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those with the largest proportion of citizen employees receive awards from 
the government. New Bahrainization policies are frequently announced 
in the newspapers of the island, and although infrequently codifi ed in law 
or comprehensively enforced, they nonetheless destabilize the livelihoods of 
foreign workers on the island. Foreign entrepreneurs and business owners 
are never sure if the laws will allow them to continue working on the island; 
capital reinvested in the business is always at risk, for a single edict can close 
the door to particular sectors of the economy for foreign workers. During 
my time on the island (2002–3), for example, the new minister of labor and 
social affairs announced a directive of 100 percent Bahrainization for the 
ministry itself, which included the Bahrain Training Institute, my sponsor 
institution and home to a large staff of expatriate instructors on multiyear 
contracts. Similarly, a year after my departure, the minister of labor and 
social affairs announced the kingdom’s plans to fully “Bahrainize” car sales 
showrooms, supermarkets, travel agencies, and furniture stores by 2006.
With the future of the transnational presence in the Bahraini workforce 
always uncertain, the active transnational connections established and main-
tained by members of the Indian diaspora are more than an attempt to keep 
in touch with the culture of their homeland; these connections are essential 
components of their livelihood strategies—active networks sought to bal-
ance the uncertainties of life outside the Indian state and, more specifi cally, 
the vulnerabilities unique to the nations of the Arabian Gulf. Although 
many of the families I spoke with maintain a presence in India, most have 
also extended their networks westward. Frequently these networks are an 
extension of historic, transnational familial and social networks established 
in the colonial and postcolonial era—rebuilding, for example, connections 
with portions of the family that found their way to colonial Africa under 
British rule or, alternatively, to England itself, where many of the former 
Indian colonial bureaucrats obtained citizenship.
Many of the family histories and migration narratives I collected illus-
trate these points, but in the sections that follow I present vignettes describ-
ing the particular circumstances and histories of two different members of 
the Indian diasporic elite in Bahrain.
Mariam’s Story
Mariam’s family is from Goa, the former Portuguese colony on India’s 
western coast. Her father worked for the British colonial administration, 
a post that eventually carried him to colonial Uganda, where Mariam and 
three of her siblings were born. Her father retired from that position and 
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moved back to India but was unable to secure suffi cient employment to feed 
the family, so he returned to Africa. The three youngest children, including 
Mariam, remained in Goa with their mother to fi nish their schooling. When 
Idi Amin came to power in Uganda, her siblings, sensing trouble, began to 
move their money to Canada; at that time, Mariam noted, “Canada was 
still raw—they wanted people.” One brother stayed behind in Africa and 
lost everything, and later went to Canada as a refugee.
Mariam married in Goa and planned a life in India. She and her husband 
moved about India in search of better work, but after the untimely death 
of her husband she returned to Goa to work as a teacher. Goa is a conser-
vative city, she said, and the life of a widow is not an easy one. As related 
in the preceding chapter, Mariam stated that “a widow is never looked on 
in the same fashion as a normal person.” With her family spread around 
the globe, Mariam began to consider other options. Her sister suggested 
she come to Bahrain. Although she had never been to Bahrain, it was like a 
homecoming: “we’re a big family,” she described, “and we’re all separated. 
We’re all out, some in Canada, wherever else, in Africa. My sister was here 
[in Bahrain], so coming to Bahrain, I felt like I was returning to my family, 
you know?” Her sister helped arrange employment for Mariam at one of 
the large embassies on the island.
After some years in Bahrain, Mariam remarried a Goan transmigrant she 
met on the island. They are uncertain about how long they will remain in 
Bahrain. Her daughter is in school at the American University in Dubai but 
intends to continue her studies in the United States. Her parents and sib-
lings are naturalized British citizens. Three of her siblings are “out”—a term 
she used to describe their presence in Canada, and the remainder are “here,” 
meaning in Bahrain or India. When I noted that she used “here” to refer to 
both Bahrain and India, she replied, “I know, I know! It’s because we’re so 
close to Bahrain—Bahrain is so close to India, we feel we are there. It’s just 
like India here!” Her brothers in Canada have children now, most of whom 
have married Canadians. They still maintain a house in Goa—“we have our 
own place—you have to have one! In case you’re thrown out of Bahrain, 
you have to have a roof over your head”—a common enough practice, but 
one not shared by all members of the diasporic elite.
For Mariam, Bahrain represents one juncture in her family’s long trans-
national history. Through her familial relations, she maintains contact with 
her home city in India, with the United Kingdom, fl eetingly with Africa, 
and most strongly with Canada. Her daughter, while at the time in the 
United Arab Emirates, plans on relocating to the United States, thereby 
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establishing a new beachhead in the extended family’s geographical distri-
bution. Mariam’s job in Bahrain is a good one—her position at a Western 
embassy provides an additional buffer against the tides of Bahrainization. 
At the same time, her husband’s position at an advertising fi rm is more pre-
carious, for it is the very sort of position that the government is seeking to 
Bahrainize. The network of family and friends, established over a lifetime, 
provides Mariam and her nuclear family with the opportunity to weigh the 
vulnerabilities of life in Bahrain against the costs of relocation to one of the 
other nodes in her global network.
Farid’s Story
In the fi nal decade of the nineteenth century, Farid’s great grandfather, a 
Bohri Muslim from the westernmost Indian state of Gujarat, embarked on 
a pilgrimage to Mecca. The journey by ship and land took the better part of 
three months each way; including a two-month stay in Mecca, his sojourn 
lasted nearly eight months. After a stop at Muscat at the entrance to the 
Gulf and passage through the Strait of Hormuz, the ship anchored in the 
shallow bay between Muharraq and Manama, the two principal islands of 
Bahrain. There, before journeying onward to Mecca, Farid’s great grand-
father encountered a busy port and market, and a British/Indian colonial 
bureaucracy actively seeking merchants and traders from points east.
Returning from his pilgrimage, Farid’s great grandfather began to plan 
for the move to Bahrain, and after ten years of preparation, he arrived in 
1902. His brother eventually joined him, and the two—shuttling back and 
forth between Bombay and Bahrain—profi ted as merchant traders of vari-
ous goods. Eventually, Farid’s great-grandfather’s three sons took over the 
business. Like the family’s fi rst generation of transmigrant merchants, the 
three brothers shuttled back and forth between Bombay and Bahrain every 
two or three years. One brother managed the business, the second, either 
in transit or in Bahrain, was brought up to speed, and the third cared for 
the families and properties in Bombay. One of the three brothers, a reck-
less spendthrift who, when alone in Bahrain, would inevitably purchase the 
latest model Mercedes or an American-made Harley Davidson motorcycle, 
was eventually pushed out of the business and permanently relocated to 
Bombay, where he was given a small piece of property to manage.
The two remaining brothers now controlled the business in Bahrain. 
In the years that followed, one brother’s son fell in love with the other 
brother’s daughter, and subsequently they married against the wishes of 
their parents. Farid was the new couple’s fi rstborn son, and within a year 
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of his birth (in the mid-1960s) the couple moved to Bahrain. Initially they 
lived with their parents in the “joint family” tradition of India, in a fl at in 
the historic central souk of downtown Manama. Farid’s father opened a 
haberdashery on one of the narrow thoroughfares of the souk, all under 
a business license acquired before regulations required a Bahraini partner. 
This arrangement means that he and his family are “self-sponsored.” Today, 
Farid and his wife run the same store his father built decades ago, and he 
has several warehouses and a small offi ce, all of which are located near the 
original business.
The business is profi table, but Farid remains insecure in Bahrain. 
Additional businesses he has opened over the years require a Bahraini “sleep-
ing partner,” and although the initial agreement is often for BD100 ($265) a 
month, these partners often increase their demands once a business shows 
a profi t. As Farid noted, “He [the sleeping partner] comes and tells you he 
wants BD500 [$1,326], and you have no choice. You have to give it to him. 
Otherwise he’ll just pack you off. Your whole existence in Bahrain depends 
on him.” It is a constant threat, and he has avoided sleeping partners’ at-
tempted takeovers by loading threatened businesses with debt. Although 
he has the license for the haberdashery, he is not a permanent resident. He 
still has to renew his residence permit every two years.
Farid considered getting a Bahraini passport. Through a well-placed 
local contact, he weighed the option of paying BD20,000 ($53,056) for a 
Bahraini passport, calculating that he would then be able to save hundreds 
of dinars per month on the businesses by avoiding the need for sleeping 
partners. Instead, however, he began moving his resources to Canada. 
As he described the process, “it wasn’t easy. I had to do a lot of running 
around, but I got my [Canadian] passport. So if I get kicked out of here—
and that could happen, because there really aren’t any laws here—if they did 
revoke my residence permit, there are no courts I could go to or anything 
like that. It would just be done. . . . But now I know I can go to Canada, and 
I’m relatively comfortable there. I could start a business, do something, get 
a job. . . . It’s a safety net. At least in the back of my mind, that part is safe. I 
mean, it was a big thing for me. You might not understand.”
As a fourth-generation Indian transmigrant, Farid has a signifi cant con-
nection to Bahrain. His businesses represent a considerable fi nancial re-
source built over several generations. Moreover, the business license he 
inherited provides his cornerstone business—the haberdashery—with a 
degree of insulation against the vulnerability wrought by the kafala and 
sleeping-partner system. Nonetheless, the tenuousness of his existence in 
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Bahrain, illustrated by his inability to use the legal system and his distrust 
of the mercurial Central Population Register (which issues the residence 
permits), led him to procure citizenship in Canada.11
Aihwa Ong uses the term fl exible citizenship “to refer especially to the strat-
egies and effects of mobile managers, technocrats, and professionals seeking 
to both circumvent and benefi t from different nation-state regimes by select-
ing different sites for investments, work, and family relocation” (1999, 112). 
Although both Farid and Mariam generally fi t this model, I use the term 
strategic transnationalism as a means of downplaying the importance of citi-
zenship in the diasporic elite’s strategic geographical calculations. Although 
citizenship remains one important variable in their strategic planning, only 
a small handful of the Indian diasporic elite are citizens of Bahrain. Instead, 
like Farid, with citizenship in Canada, or Mariam, with citizenship in the 
United Kingdom and India, members of the Indian diasporic elite build 
transnational networks to mitigate the vulnerability that noncitizens face 
in Bahrain. In this calculus, the diasporic elite seeks to benefi t from op-
portunities in Bahrain: as a primary regional nexus in the global fi nances-
cape, Bahrain is dotted with transnational corporations that serve the more 
conservative surrounding nations. These opportunities, combined with 
the generally higher remuneration than that paid to those holding similar 
positions in India, make work in the Gulf a lucrative, if risky, venture for 
the Indian diasporic elite. In responding to the vulnerabilities wrought by 
the structure of dominance that constrains and controls the foreign popu-
lation in Bahrain, the Indian elite build on historic networks forged in the 
colonial and postcolonial era—transnational networks that connect them 
to multiple continents. They also forge new networks that engage global 
capitalism in multiple territories and venues. Together, these historic and 
new networks—the essential fabric of this strategic transnationalism—are 
at once a reaction to the vulnerabilities particular to the Gulf states and a 
sophisticated and strategic adjustment to the mobility inherent to the de-
mands of the neoliberal fi nancescape.
Transnationals Unbound
The great majority of case studies in transnationalism focus on migra-
tion to the West, and particularly to the United States. The structure of 
dominance that Indian transmigrants face in Bahrain is composed of a 
signifi cantly different set of vulnerabilities than those typically portrayed 
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in these case studies. In this chapter I focus on the diasporic Indian elite, 
and through my analysis I challenge the fundamental bipolarity not only of 
these typical transnational models (in the sense of people with social fi elds 
spanning two nation-states), but also of diasporic models (in the sense 
of people with a particular relationship to a territorial homeland). Like a 
handful of other scholars concerned with contemporary transnationalism, 
I seek to illuminate the transnational lives of populations moving outside 
“the West,” widely conceived.
Using the basic bifurcation suggested by Mahler and already used by 
Leonard, I compared the lives of the Indian diasporic elite in Bahrain with 
those of the Indian transnational proletariat on the island. My analysis sug-
gests that, on the one hand, the diasporic elite face a variety of vulnerabili-
ties unique to their socioeconomic position: the presence of their families 
on the island, for example, renders them vulnerable to particular forms of 
abuse under the sponsorship system. Similarly, the businesses they own 
and manage open them to another venue of vulnerability. On the other 
hand, the ethnocratic underpinnings of the structure of dominance in place 
on the island reject the class-based logic of the neoliberal system, and gen-
erally subject members of the diasporic elite to the same forms of everyday 
structural violence that their impoverished countrymen—the transnational 
proletariat—face. The color of their skin, their language, religion, and cul-
ture, their nationality: these vectors all come in to play in the subjectifi ca-
tion of the diasporic elite as servants to the Bahraini national project.
Unlike their impoverished countrymen at work on the island, however, 
members of the Indian diasporic elite build and maintain a set of global 
networks to mitigate the vulnerabilities rendered by this structure of 
dominance. The insecurities of life in Bahrain, including the violent un-
dercurrents of their everyday encounters with the citizenry, but also encom-
passing their structural inability to assert their rights in the bureaucratic 
machinery of the state, push them to a strategic transnationalism. Their 
lives are, in some sense, untethered from both the local milieu of Bahrain 
and the diasporic, ancestral homeland of India: their allegiance is to what 
Appadurai has called the “nonterritorial transnation” (1996, 173).
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Typical portrayals of social relations in the Gulf states describe a 
nearly insurmountable divide between citizens and foreigners. The preced-
ing chapters of this book certainly contribute to that portrait: the social 
divide between citizens and foreign workers in Bahrain is formidable, and 
although others have directed their attention to the many and interesting 
“exceptional” spaces—in marriage between citizen and foreigner, through 
the intimate and everyday contact between employer and domestic servant, 
or through the ongoing interactions between the elite classes of the differ-
ent communities on the island—these arenas of interaction remain excep-
tions to the norm (see Nagy 2008). At the same time, one can delineate a 
public sphere whose boundaries encompass citizen and foreigner. In this 
chapter and the next, I examine two facets of this encompassing public 
sphere. In this chapter I explore the diasporic social clubs and a handful 
of other voluntary associations on the island. Those clubs and associations 
include long-standing regional clubs, such as the Kerala Club, as well as vol-
untary associations like the Toastmasters and Lions clubs that oftentimes 
convene citizens with foreigners of many different nationalities. In the next 
chapter, I describe another facet of this public sphere through an examina-
tion of the English-language newspapers on the island.
The theoretical foundations of the concept of the public sphere trace 
their genealogy to the work of Jürgen Habermas. In its most basic ren-
dition, the public sphere represents an inclusive conceptual space where 
meanings are publicly articulated, produced, and negotiated (Habermas 
1989). At the same time, the activity of this public sphere is more than 
a refl ection or window to the public: it is a generative process by which 
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the public is constituted. Habermas (1989) envisioned this public sphere 
as overlapping—and strategically between—the private sphere and the 
state. In that public space, individuals develop a collective identity and a 
set of interests distinct from those of both the private sphere and the state. 
Although this conception of the public sphere remains foundational, more 
recent work has pointed to particular problems with Habermas’s formu-
lation. More specifi cally, scholars have argued that the notion of an all-
inclusive public sphere fails to grasp the nuances of social power: group 
formation is as much about who is excluded as included. Analyses often 
focus on the formation of “counterpublics” that challenge the hegemony 
of the dominant public sphere (Fraser 1992; Warner 2002). Overall, many 
contemporary scholars suggest that the public sphere is better understood 
by its frictions, divisions, and omissions than by its cohesion.1
Habermas’s notion of a public sphere has been reinvigorated by the at-
tention directed to the diasporic and transnational movement of peoples 
around the world. Ethnographers and other scholars attentive to these 
populations on the move have relied on his concept to delineate the cultural 
space where people distant from their homeland, and oftentimes distant 
from one another, forge some common communal identity (Appadurai 
1996; Werbner 1998). Victoria Bernal’s work, for example, reveals how the 
Internet serves not only as “an arena of nonviolent confl ict in a violent 
world but also as a multiplier of outrage and as a vehicle for mobilizing ac-
tion in situations of confl ict” (2005, 662). Generally speaking, these schol-
ars agree that there is more going on within these public spheres than the 
“rational discussion” proposed by Habermas: these public spheres are the 
sites at which culture is produced.
This model suggests that the task before me is to examine the con-
tours of the Indian diasporic public sphere—to investigate how Indians 
in Bahrain engage in a communal diasporic public discourse with Indians 
from Canada, India itself, the other Gulf states, Singapore, and the count-
less other locations where members of this long-standing diaspora now 
make their home. This model also suggests that the business of unpacking 
the other public spheres in the cosmopolitan Gulf states—say, the Pakistani 
diasporic public sphere, the Filipino diasporic public sphere, or the Bahraini 
public sphere—is the purview of other ethnographers and scholars. Rather 
than pursuing this model, I am interested in delineating the contours of the 
public sphere that overlaps the many communities present on the island—a 
public sphere where Indians talk with other Indians, but also with Bahrainis, 
Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, Britishers, Americans, and the many 
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other peoples who make a home on the island. The idea that Indians be-
come and perform their “Indian-ness” in discussion with one another (and 
across the transnational divide) is certainly true. Yet they also become and 
perform that “Indian-ness” through discussion and debate with the many 
peoples who also make their home on the island. An examination of this 
overarching public sphere tells us something about the experiences of each 
group, about the way they perceive themselves, about the relations among 
these groups in Bahrain, and about the ideas that underpin the structural 
forces described in previous chapters.
Diasporic Social Clubs and Voluntary Associations
The Bab al-Bahrain, or “door to Bahrain,” is a colonial-era edifi ce on the 
maritime front of the old souk in central Manama. Although infi ll and con-
struction have pushed the actual shoreline well beyond the former wharf 
and customs house described by the oldest individuals with whom I spoke, 
the Bab al-Bahrain remains an important reference point in the contempo-
rary city. From that central hub, the narrow roads crowded with pedestrians 
and slow-moving vehicles reach back into the heart of the market. Small 
hotels, mosques, countless stores, and restaurants line the close-quartered 
streets. By following these streets back from the waterfront, one eventually 
emerges into a dense residential neighborhood where residual members 
of the citizenry’s most impoverished classes live side by side with the bur-
geoning population of transnational laborers.2 Unlike their more fortunate 
brethren in labor camps or company-arranged apartment buildings, many 
of the transnational laborers in this beleaguered neighborhood are illegal 
workers. Through the confl uence of circumstances described in previous 
chapters, the men in this neighborhood largely work on the black market, 
selling their labor to whomever they can fi nd for a few dinars a day. In 
buildings rented from Bahraini owners, transmigrant laborers crowd into 
the small rooms. In some of the apartments men sleep in shifts.
On a hot summer night in 2003, one of these buildings caught fi re. 
Sanjay, a South Indian laborer, had returned home some two hours earlier 
from a party at the company for which he currently works. He fell fast 
asleep. Shortly before midnight, he was abruptly awakened by the Pakistani 
men who roomed down the hall. Smoke had already fi lled the building. 
Together the men made their way to the roof. Finding a small ladder in 
the debris scattered on the rooftop, they laid it across the span between 
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buildings and slowly crossed. With smoke billowing all around them, they 
thought that the building next door might also be on fi re. They made a 
second crossing and were fi nally able to descend to the street. Outside their 
former home they gathered with the other workers, most of whom wore 
nothing more than their undergarments, and watched the building burn. 
Miraculously, all of the building’s occupants survived. Sanjay lamented his 
own personal loss—80 dinars ($210) in savings, the air conditioner that he 
and his roommates had recently purchased, and the DVD player and televi-
sion that he himself had purchased. Sanjay had been away from India for 
over ten years, and these last two items were his and his alone—the product 
of those many years of hard work, and items of signifi cant symbolic as well 
as monetary value. Unlike the papers of many of his fl atmates, his Central 
Population Register card and other valuable documents were with his cur-
rent employer—part of his effort to again legalize his status on the island—
and were hence spared from the fl ames.
For several nights the men slept on the sidewalk or in the beds of pickup 
trucks parked on the street. The owner of the building initially refused to 
provide any assistance, and few of the men had a responsible kafeel to which 
they might turn.3 Within a few days, several groups materialized to provide 
assistance. The Pakistani Club provided air conditioners and assorted items 
to the Pakistani men in the building. A group called Helping Hands and 
another called the Art of Living contributed various essentials to the build-
ing’s inhabitants regardless of nationality. Six days after the fi re I received a 
call from my friend Santosh. He invited me to come down to Tamil Social 
and Cultural Association (TASCA), the principal social club for the Tamil 
contingent of the Indian community, and help with the allocation of essen-
tials to the men displaced by the fi re.4 Twenty or thirty of the now-homeless 
Indian laborers waited in front of the club, and over the course of several 
hours we distributed bananas, rice, fruit drinks, work boots, lunch boxes, 
small cooking stoves (or “cookers” in the Indian iteration), and a variety of 
other items. Some of the men were from Tamil Nadu, but many came from 
other Indian states. Later, Sanjay and his former roommate came to my fl at 
for a light dinner, after which we talked about the fi re, their experiences in 
Bahrain, and the role that the various institutions of the Indian community 
had played in assisting them with their ongoing plight.
Over the course of a year in Bahrain I spent many of my evenings at 
TASCA, the Indian Club, and many of the other social clubs and volun-
tary associations in the diasporic community. The constellation of diasporic 
social institutions in Bahrain is unparalleled elsewhere in the Gulf, and it 
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is around dramatic events like the one described here that many of them 
spring to action. My understanding of these clubs and associations began 
with an interest in how these social forms provided help and assistance to 
those transnational laborers most exploited by the system of relations in 
place on the island. In a sense, I remain tied to that analysis, for these clubs 
and associations provide the primary response to the periodic crises—both 
collective and individual—faced by members of the Indian community. As 
I came to know these clubs and associations better, however, I began to un-
derstand that these venues also constituted the primary social foundation 
for foreign workers’ participation in the complex public sphere of contem-
porary Bahrain. In the remainder of this chapter, I move from looking at 
these clubs as a counterbalance to the structural violence of contemporary 
relations on the island to an understanding of how members of the Indian 
community position themselves in the public sphere through their partici-
pation in these clubs and associations.
Six Social Clubs
The constellation of social clubs and voluntary associations one encoun-
ters in Bahrain is unique in the Gulf context. In several of the other Gulf 
states—Oman, for example—the state allows only a single umbrella orga-
nization to serve each national contingent. In Bahrain, however, the gov-
ernment has allowed the fl orescence of these clubs to proceed with only 
occasional hindrance. As Fuad Khuri (1980) described, Bahraini social and 
political clubs have a long and important history in the political landscape 
of the island as the principal site of the citizenry’s political activity under 
the authoritarian regime. Diasporic social clubs predate these indigenous 
clubs on the island, but today they also build on the legacy of those strong 
indigenous social clubs. The proliferation of these social clubs also marks 
Bahrain as more liberal and open than its neighbors, an identity that re-
mains key to the state’s vision of its ongoing role as a service hub to the 
conservative neighboring nations. Many of the transmigrants with whom 
I spoke noted that these social clubs are one of the particular attractions of 
diasporic life in Bahrain—a social luxury unavailable across the causeway 
in Saudi Arabia, for example. At the same time, the analysis presented here 
demonstrates that these social clubs package diasporic culture behind villa 
walls—effectively moving the practice of foreign culture out of the public 
sphere and, in many cases, beyond the direct concern of a citizenry that 
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continues to struggle with the ramifi cations of the transnational presence 
on the island.
No simple accounting of these social clubs is possible, for the constella-
tion of active clubs on the island includes not only those formal groups reg-
istered with the Ministry of Social Development, but also those informal 
groups active around the island. From the government’s perspective, all 
these groups are classifi ed as nongovernmental organizations. Prospective 
clubs must provide the ministry with an abundance of information, includ-
ing minutes from the meeting of the founding general assembly, the names 
and signatures of founding members, copies of their identity cards, and the 
club’s constitution. Registered groups also consent to regular monitoring 
by the state. As of 2008, the Ministry of Social Development recorded a 
total of 423 registered nongovernmental organizations. This number in-
cludes 46 diasporic social clubs and 19 religious organizations. The remain-
ing clubs are predominately citizen-based organizations. I present brief 
snapshots of six different diasporic associations, which yields a fairly rep-
resentative cross-section of the institutions that together make up much of 
the social fabric of diasporic life on the island.
The Indian Club
My fi rst visit to the Indian Club occurred on one of the few rainy nights 
of my stay in Bahrain. Several weeks after my arrival on the island, an 
Indian professor and colleague from my institutional sponsor in Bahrain 
suggested we meet at the Indian Club for a drink and discussion. My gra-
cious host had found himself on the tail end of a long career in academia, 
and so with a few years left in which to amass enough savings to retire com-
fortably, he and his wife had relocated from India to Bahrain for the op-
portunities it provided. The professor arrived at the club shortly after I did, 
and meeting at the entrance we moved from the densely urban streets of 
central Manama, bustling with South Asian workers, through the security 
checkpoint that ascertains one’s membership or, in my case, guest  status, 
and onto the grounds of the club. Children played cricket on the twin ten-
nis courts, shouting to each other in English as their parents sat around the 
tables between the courts and the bar.
Founded in 1915, the Indian Club is the oldest of the Indian expatri-
ate social clubs on the island (Franklin 1985, 488). It has the largest mem-
bership (estimated to me at 1,200 families), and that membership is 
regionally and religiously mixed. Although a handful of Bahrainis and 
other non-Indians hold memberships, Indians—and particularly South 
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Indians—predominate. The club relocated to its current premises in the 
mid-1940s, and those premises, including tennis courts, meeting halls, and 
other open spaces, are the largest among the South Asian expatriate clubs. 
Along with the sizable auditorium at the Indian School, the premises of 
the Indian Club often serve the community’s need of accommodations for 
large meetings, celebrations, and other activities. The club’s reading room 
contains a wide variety newspapers and periodicals from India. Two bars 
serve as meeting points for the diverse membership, and in the smaller ad-
joining meeting rooms I observed various performances and activities dur-
ing my occasional visits.
The Indian Club principally serves the diasporic elite. In his close ex-
amination of the Indian Club two decades ago, Franklin found that a long 
waiting list for membership, combined with a vetting process that focuses 
on “prestige, occupation, and infl uence,” serves to maintain a membership 
that, although from a diversity of regions within India, is fairly homog-
enous in terms of social class (1985, 490). Add to this calculus the fact that 
high membership dues screen the lower middle class from the membership 
rolls and we are left with a contemporary portrait similar to what Franklin 
described in the 1980s: the Indian Club remains a venue for the diasporic 
elite and their families.
Although its members may come from the middle and upper classes of 
the Indian diaspora, the club nonetheless includes individuals from across 
the categorical divisions—be they ethnic, regional, or religious—of the 
Indian community. As one of the former presidents of the club remarked, 
in many ways the trans-Indian identity fostered by the club is a vestige of 
social relations constructed in decades past: “In 1915 . . . it wasn’t called the 
Indian Club, for there were very few Indians here [in Bahrain] . . . at the time 
it was the only club, and the population here were Indians. Not Keralite, 
not Karnataka, but Indians. So there was no need for these other clubs. 
It was only in recent years that they started forming these other clubs.” In 
contrast to the fl orescence of regionally and religiously specifi c clubs, the 
Indian Club continues to represent itself as a venue specifi cally aligned with 
a particular vision of India—one aligned with both the Indian School and 
the Indian embassy, which are seen as representative of the whole of India. 
Beneath the surface, however, regional frictions and other lines of tension 
continue to be exerted and performed in the context of the club. The former 
president, continuing his comments from above, added that “the Indian 
Club now has become very political. You have the north and the south—
you have different groups. . . . These are ethnic divisions that are played 
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out in the context of the club, and geographical too, because you have the 
South Indian group—the Malayalee group, and you have the north Indian 
group. And I guess at the Indian Club, there is also the Sindhi group.”
Although the Indian Club, like the Indian School and a handful of other 
institutions on the island, is confi gured around the idea of a singular na-
tional Indian identity, these venues nonetheless provide space for the ex-
pression of regional, ethnic, religious, and class-based identities within the 
larger domain of a single Indian national identity. Unlike the smaller re-
gional clubs, which, individually, can be conceived of as locations for trans-
migrants to reconnect with particularistic Indian identities, the Indian Club 
serves as a domain for the iteration or performance of those identities in re-
lation to one another. It is a venue in which the diasporic elite can challenge, 
articulate, or support the idea of a singular national identity that transcends 
the regional, linguistic, cultural, and religious differences attributed to the 
Indian homeland.
The Tamil Social and Cultural Association
For nearly twenty years, transmigrants from the state of Tamil Nadu 
met together unoffi cially. The once-small diasporic constituency organized 
meetings in each other’s fl ats or borrowed larger spaces from existing clubs 
to produce the events and shows they planned together. At the turn of 
the millennium, the group fi nally secured premises in central Manama and 
registered with the Ministry of Social Development. The formalization of 
the Tamil Social and Cultural Association (TASCA) coincided with two 
decades of demographic expansion of the transmigrant networks between 
Tamil Nadu and Bahrain. Although the offi cial numbers are not released by 
the Bahraini government, the Tamil community now claims to be second 
in size only to that of Kerala among the Indian communities on the island. 
Like many of the other regional social clubs, TASCA’s membership is com-
posed of a cross-section of the Tamil population that extends lower into 
the economic strata of the transmigrant population than does the Indian 
Club. Reasonable membership fees ensure that even the diasporic lower 
middle class can join, and although the poorest transmigrant laborers are 
still unable to participate in the routine club activities, much of the club’s 
programming includes outreach activities to the labor camps and apart-
ment buildings in which the poorest Tamil laborers dwell (see fi g. 5.1).
Like many of the Indian social clubs, TASCA occupies a villa in one of 
the city’s central neighborhoods. A low wall separates the premises from the 
street, and the front porch typically contains various pieces of furniture or 
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boxed items either on their way in or out of the club. Inside, what was once 
a former residence has been converted to a busy and crowded social club. 
The majlis, or greeting room, where the former residents once entertained 
visitors, is now one of the main meeting rooms for the members. Upstairs 
is a small bar—the principal source of income for the club—a game room, 
and offi ces. Like all the regional clubs, foot traffi c in the club surges in the 
evening hours as men and women fi nish their workday.
Like most of the Indian social clubs, TASCA organizes a wide variety of 
events for its membership. Committees plan for celebrations of Chithirai 
Thirunaal, or the Tamil New Year, as well as for Diwali (the Pan-Indian/
Hindu festival of lights) and Pongal (a four-day celebration, originally 
linked to bountiful crops, and particularly popular among Tamils). Like 
most of the Indian social clubs on the island, TASCA also plans a celebration 
for the Bahraini Eid holiday. The club’s Ladies Wing demonstrates cooking 
techniques and spreads beauty tips among the interested members. There 
are dance classes for children, and the club maintains a library stocked with 
a variety of Tamil periodicals and literature. TASCA also fi elds sports teams 
in intramural competitions on the island. The Social Service Subcommittee 
of TASCA was particularly active during my time in Bahrain. Through that 
committee’s efforts, the club provided food, free clothing, and advice to 
impoverished men in some of the Tamil labor camps. The committee also 
Figure 5.1. South Asian laborers displaced by the building fi re await assistance from the 
TASCA outreach committee. Photograph by Andrew Gardner.
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conducted medical-training and health education seminars in the camps, 
including various programs concerning good hygiene and the benefi ts of 
both yoga and meditation to the physiological well-being of day laborers.
TASCA is representative of the vast majority of the diasporic clubs in 
Bahrain. A handful of other clubs—the Pakistan Club, the Indian Club, 
and the now-defunct Indian Association—explicitly address their diasporic 
constituents at a national level. Conversely, numerous clubs are even more 
specifi c in their constituencies than TASCA: the Kerala Catholic Club, for 
example, draws individuals through the categories of both region and re-
ligion. TASCA, based on regional (and, in some senses, linguistic) affi lia-
tion, occupies the crowded middle ground between more specifi c and more 
general venues of affi liation on the island. That middle ground is perhaps 
best exemplifi ed by the executive committee at the time of my research: 
the president, a Tamil Muslim, presided over an executive committee that 
included Hindu, Muslim, and Christian individuals.
Toastmasters
The Toastmasters Club was founded in the United States by Ralph C. 
Smedley, whose name was honored in the introductory remarks of every 
Toastmasters meeting I attended in Bahrain. Established in Santa Ana, 
California, in 1924, the club expanded rapidly during the mid-twentieth 
century and now includes 230,000 members worldwide. The club’s intro-
duction to the Gulf occurred through a direct American connection. In 
the 1950s, Bahrain constructed a small enclave by the name of Awali for 
American workers, most of whom were associated with the oil industry. 
The Bahrain chapter of the Toastmasters formed in Awali in 1964, and al-
though the initial members were for the most part American, a few Indian 
engineers and technicians also participated. As the active American mem-
bers departed the island, Indian participants continued to fuel the club’s 
activity. Through the interest and dedication of this original diasporic co-
hort, the Toastmasters persevered and eventually fl ourished on the island. 
At the time of my fi eldwork, there were twenty active chapters in greater 
Manama, and additional chapters have formed in the other Gulf states.5 
The chapter I joined was the current manifestation of that original chapter 
from Awali, and my fi rst meeting was the group’s 1,900th gathering.
Originally designed as a forum to “afford practice and training in the art 
of public speaking and in presiding over meetings, and to promote sociabil-
ity and good fellowship among its members,” the chapters in Bahrain serve 
that purpose and more.6 For the diasporic elite, the Toastmasters meetings 
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provide an opportunity to practice and engage the discursive terrain of the 
global fi nancescape—to, as the Toastmasters Web site suggests, give better 
sales presentations, hone management skills, effectively develop and pres-
ent ideas, and offer constructive criticism. In other chapters, the activities 
of a typical meeting serve a much more practical purpose: the speeches and 
presentations provide an ideal opportunity to practice English, the lingua 
franca of the higher echelons of the global economy, which brought many 
of the men and women to Bahrain.
The Manama chapter’s membership dues ensure that only the elite can 
join this particular group. Meetings are held weekly at one of the nicest 
hotels on the island; men and women are expected to wear business at-
tire. Although the majority of the members of this chapter were from the 
Indian diaspora, the membership also included individuals from Bahrain, 
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Bangladesh. Other chapters are re-
gionally specifi c: TASCA, for example, has its own chapter of Toastmasters 
that draws from its Tamil membership, as do the chapters at many of the 
other regionally, linguistically, or ethnically homogeneous social clubs on 
the island. I attended meetings held by three different chapters, and at all 
three sets of meetings women were well represented in both the member-
ship and the leadership.
In general terms, the topics presented and discussed during meetings 
centered on personal development and the tribulations of confi guring a 
successful path through the cosmopolitan workplace in Bahrain. Members 
seemed to be reproducing, rehearsing, and refl ecting upon the discourse 
they deploy daily in offi ces around the island. The Manama Toastmasters—
the chapter I joined, and the most ethnically and nationally diverse chapter 
on the island—maintained an informal policy of omitting politically ori-
ented topics (such as the policies of the Bahraini state, the Indian/Pakistani 
confl ict, or the U.S. incursion in Iraq) from the presentations, perhaps be-
cause of the heterogeneous membership of the chapter. That there was no 
place for politics in their discussions is perhaps a refl ection of the condi-
tions and circumstances the members face in their everyday lives: politics, 
ethnicity, nationality, and religion confound the logic of the cosmopolitan 
and neoliberal workplace on the island.
The Lions Club
The original Lions Club in Bahrain, formed some twenty years ago, 
was the fi rst of its kind in the Gulf. The Bahrain chapter grew rapidly, and 
the Lions Club of Riffa was formed in 1995 as an offshoot of the oversized 
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original club. The Riffa chapter also met with success: it had 75 members at 
its high point in the late 1990s, but Bahrainization and the subsequent depar-
tures depleted membership to approximately 40 members. Although all are 
welcome, the Lions Club of Riffa is predominately Muslim and includes suc-
cessful merchants, businessmen, and professionals from both the Indian and 
Pakistani communities. Many of these individuals are also leaders or former 
leaders of other social clubs and associations on the island. Like the Manama 
Toastmasters, the Lions Club of Riffa has no quarters of its own but in-
stead gathers regularly at upscale hotels. Attendees are expected to wear busi-
ness attire, and meetings typically included a dozen or so individuals. Three 
women also regularly participated during my interaction with the club.
The Riffa chapter’s activities are largely oriented toward outreach. As the 
president stated, “we engage in social service regardless of caste, creed and 
color.” Over a single year (2002), the club provided food to the poor during 
Ramadan, donated sewing machines and computers to the needy, funded 
a life-saving operation for a Bahraini child, took blind children on a beach 
picnic, took mentally disabled Bahraini children to a dolphin marine park, 
cleaned beaches, greeted sick children during the Eid holiday, sponsored a 
Bahraini youth’s trip to a leadership training program in the United States, 
led a drug awareness campaign, conducted an essay contest for children, 
organized free dental hygiene and checkups for mentally disabled Bahraini 
children, and conducted a wide variety of other service and outreach activi-
ties. In pulling these activities together, members draw on the signifi cant re-
sources they command through their businesses and contacts; money, food, 
and a variety of other items are donated from their businesses to these ends.
Unlike many of the other diasporic associations on the island, the Lions 
Club of Riffa directs its outreach efforts primarily toward Bahraini citizens 
rather than toward the transmigrant underclass. In my discussions with the 
members of the club, several pointed to the history of the British presence 
on the island, whose legacy is now remembered by many as one of a group 
who “never gave anything back to the local community,” to quote one of 
the club’s members. The Lions Club of Riffa certainly will not suffer the 
same fate. Its coordinated efforts reach the lower classes of the Bahraini 
community, and the members are careful to always call photographers from 
the island’s newspapers to document these events. The club also hosts sev-
eral fancy dinners and events during the year at which luminaries from the 
Bahraini government, the business community, and the various embassies 
serve as guest speakers or honorable attendees. These activities not only 
reinforce the club’s status among the diasporic classes but also counteract 
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the popular perception of the diasporic communities as parasites on the 
Bahraini economy. Careful not to articulate a message critical of the sys-
temic inequities within the Bahraini social structure, the elite members of 
the Riffa Lions Club envision their activities as returning something to the 
society in which they have prospered.
Ecumenical Council of Charity
Bahrain is somewhat unique in the context of the Gulf in terms of the 
proliferation of non-Muslim religious spaces on the island. Noteworthy is 
the large Hindu temple located in the center of the city’s old market district. 
Invisible from the streets of the busy souk, the temple is entered through a 
long passageway, whose access is on a street crowded with Indian-owned 
businesses. This particular venue was established and is still controlled by 
the Bhatia segment of the Indian diaspora and mainly serves Hindus from 
Gujarat, Maharati, and Punjab;7 two other temples in other locations (both 
in large villas) serve other Hindu constituencies.
The Christian community in Bahrain uses the large Catholic church 
(with a school), the historic Anglican church, and several other compounds 
scattered in the central districts of the city. The Anglican church grounds in-
clude the church itself, along with several wings. The spaces in those wings 
are loaned to a number of non-Anglican denominations and various associ-
ated groups. After several months on the island, I began attending meet-
ings of the Ecumenical Council of Charity (ECC), held monthly in one of 
the rooms on the Anglican compound. The ECC is a nondenominational 
Christian voluntary organization specifi cally confi gured to reach out to in-
dividuals in crisis. Monthly meetings are informal and begin with a prayer. 
The remainder of the meeting consists of reporting on outreach activities 
currently under way and planning future efforts.
In the several meetings that I attended, discussion largely focused on 
the hospital visits conducted by a team of ECC members. Although their 
primary goal was to console individuals amid diffi culties—and to pray for 
those individuals—the hospital visits also allowed the ECC to identify par-
ticular scenarios in which they might provide monetary or other forms of 
assistance to individuals in need. Examples from one of those meetings 
included the following:
• A Sri Lankan domestic worker had been diagnosed with breast cancer, 
but her sponsor refused to release her passport until she paid him 300 di-
nars [$850]. She was languishing in the hospital and did not have the money 
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to pay for her release. The council decided to contribute 100 dinars [$265] 
to this end.
• A thirty-eight-year-old Indian male was injured by an automobile 
while riding his bicycle. He had a heart attack and suffered brain damage. 
The man needed to be repatriated to India, and although the sponsor was 
willing to pay for three seats (so he could lie down), two more seats were 
needed for a nurse and an assistant. The council decided to refer this case 
to the Indian embassy and to the Indian Community Relief Fund, as they 
have funds dedicated to this purpose.
• An Indian laborer suffered a heart attack on a construction site and 
was languishing in the hospital. His sponsor was unconcerned with the 
laborer’s welfare. The ECC had successfully contacted his family to let them 
know that he was now in the hospital in Bahrain. Plans to repatriate him 
were under way, but details remained scarce. The council concluded that 
they would continue to evaluate the situation.
Overall, the ECC’s efforts typically focused on contacting other agencies 
and institutions, thereby engaging the disparate and apolitical diasporic 
networks that take responsibility for the various transmigrant constituen-
cies. Often this task is as simple as contacting the various embassies on 
the island. In many situations, however, the ECC also provided monetary 
support, particularly when injured, ill, or dead transmigrant laborers faced 
unresponsive sponsors. This assistance, while often framed in terms of a 
Christian ethos, was provided to individuals regardless of religion, ethnic-
ity, or nationality.
Indian Ladies Association
As the former president and longtime member of the Indian Ladies 
Association stated, “we are a high-profi le organization.” Formed in 1956 by a 
group of wealthy women from Bahrain’s Indian diaspora, the Indian Ladies 
Association (ILA) draws its membership from the Indian diasporic elite. 
Originally a forum for women to “hold a monthly tea and meet weekly to 
sew, make handicrafts, and socialize” (Franklin 1985, 487), the ILA in the in-
tervening years has taken on a variety of more ambitious projects and goals, 
many of which are directly aimed at serving both the diasporic and indig-
enous populations on the island. The Kitchen Craft Committee and the 
Beauty and Fashion Committee of many years’ standing have been joined 
by a Community Service Committee and its Workers’ Subcommittee. 
Membership in the ILA fl uctuated between 150 and 200 members over the 
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decade prior to my fi eldwork, and together the members, which included 
both professional women and the wives of businessmen and merchants, 
represented the social apex of the Indian community. The ILA also has a 
structural arrangement with the Indian embassy: the wife of the Indian 
ambassador is the honorary president of the association.
During 2002 and 2003, much of the ILA’s energies were devoted to 
the ongoing support and maintenance of SNEHA, a center for mentally 
disabled youth from the diasporic communities on the island.8 The seed 
for this project was planted by a former ILA member. She and her hus-
band brought their mentally disabled child on their professional sojourn to 
the Gulf, and because the government-organized centers for such children 
on the island were for citizens only, they found no institutional support 
for the care of their child. Together the women of the ILA founded the 
SNEHA center, whose headquarters were located in a large offi ce building 
in central Manama. The center was fully funded and partially staffed by 
the members of the association. In granting a charter for the center, the 
Bahraini government imposed a limit of twenty children, and the center 
was operating at full capacity in 2003. The budget for the center was ap-
proximately BD10,000 ($26,500), derived through a combination of do-
nations and fund-raising. The SNEHA premises were also used for other 
purposes, including a low-cost English course aimed at the transmigrant 
working class.9
During my time in Bahrain, the ILA also conducted a wide variety of 
programs aimed at the men in the labor camps scattered about the island. 
Once a month the women, working closely with a set of labor camp su-
pervisors, arranged for a home-cooked Indian meal to be delivered to a 
particular camp on Friday, typically the day of rest for most laborers. The 
members’ contacts in the labor camps proved useful for planning the an-
nual workers’ talent show, held on the grounds of the Indian Club in 2003 
(see fi g. 5.2). This large event drew 1,600 laborers (along with a variety 
of luminaries from the diasporic community, all of whom sat in the re-
served section in front of the stage). Laborers performed skits and songs 
for a variety of prizes, including a round-trip ticket to India on Air India. 
Performers from the Indian diasporic community and a few imported from 
India sang songs and danced, and food was provided to all the men. As 
the chairwoman of the Workers’ Subcommittee observed: “[The workers] 
are talented, and they have the capacity, but unfortunately the way they 
live . . . they have no chance to show these talents. You see, you have to be-
come a member of a club to show these kinds of talents, but where will they 
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get the kind of money to become a member? So we do this for them. They 
sing, they enjoy, they are quite happy.”
Among its many other annual activities, the ILA also arranges a show 
for the Bahraini emir’s wife and a variety of her female relatives and friends. 
As many of the women in the royal family have a minimal public presence, 
the event is relished by both parties.10 The ILA arranges for the event to be 
held in a fi ve-star hotel, and, as a former president of the ILA described, 
“we put on a colorful dance or fashion show for them, arrange raffl e prizes 
for them—it’s an evening just for them. It’s only ladies—about 400 or 500.” 
The ILA’s interaction with the royal family also includes visits to the emir’s 
wife’s majlis, where, often, the association receives substantial donations 
that fund its projects. The interaction between the ILA and the royal family 
is unusual in comparison to the activities of other social clubs and associa-
tions on the island, and is a symbol of the status maintained by the mem-
bers of the ILA.
As the tenor of the chairwoman’s comments about the workers’ talent 
show indicates, reaching out to the poorest members of the transmigrant 
Figure 5.2. Indian men dancing and celebrating at the 2003 workers’ talent show, 
hosted by the Indian Ladies Association at the Indian Club. Photograph by Kristin 
Giordano.
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class is an act that provides the men with a welcome and rare break from 
the diffi cult conditions they face in the camp and, at the same time, affi rms 
the class distinctions within the diasporic community. The activities of the 
ILA—from its outreach activities with the labor camps to the private meet-
ings with the women of the royal family—assert a parity between the elite 
members of Bahraini society and the elite members of the Indian diaspora. 
In other words, many of these activities highlight social class as the primary 
logic of the culturally plural space of Bahrain and, in doing so, push reli-
gion, ethnicity, and nationality into the shadows.
Social Clubs in Context
The social clubs and voluntary associations on the island take many 
forms, but they all share a set of challenges specifi c to the transnational mi-
lieu of contemporary Bahrain. Perhaps the foremost of these challenges re-
volves around the cyclical and itinerant nature of the transmigrants’ stay in 
the Gulf. The nature of the transnational environment—where individuals 
are moving back and forth between India or moving onward from Bahrain 
to other locations—makes the retention of a core set of members diffi cult. 
Those with ample free time to organize, manage, and lead clubs or com-
mittees within clubs are commonly individuals in well-paid positions who 
observe typical work hours, either seven o’clock to three or nine o’clock to 
fi ve. It is these very positions, however, that the collection of government 
policies known as Bahrainization seeks to replace with citizen-workers. 
Hence many of these social clubs must constantly cope with member attri-
tion—and particularly the members most capable of devoting the time and 
energy to the club or association’s activities. As the president of the Riffa 
chapter of the Lions Club described, “We started with 75 members, and 
eventually came down to less than 40 members. The main reason for the 
loss of members is departures related to the Bahrainization scheme. I don’t 
blame the Bahrainis—this is their home, their place. But that’s certainly the 
biggest cause. Like my brother—he left the island and is in the States, and 
he’s started a new Lions Club in Chicago. But yes, departure is a problem. 
Last year we lost ten members. The year before that we lost even more.”
By the end of my fi eldwork in Bahrain, the president of the Riffa 
chapter had fi nalized his own plans for emigration to the United States. 
Vaishali, a longtime member of the Indian Ladies Association, painted a 
similar portrait: “Our membership fl uctuates. This year, for example, I’ll 
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have a set of members that withdraw, but I’ll have other new members 
that come. . . . Over the last few years, many have either retired and gone 
back—gone on to Canada or gone back to India because their husbands 
have lost their jobs. But the association is steady—we do the work! There 
are at least twenty members like me who’ve been constantly active since 
1985. But with the others, you cannot say from year to year.”
While clear about the challenges presented by the transnational milieu, 
Vaishali is also clear about the important role played by the social clubs 
and voluntary associations. Together, these social institutions comprise 
the basic social fabric of diasporic culture and society in Bahrain—the only 
diasporic institutions with some degree of permanence in the transnational 
milieu. For Durkheim, institutions such as these were the basis of society in 
that they transcend the individual’s temporal existence; in the transnational 
milieu of contemporary Bahrain, it is not just the lifespan of the men and 
women that pales next to the permanence of these institutions—it is the 
transmigrants’ temporary existence in the conduits of transnational migra-
tion that makes the relative permanence of these institutions so important.
The social clubs and other voluntary organizations face additional chal-
lenges in the context of contemporary Bahrain. The Bahraini Ministry of 
Social Affairs licenses and registers all social clubs. As one former club pres-
ident commented: “The ministry must approve all these new clubs, and to 
get a license for a fresh club is not very easy. There are already more than 200 
clubs here in Bahrain, and it’s diffi cult to regulate. They want everybody to 
merge and form larger clubs. There are sports clubs, professional clubs, so-
cial clubs . . . and the government thinks this is a problem.” In recent years, 
the Ministry of Social Development has monitored, disciplined, and closed 
several active clubs on the island. Oftentimes these events are in response 
to complaints from citizens about drinking and “mixing,” the term gener-
ally used for open and public interaction between genders.11 Vaishali also 
reported that the ministry curtailed the transnational movement of funds 
collected by clubs: “Initially, and even through 1991, we [the ILA] used to 
send money to India. We collect money, and we have a fund, so our mem-
bers used to bring all kinds of applications. Suppose in my village there is a 
fund, an orphanage that needs a little money. So I can probably suggest my 
center, and maybe the name of somebody involved, but anyway, in 1991 the 
Ministry of Bahrain stopped that. There is no need to send it [money] to 
India, they said—why don’t you spend it here?”
Relations between the diasporic social clubs and the government re-
veal another aspect of governance of the transnational populations on the 
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island. The social clubs, while providing an important venue for sharing 
information and participating in the diasporic culture, nonetheless do not 
provide a platform for challenging the hegemony of the state, for assert-
ing some semblance of basic rights for noncitizens, or for challenging the 
systemic aspects of the structural violence many foreign workers endure.12 
Some of the clubs and associations seek to assist laborers in particularly 
dire circumstances—the Ecumenical Council of Charity was engaged in 
a variety of outreach activities to the most impoverished laborers, and a 
dedicated TASCA subcommittee dealt weekly with delivering various 
forms of assistance to the most marginalized members of the Tamil com-
munity. Generally speaking, however, these activities posed no challenge 
to the structure of relations underlying the violence and exploitation many 
of these impoverished foreign workers endured. In paying off sponsors, 
providing food and shelter to workers abandoned by their kafeel, or raising 
funds to help sick or deceased foreign workers return to India, these clubs 
and associations sought to redress the detritus of this system without con-
fronting its underlying cause. In short, the clubs and associations’ activities 
were to be cultural, not political, in nature.
Indian Culture behind Walls
These social clubs and voluntary associations provide a constellation of 
options for performing “Indian-ness,” although, as many of the men and 
women stated, outside their homes and social clubs they were simply treated 
as South Asians. In essence, the markers of more specifi c identities—class, 
region, religion, and so forth—were elided in the public sphere of Bahrain. 
In their descriptions, these homogenizing experiences in the public spaces 
and workplaces on the island took many forms. Newspapers refer to the 
nationality of foreigners, reporting them as Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, 
and so forth. Even those Indians who were born and raised in Bahrain 
observed that having a Bahraini passport would do little to change the na-
ture of their interactions with the citizenry: they are Indians and foreign 
to the genealogical conceptions of citizenship that shape relations between 
individuals and the state. In the world of Bahrain, Indian workers are con-
stantly racialized. Faced with a system that reinforces this singular identity, 
social clubs and voluntary organizations provide a key venue for reinvesting 
in the specifi cities lurking beneath the transcendent Indian identity. It is 
in those venues that one can perform being a Keralite, or a Christian, or a 
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Tamil Catholic. In these clubs and associations individuals reconnect with 
the particularistic identities that make them Indian, that make them some-
thing more than just foreign workers. As the former president of one of the 
largest social clubs on the island described,
[For Indians] away from those clubs, their life in the general world of 
Bahrain is a second class life. They have to obey someone, they have 
to do unpleasureable things to please someone. There’s a kind of hu-
miliation, frustration in their work. When they come from that world 
to the club, or to the Indian embassy, which is their own world, then 
there they remember that I’m an Indian citizen, and I have a right to 
complain about the table being dirty, or the bathroom stinking. They 
write a letter. It’s the action of a person that’s not satisfi ed with life in 
the outside world of Bahrain. He goes to his own, he’s got no family 
here, he can’t shout at his wife that his tea isn’t ready. So such people, 
they take it out on someone somewhere. And the only people that 
will listen to them are their own people at the Indian School, Indian 
embassy, or Indian Club. If they did the same thing at their job, they 
would say pack up and leave the country.
Sheba George (2000) observed, in her analysis of the husbands of Keralite 
nurses within a community in the United States, that the men who accom-
pany the nurses are disenfranchised and disempowered in the American 
workforce. Voluntary associations—and particularly churches—offer “a 
unique setting for men to restore their lost identity and their self esteem. 
To compensate for demotion in the labor market and family, they use the 
church in three signifi cant ways: to assert their leadership, to develop a 
sense of belonging, and to secure their exclusiveness” (George 2000, 163). 
Voluntary associations in Bahrain serve a similar function: as spaces beyond 
the direct purview of citizens and state, social clubs and voluntary organiza-
tions provide key venues for the performance of “Indian-ness” and, at the 
same time, for the expression of the fi ssures in that identity.
For members of the Indian diaspora, social clubs and voluntary asso-
ciations provide one of the principal venues for the articulation and, alter-
natively, the rejection of class. At one level, Indian social clubs provide a 
closed system, outside the purview of citizenry and state, and beyond the 
habitus of everyday interactions between citizen and foreigner. The social 
clubs and associations are spaces where the statuses native to India can be 
deployed and utilized. Alternatively, some of the voluntary clubs provide 
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venues in which citizens and noncitizens mix, and, occasionally, locations 
where the class logic of the global capitalist system can be affi rmed rather 
than rejected. At one Toastmasters meeting, for example, I watched a club 
secretary of Indian descent browbeat a Bahraini member for his suggestion 
on the format for an upcoming award ceremony. The Indian member’s loud 
and angry tone was unusual—I had never observed any interaction like this 
outside the context of these social clubs and other voluntary organizations. 
Clubs like this chapter of the Toastmasters, designed for cosmopolitan 
English speakers from all the various communities on the island, provide 
not only venues in which middle-class and elite diasporic community mem-
bers practice English. They also provide venues in which the discourse of 
the professional class is practiced and, simultaneously, in which statuses 
achieved under the logic of the global capitalist system are deployed and af-
fi rmed. Unlike other spaces on the island, at this meeting the Bahraini and 
Indian were on equal footing.
At other junctures, however, voluntary associations and social clubs pro-
vide a venue for rejecting class hierarchies of the global, capitalist political 
economy, for these social clubs also provide a venue for reaffi rming the 
statuses and identities of the homeland. Although an individual’s caste or 
status in India may hold little sway with his or her sponsor or, alternatively, 
in the larger context of Bahraini culture, those categories may fi nd traction 
in the arena of the social club. Performing “Indian-ness” can take the form 
of reinvesting in the social and cultural aspects of Indian life that fi nd no 
traction in the larger public sphere in Bahrain.
Social Clubs, Voluntary Organizations, and the Public Sphere
At fi rst glance, these social clubs and voluntary associations might best 
be understood as another component of the stark social and cultural divi-
sions that characterize the Gulf states. Amid the strikingly plural context 
of the contemporary Gulf, the proliferation of these clubs and associations 
in Bahrain moves the collective performance of Indian culture behind club 
walls and into conference rooms of the large hotels on the island. Although 
these spaces provide an arena for the construction of meaning—for the ar-
ticulation of what it means to be an Indian, a Catholic Keralite Indian, 
or an elite cosmopolitan Indian—the generation of these identities seem-
ingly occurs in enclaves beyond the view of the Bahraini public. If that 
separateness is as absolute as this analysis suggests, perhaps these clubs are 
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best understood as nodes or venues in the Indian diasporic public sphere 
rather than as components of an all-encompassing public sphere located in 
Bahrain. Put another way, are these clubs and associations part of a hetero-
geneous Bahraini public sphere?
Several points can be brought to bear against this perspective. First, it 
seems obvious that as cloistered as much of this cultural performance is, 
nonetheless it is in constant dialogue with the experiences these men and 
women have outside those walls. The iteration of particularistic Indian 
identities is an act intricately intertwined with the world in which many 
of these men and women work and live. In the habitus of everyday inter-
actions on the island, these men and women are homogeneously framed 
as South Asian labor; hence the act of seeking and performing more par-
ticularlistic identities occurs against that backdrop. In other words, the 
meanings and identities they construct behind club walls are a response to 
their experiences and frustrations outside those walls: the Lions Club’s out-
reach activities to poor and disenfranchised Bahrainis is an assertion of the 
diasporic elite’s status, of the elite’s complicity with the vision of modernity 
promoted by the state, and, in the largest sense, with the neoliberal logic of 
a system that favors class over ethnicity, nationalism, religion, and culture. 
Or, in another sense, the intra-Indian political machinations of the Indian 
Club provide an opportunity to be political in ways that one cannot be be-
yond the walls of the club. As both of these examples suggest, the activities 
of these clubs are directly related to the experiences these men and women 
encounter in the larger public sphere in Bahrain.
Rather than think of these clubs and associations as components of dis-
crete diasporic public spheres, I suggest we think of them as active par-
ticipants in this plural and more comprehensive Bahraini public sphere. In 
this chapter, I have focused on how participation in that public sphere is 
fi ltered, constrained, and truncated by the social relations on the island. 
At times that governance seems external in nature. One can easily see, for 
example, how clubs and associations must avoid the ire of the state and 
citizenry, and therefore move their activities behind walls. At other times, 
however, it becomes apparent that these groups internalize the terms of this 
governance and collectively negotiate their representation to fi t the public 
they imagine. These forces and tensions are threads we can continue to 
trace in an examination of the English-language newspapers.
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Several years ago in Bahrain a young married couple joined friends 
for a seaside walk. The young man, twenty-four years of age and a for-
eign worker from Nepal, worked as an air conditioner repairman on the 
island—a valuable technical trade in the sweltering kingdom. His young 
wife, aged twenty-one and also from Nepal, worked as a waitress some-
where on the island. Together, the group of friends spent the afternoon on 
the Causeway, the 26-kilometer collection of jetties and bridges that since 
1986 has connected the small island kingdom with Saudi Arabia. At some 
point the young Nepalese couple diverged from their friends, clambered 
over the rocks along the shoreline, found a secluded spot and, by their own 
account, began kissing and cuddling.
High above them in the Causeway observation tower, a coastguard of-
fi cer on routine patrol spotted the young couple below. To quote the offi cer, 
“I was on my routine duty in the King Fahad Causeway restaurant tower 
and I observed a man and a woman lying on the rocks on the embankment 
of the causeway bridge and performing sex openly. . . . I was surprised at wit-
nessing this scene and decided to go down and stop this act. I caught them 
red-handed and then handed them over to the causeway police.” It was fur-
ther alleged that when arrested, the couple were naked from the waist down. 
The young man and his wife denied these allegations. In the young man’s 
words, “We were simply sitting on the rocks and my wife was sitting on my 
legs and then this policeman arrived and arrested us and took us to the police 
station. . . . We were fully dressed and my wife was on my lap and we were 
only hugging each other and kissing.” His wife delivered a similar version of 
the events to police: “I went with my husband near the sea and sat on the 
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rocks on the embankment and then we started to exchange kisses with each 
other for about fi ve minutes. Then suddenly this policeman appeared and 
arrested us.” The fate of the young Nepalese couple remains a mystery to me, 
for I came to know about this particular sequence of events through the Gulf 
Daily News, the predominant English-language newspaper on the island.1
At one level, this newspaper has provided a tapestry of events, stories, 
and reports that continues to situate the ethnographic data I personally 
collected in 2002 and 2003. This particular story, for example, provides an-
other glimpse of the governance of foreign workers on the island: their 
bodies, their behavior, and their relations can easily become the purview of 
both sponsors and the state. Perhaps more important, however, is that sto-
ries like this one are active agents of that governance, for stories broadcast 
through the newspapers, then told and retold in the many foreign commu-
nities on the island, delineate the powers of the state and reinforce the vul-
nerability that individual foreigners face. In the telling and retelling, these 
stories describe the parameters of appropriate and inappropriate behavior, 
and the risks foreigners face in an unfamiliar land.
More and more, however, I have also come to understand the role of this 
English-language newspaper as a central junction in the public discourse of 
the small island kingdom, a discourse that reveals the interests of the state, 
the topography of Bahraini nationalism, and the intricate friction between 
citizen and foreigner. Although newspapers have been of occasional interest 
to anthropologists, the connection between newspapers and national iden-
tity is well established in the broader literature (Anderson 1983; Hall 2005). 
In this chapter, I adopt Gupta’s perspective that newspapers also provide 
the “raw material necessary for a thick description” of translocal phenom-
ena such as the state—particularly, I argue, in the context of Bahrain and 
the neighboring Gulf states (Gupta 2006, 222). To make a long story short, 
events like the one I just described—in their occurrence, in the public discus-
sions they engender, and in the parameters those public discussions take—
reveal the tectonic frictions underlying the extraordinarily transnational 
environs of the contemporary Gulf. Also, they provide us with a second 
glimpse at the public sphere I began describing in the previous chapter.
English-Language Newspapers in Bahrain
The Gulf Daily News is the older of the two primary English-language 
newspapers on the island. Both newspapers—the Gulf Daily News and the 
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Bahrain Tribune—have Arabic sister papers with which they share content. 
Founded in 1978, the Gulf Daily News was for many years the only English-
language newspaper on the island. The newspaper’s journalistic staff in-
cludes Indians, Bahrainis, Filipinos, and Britishers, many of whom provide 
a direct link between the newspaper and issues in their respective diasporic 
or local communities. Although primarily staffed by foreigners for much 
of its history, the Gulf Daily News was long regarded as pro-government. 
Over the last decade, however, it has established a much more nuanced and 
complex position relative to the state.
Because Arabic is the national language in Bahrain, one might assume 
that the Gulf Daily News and other English-language newspapers primarily 
serve the expatriate community and hence are peripheral to the overarching 
public sphere this (and the previous) chapter seeks to chart. To the contrary, 
however, English has emerged as the primary and common language that 
bridges the many national communities at work on the island. Although 
not all Indians speak (or read) English, and not all Bahrainis speak (or read) 
English, it is the primary language of the private sector, and it is the only 
language that signifi cant portions of all the various national communities 
on the island speak. As a widely distributed cultural text, the Gulf Daily 
News probably reaches a more diverse and broader audience than any other 
medium on the island.2
The contention that the Gulf Daily News plays a central role in the in-
tercommunity public space in Bahrain should not obscure the fact that 
all newspapers on the island exist under heavy censorship. Much of that 
censorship occurs as direct state intervention. In 2008, for example, the 
International Press Institute began its report on media freedom in Bahrain 
with these sentences: “State authorities have carried out a systematic attack 
on all forms of free expression in Bahrain this year, severely limiting the ease 
with which human rights activists, civil society representatives and journal-
ists can carry out their work. Through intensifi ed censorship of the Internet 
and an increased number of legal cases against journalists, the state’s at-
tempts to silent dissent have been far reaching” (IPI 2008). In particular, in-
tense state censorship surrounded “Bandargate,” the nomenclature for the 
events and public reactions following the actions of Sudanese-born British 
adviser Salah al-Bandar after he released a report and supporting documents 
contending that high-level government offi cials and representatives of the 
royal family were tampering with elections and working on a variety of 
other fronts to ensure the continuing dominance of the Sunni minority of 
the citizenry. Journalists writing about the report were prosecuted, and the 
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courts issued a permanent ban on reportage concerning the Bandar report. 
State-based censorship encompasses a variety of other issues as well, includ-
ing women’s rights in Bahrain, the state’s security apparatus, and high-level 
fi nancial corruption on the island. Journalists and editors are typically sued 
for defamation and face signifi cant fi nes and six-month to fi ve-year prison 
sentences for “press offences.”3
Explicit state-based censorship, however, is only one aspect of how the 
power of the state is exerted in this public discourse. The threat of censor-
ship (with the accompanying fi nes, prison time, and deportation) is inter-
nalized by the various participants in this public sphere, albeit to varying 
degrees. As one self-described blogger/insider wrote,
I agree . . . that the censorship policies of the editor-in-chiefs of papers 
in magical Arabia strangle and dilute a lot of stories and even perhaps 
portray an incorrect picture to readers. However, the issue is more 
complicated when you take into consideration that we (journalists/
editors/columnists) are self-censored to begin with, especially when 
it comes to touchy issues.
Allow me, as an insider, if you may, to run by you a common sce-
nario, in our papers: As a journalist, I would tone down my story 
and add a twist to it, which will make it more acceptable to the news 
editor, who would be the fi rst person to read the article. The news 
editor, in turn, would dilute the potentially damaging story, cutting 
out anything the self-censored journalist may have slipped into the 
copy to suit the paper’s policies and the whims of the editor-in-chief. 
Then the “sensitive” story goes to the editor-in-chief ’s desk, who may 
use his own judgement to either publish or kill the story.
If the story is to be published, the top-notch editor would be risk-
ing a show down with authorities the next morning but would be 
scoring brownie points with his journalists and news editor. It is im-
portant for any editor-in-chief to appear strong and in charge of his 
own decisions. Secretly and away from prying eyes, he may seek “ad-
vice” on whether to carry the story or not even after agreeing to run 
it and may then hold it for a day or two, depending on what else is 
going on. If he decides to kill the story, then our enterprising editorial 
team may challenge his decision, take back the story, rewrite and re-
edit it, until it looks and sounds nothing like it originally was.
Only once all and each of our strictly abided to self-censorship cri-
teria are fulfi lled, does the story make the headlines. Not surprisingly 
122 City of Strangers
enough and despite all this care and sensitivity in handling the story, 
all hell breaks loose once it is fi nally published. The authorities 
are angry, the source is mad, everyone calls for beheading everyone 
else and life continues as normal as we write and rewrite the truth as 
we see it and as we think the authorities would like to see it . . . regard-
less of what it really is . . . for in reality the truth is merely a matter of 
perception.4
As this purported insider’s description makes clear, the internalization of 
the interests of the state yields a self-censorship that operates at many differ-
ent levels of the journalistic enterprise. Editors perhaps refl ect the interests 
of the state in the stories they choose to run or not run, but the feedback 
from this process ensures that journalists and columnists also conform to 
the perceived norms. By this argument, these columnists and journalists 
envision, write, and submit stories that avoid a host of sensitive topics. This 
portrayal suggests an almost panoptic state-based regime that shapes the 
“reality” purveyed in the public sphere of Bahrain.
My analysis of the Gulf Daily News suggests a more nuanced scenario. 
As the story with which this chapter began suggests, some of the recurring 
themes in the Gulf Daily News directly refl ect the power and interests of 
the state. Stories like the one concerning the Nepalese couple directly con-
vey the power of the state and the parameters of vulnerability that foreign 
workers face during their sojourn on the island. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I consider fi ve other recurring themes in the Gulf Daily News, and 
although this list is not exhaustive, these fi ve threads displace the notion of 
the state’s omnipotence in this public discourse. Specifi cally, these themes 
paint a more complex portrait of the interests and the stakeholders’ contri-
butions to this public discourse. Certainly the interests of the state, and its 
power to censor, remain a central factor in this public sphere. But the con-
versations, discussions, and announcements these themes distill typically 
triangulate among citizens, the state, and the foreign communities on the 
island, and the alignments of those various groups shift at different times 
and contexts.
Envisioning the Modernity of Bahrain’s Near Future
The Gulf Daily News, and for that matter all the newspapers on the is-
land, adeptly promotes a particular vision of Bahrain’s path to the future. 
This portrayal typically focuses on the island nation’s numerous infrastruc-
tural modernization projects and real estate developments, from those 
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imagined, envisioned, or proposed to those under way or nearing comple-
tion. Supporting those announcements of material projects is a steady stream 
of proclamations concerning the fi nancial and economic well-being of the 
island kingdom—messages fi ne-tuned to affi rm Bahrain’s central role in the 
region’s global fi nancescape. The articulation of these interrelated themes 
is a veritable constant in the island’s newspapers. A recent headline, for ex-
ample, announced “Bahrain on Right Track,” from an article heralding the 
fact that “one of the world’s top fi nancial ratings agencies yesterday issued a 
glowing report on Bahrain’s economic prospects.”5 Other headlines report 
that Bahrain’s “Future Glitters,” that Bahrain was experiencing “Growth in 
the Fast Lane!” that Bahrain was in a “Banking Boom!” and that a “$3BN Sea 
City” would soon begin construction. As these examples suggest, the news-
paper provides an important forum for announcing new projects and key 
milestones in the economic development of the kingdom. Collectively these 
portrayals lodge Bahrain as an active and successful participant in the global 
political economy and simultaneously buttress the idea of the royal family’s 
benevolent stewardship of a nation during a period of dramatic change.
These articles also mine an aesthetic vein. Artists’ computer-generated 
renditions of the skyscrapers and real estate developments to be built are 
centrally featured in the newspaper. These images, ubiquitous not just in 
Bahrain but in all of the Gulf states, portray a clean, manicured, organized, 
and architecturally inventive near future. The bird’s-eye views digitally gen-
erated by architects, designers, and artists contain only vaguely sketched 
humans or, more commonly, no people at all. These images are often ac-
companied by photographs of Bahrain’s leaders convened with European 
or North American CEOs and their architectural models, reinforcing the 
role of the Bahraini leadership as stewards of modernity and development 
(see Dresch 2005, 6). The portraits of Bahrain’s near future and the architec-
tural models around which these men convene draw on a stock of imagery 
that aligns the national vision with a global and cosmopolitan future. In 
doing so, these images marginalize the particular and local, for as a genre 
they present a modernity without place—a vision of Bahrain that is both 
vague and generic, and one that is palatable in the sociocultural context of 
the contemporary island.
In both image and word this neoliberal vision of Bahrain’s future is 
portrayed as frictionless and indisputably good. It meshes the interests 
of the ethnocratic state and its Sunni leadership with that of the foreign, 
cosmopolitan elite residents of the island. At the same time, this vision 
masks the heavy dependence on foreign labor and foreign ingenuity: with 
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the private sector predominantly composed of foreign workers, the hu-
mans missing from these artistic renditions are not Bahrainis. This vision 
of modernity also masks the inequities of distribution on the island, in 
that the Shi’ite underclass stands to benefi t little from this growth. This 
underclass’s critiques—and, in fact, all critiques—of the inequities of dis-
tribution on the island are muted in the symbolic and discursive presenta-
tion of Bahrain’s glorious path to the future.
All of this suggests several things about the newspaper and the public 
sphere in Bahrain. Gupta argues that the newspaper is not simply the arm 
of the state but rather exists at the confl uence of folk, regional, and national 
Figure 6.1. Newspaper headline from the Gulf Daily News.
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ideologies “competing with each other and with transnational fl ows of 
information, tastes, and styles” (2006, 213). Although that competition is 
apparent in some of the other themes described, the monolithic portrayal 
of Bahrain’s near future seems uncontested in the pages of the Gulf Daily 
News. In both symbolic and discursive terms, the modernity promoted in 
the newspaper should be seen not as a window to a collective and homoge-
neous idea of Bahraini nationhood, but as an assertion of a particular vision 
of Bahraini nationhood—one aligned with the cosmopolitan interests of 
those classes that most directly benefi t from the neoliberal fl ow of capital.
Mapping the Bureaucracy and Critiquing the System
The Letters to the Editor section of the Gulf Daily News burgeons with 
contributions concerning the many challenges foreigners face in navigat-
ing the Bahraini system. In earlier chapters, I used the ethnographic data 
I collected in Bahrain to portray the lives of the Indian foreigners on the 
Figure 6.2. The Bahrain Financial Harbour project in an artist’s rendition. 
http://www.bfharbour.com.
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island; it should be clear that many of them are isolated, that their primary 
contact was a labor broker in now-distant India, and that only their kafeel 
is there to offi cially represent them once they are in Bahrain. Although 
this  structure of dominance isolates foreigners and prevents them from 
accessing the bureaucratic conduits of power through which they are gov-
erned, the newspaper—and particularly the Letters to the Editor section— 
functions as a public forum for solving the day-to-day problems foreign 
workers typically encounter on the island.
Consider, for example, this question from the Letters section of the Gulf 
Daily News: “My visa expired more than six months ago and I have given 
notice to my sponsor that I am going to change my visa and my new spon-
sor has got the labour permit. But my sponsor is not returning my passport 
(and my family’s). Now he has promised me that since he is abroad he will 
return it on arrival. How can I have a new visa?”6 In reply, the GDN editor 
directed the author to a series of Web pages that might help him navigate 
the state bureaucracy. Dozens of questions of this sort appear in the Letters 
to the Editor section every month. Their writers ask for advice, guidance, 
or clarifi cation, and typically focus on the Byzantine processes that govern 
the fl ow of human capital to the island kingdom.
At other junctures, the desire for advice, guidance, or clarifi cation gives 
way to complaints and open critique. For example, the following letter ad-
dresses a previous letter in the Gulf Daily News, as well as the published re-
sponse (by a government representative) to that letter: “A letter clearly asked 
for information about ‘Housemaid visas for expats’ (GDN October 9). The 
response to it just states that there are specifi c rules for it and to contact 
the Labour Ministry. Why haven’t these specifi c rules been published? We 
would all like them to be published. The answer was not specifi c. Why do 
government departments always give vague answers and not specifi c infor-
mation? Why this red tapism?”7 The accusation of “red tapism” from this 
anonymous letter writer is part of a broader critique levied by foreign writ-
ers in this section of the newspaper. Collectively they accuse the government 
of bureaucratic ineptitude; they posit themselves and other foreigners like 
them as disempowered but rational agents of modernity.
The ideological parameters of this position are more clearly visible in 
this long retort responding to recent changes and a host of broader sys-
temic problems the anonymous author encountered in Bahrain:
Recently we have been inundated with comments concerning the 
rights of Bahrainis, and only Bahrainis, to determine the future of this 
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country and to infl uence legislators in making change. But, who will 
listen to my voice? And why should I have a voice? As a businessman 
I am contributing to the country and the government in many ways, 
which are quite often ignored or forgotten by our MPs [members of 
Parliament] and the ordinary people.
I pay municipal taxes on both my residence and my place of busi-
ness (nearly BD100 per month); I pay Commercial Registration fees, 
Chamber of Commerce levy, LMRA fees, residence visa and other 
government charges. In addition I am paying rents into the pock-
ets of citizens and wages that go into circulation through my em-
ployees’ rents and shopping etc; I am also regularly asked to sponsor 
local charity events, the proceeds of which go to many local worthy 
causes. In total, I am probably paying indirect “taxation” amounting 
to BD20,000 per year to Bahraini economy. And in exchange for 
that, I have absolutely no representation.
Young women at the LMRA regularly berate me for not employ-
ing more Bahrainis, or not fi lling in forms, or not changing the way 
I do business to suit their demands. These very same women insist 
I use a Bahraini to interact with their desks as I am not considered 
capable. This forces me to visit them several times on each matter, as 
the Bahraini doesn’t understand my business or its needs.
And now, the MPs, whose salaries I am indirectly contributing to, 
are starting to introduce laws that will restrict my freedom and limit 
my lifestyle. Fortunately, I can conduct my business from anywhere 
in the region; maybe it’s time to consider changing my base—Muscat 
is very appealing. Have our esteemed legislators heard the story of the 
goose that laid the golden egg—but of course, they wouldn’t as that 
is another decadent folly from the West. A little like the fairy tale of 
Business-Friendly Bahrain.
Signed, A Frustrated Businessman.8
This letter and many others like it clearly illustrate the ideological position-
ing that goes on in the Letters to the Editor section of the newspaper. The 
author—“Frustrated Businessman”—maps his contributions to the Bahraini 
economy, positioning himself as an ideal entrepreneur directly contributing 
to Bahrain’s national interests. At the same time, Bahrainis are portrayed as 
incompetent stewards of the system they host: they fail to give him the 
rights he sees as appropriate to his economic contribution, they fail to rec-
ognize and respect that contribution, they fail to effi ciently assist him with 
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the management of his business, and they seemingly wish to build a cultur-
ally uncomfortable environment for the author and his foreign employees. 
Many of the letters to the editor contribute to this overarching theme, and 
the rhetorical path that “Frustrated Businessman” follows is a common 
one: specifi c criticisms escalate into broad denunciations of Bahraini in-
competence and contradiction.
A few points merit further discussion. Although much of my analysis 
of the activity in this facet of the public sphere is focused on the cultural 
and ideological negotiation of the various collective identities present on 
the island, we ought not lose sight of the mundane functions this venue 
also serves. For foreign workers isolated in an unfamiliar system and bound 
to a sponsor who may not have their interests at heart, the Letters to the 
Editor sections of the English-language newspapers provide an important 
clearinghouse for information on how to navigate the system in which they 
fi nd themselves enmeshed. This venue disseminates information and strate-
gies integral to the foreign workers under this comprehensive governance, 
and, as the second and third letters exemplify, it provides a rare space for 
foreigners to publicly critique the state. Certainly there are limitations to 
this facet of the public sphere, for this venue is open only to those for-
eigners and citizens with a mastery of English. Nonetheless, the anonymity 
of the letters to the editor encourages discussions and critiques that one 
would rarely hear in other public spaces on the island.
The Global Appeal
In his book about the emergence of a unifi ed and global indigenous 
identity, Ronald Niezen portrays indigenous peoples’ increasingly sophisti-
cated use of the global media to publicize the confl icts with the states under 
which they oftentimes suffer. In particular, he focuses on the “politics of 
shame,” or the process by which small and marginalized indigenous groups 
garner global attention and occasionally repulse their more powerful foes 
(Niezen 2003, 28). By pursuing this strategy, these groups seek more than 
a witness to their oppression: the threat of attention to their dilemmas and 
tribulations is a weapon in and of itself. Its successful use is an increasingly 
common aspect of numerous studies in political ecology and related fi elds 
(Brosius 1999; Hornborg 2005).
That same stratagem can be delineated in the Gulf Daily News. Occasional 
travesties or state-generated actions perceived as particularly egregious be-
come the focus of attention in the newspapers. In August 2006, for ex-
ample, a fi re in the decrepit accommodations of a large group of South 
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Asian laborers took the lives of sixteen men. In the weeks that followed 
the fi re, a series of headlines in the Gulf Daily News reported that “Offi cials 
‘Must Quit over Fire Tragedy,’ ” that the “Camp Horror Could Have Been 
Averted,” and that “Bodies [of the deceased workers were] ‘Stuffed into 
Drawers.’ ”9 These articles were daily accompanied by irate letters to the 
editor lamenting the conditions in which the laborers were forced to dwell, 
as well as the response of both the state and the men’s sponsor to the trag-
edy. Similar collective responses followed what is commonly referred to in 
Bahrain as the “dhow tragedy” (in which a large and overfi lled party dhow 
capsized in the bay, leaving fi fty-eight dead), as well as the state’s effort 
to block access to Mahmood’s Den, one of the fi rst and most widely read 
blogs in Bahrain and staunchly focused on civil rights issues.
In this sense, the Gulf Daily News functions as a conduit that allows the 
foreign and disenfranchised communities to challenge—and potentially 
circumvent—the governance of the state. Journalists, editors, and letter 
writers, by focusing on the injustices, violence, and exploitation levied 
against foreign workers (or, in the case of Mahmood’s Den, against vo-
ciferous citizens), attempt to bring global attention to these events through 
a politics of shame. As these examples suggest, oftentimes these stories and 
letters provide noncitizens and the predominantly foreign journalists of the 
Gulf Daily News with an opportunity to directly accuse citizens—and occa-
sionally the state itself—of injustice. By illuminating the causes and condi-
tions of these events, members of the various communities on the island seek 
to push back against the injustices they perceive. Although this sort of jour-
nalistic discourse is more common in western Europe and the United States, 
in the context of Bahrain—where foreign workers have little recourse within 
the legal system, are bound to their kafeel/sponsors, and are marginalized 
by the state—the attention garnered by these articles and letters provides 
a signifi cant source of collective power in the absence of other options.
Cultural Friction and Open Debate
Bahrain, as we have seen in previous chapters, is marked by signifi cant 
social divides. Although individuals from different communities may min-
gle with citizens in the workplace, generally there is a dearth of interac-
tion between citizens and foreigners—a noteworthy state of affairs in both 
Bahrain and its neighbors (e.g., see Vora 2008). As I have argued, there are 
good reasons for this segregation. From the perspective of foreign workers, 
citizens are a potentially threatening force capable of interfering with their 
tenuous status on the island, and hence a potential threat to the signifi cant 
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resources most of these foreigners have committed to secure employment 
on the island. Against the backdrop of these social divisions and the trun-
cated public presence of foreign communities on the island, the Letters to 
the Editor section of the Gulf Daily News stands in stark contrast. Things 
that never would be uttered in a public setting make frequent appearances 
in this section of the paper, and open debates are waged over the course of 
weeks or months. Certainly the anonymity of this section plays an instru-
mental role in forging the freedoms of this space, but that ought not eclipse 
the fact that this venue is of extraordinary interest, for it is one of the only 
venues where countless individuals, both foreign and native, engage in ex-
tensive debate.
Although my interest in this section of the newspaper was piqued almost 
immediately upon arrival on the island, perhaps the most demonstrative 
example of the scope and terrain of these debates occurred several years 
after my departure. In the summer of 2006 a Budweiser Battle of the Bands 
competition was held in Manama. As the various letters to the editor that 
followed the event indicate, the top prize was taken by a Filipino/Filipina 
group named Bahrain Chili Band.10 The debate kicked off with the com-
ments from an anonymous writer who suggested that their performance 
was “nothing short of a strip show, just like the ones you see in Pat Pong, 
Thailand.” These sentiments were confi rmed by a writer named Lizy, who 
noted that their performance was “simply a strip show . . . [that] brings 
down the name of Filipinas in Bahrain.” She further wondered why the 
organizers couldn’t impose a dress code on the competition.
This open debate then turned on the comments of an author writing 
under the moniker of Fatami. She argued that nakedness is natural—we’re 
all born that way. Continuing, she implored others to “look at the beaches 
in Europe. There are clothing optional beaches which allow women the 
option of going without their tops and hardly anyone looks at them ex-
cept the Americans who go wild over female breasts because of their puri-
tan upbringing.” These comments ignited the debate, and in the days that 
followed a slew of letters reproached Fatami. “Concerned Filipina” stated 
that the women in Bahrain Chili Band were not at the beach, but rather 
at a hotel, and that Fatami should try to practice what she preaches on the 
streets of Manama and see how it goes. Mohammed, speaking in the plural, 
sought to pierce the anonymity of this dialogue with a series of questions: 
“Who are you? Where do you stand? Which point do you speak from? And 
are you Muslim?” He concluded with the suggestion that “if you are Arabic 
and Muslim we recommend you to read the Holy Quran and review it 
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carefully. You might have missed some very important explanation.” Two 
days later, Oamir concurs with Mohammed and further accuses Fatami of 
thinking only of her body, not her mind.
Fatami’s reply, printed a few days later, contends that the laws that 
Oamir cites were “established 1,500 years ago and have not been updated 
since. . . . You and a lot of people living in the Middle East have archaic ideal 
about women. . . . Women are now equal to men in all parts of the world 
except some areas of the Middle East where they are still being held back. A 
woman has a brain and can use it, so free her and let her make her own deci-
sions.” Another anonymous writer joined the debate, contending that only 
in the liberal West can “man marry man and women can marry women. 
Please keep your broad minds and so-called freedom in the west only. It is 
not applicable here. Women are not equal in any part of the world . . . the 
reality is that women can never be equal to men.” This argument concluded 
with a fi nal letter from Fatami in which she remarked that women now 
only need men for sperm, which is easily attainable at sperm banks. “As I 
said before,” she continued, “you guys in the Middle East are way behind 
the times. Just look at the traffi c, parking problems in Bahrain that you 
cannot solve.”11
Readily visible in this debate are the complex positions of the various 
communities on the island. The two Filipina contributors, for example, 
avoid express support for their countrywomen’s performance: instead, 
they scold the women—and Fatami—for degrading the collective image 
of Filipinos on the island. This stance echoes the work of others who have 
tracked how members of these foreign communities both in the Gulf and 
other places internalize the terms of their own oppression (Constable 
1997; Nagy 2008). It is equally interesting how the debate steadily ascends 
to the topics of gender, Islam, and Western culture. One can read much 
into Mohammed’s use of the plural (for Bahrainis? Arabs? Muslims?), in 
comparison with the singular deployed by the other writers, as well as his 
attempt to discern Fatami’s positionality from behind the curtain of ano-
nymity afforded by the newspaper.
For the purposes of this chapter, what is of interest is not just the con-
tent of the debate but the fact that the everyday conditions in which trans-
migrants live in the Gulf rarely allow for discussion and debate across 
ethnic and national divides. Foreign workers, typically caught in extraor-
dinarily unequal relationships with their sponsors and citizens as a whole, 
would never purvey these opinions in public venues. The anonymity of 
the Letters to the Editor section—an anonymity challenged at one point 
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by Mohammed’s interest in discerning Fatima’s background—provides a 
public space for citizens and foreigners to engage one another on equal 
footing.
Demonstrating Compliance
Arriving on the island as a lone anthropologist without signifi cant 
contacts, I quickly sought any engagement with the South Asian com-
munity I hoped to study. The various social clubs and voluntary asso-
ciations of the South Asian community allowed me to quickly begin to 
engage that community. Indeed, those clubs and associations emerged 
as central to my analysis of this diasporic community. The Lions Club of 
Riffa in particular provided me with a network of friends and contacts 
that connected me with many of the luminaries of the South Asian com-
munity, and as both a member and participant-observer in this club I was 
allowed to deeply engage and participate in the club’s activities and the 
processes by which its activities were guided. Those activities included 
trips to the Dolphin Park for mentally disabled Bahraini children, events 
for sick Bahraini children during the Eid holiday, a beach picnic for blind 
Bahraini children, and much more. For a club whose membership was 
almost entirely composed of wealthy Muslim South Asian businessmen, 
it is noteworthy that nearly all of their outreach activities were aimed at 
segments of the Bahraini community.
At most of the public activities and events I attended that were held by 
the Lions and the other clubs, photographers and reporters from the news-
papers were present. Indeed, after a few weeks of attending these meetings, 
I spent a substantial portion of my monthly budget on a pair of new suits, 
for it seemed as if most of these photographs appeared in the newspapers 
the next day. Both the Gulf Daily News and the Bahrain Tribune devote sig-
nifi cant space—often an entire page—to photographs taken at the conclu-
sion of meetings and offi cial gatherings.
Consider the coincidence of the two facts. First, like many of the other 
elite diasporic voluntary associations on the island, the Lions Club of Riffa 
channeled its international call to service toward disadvantaged Bahrainis. 
Second, all of these sorts of clubs and associations are careful to report 
and photograph their activities in the English-language newspapers on the 
island. Through my interviews with members of these clubs, I came to 
understand that their service, while completed with the best of intentions, 
also served to promote their ethnic and national communities on the island, 
and to demonstrate their compliance and affi liation with the predominant 
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national vision promoted by the state. In essence, the men and women of 
these clubs were arguing—against the tides of Bahrainization, and against 
the problematic daily interactions with citizens—that they were valuable 
assets to the state and its citizenry, that they were fi ne and upstanding 
(non)citizens, and that they posed no cultural threat to Bahraini society. 
Like the Filipina women who supported the criticisms levied against the 
Bahrain Chili Band, and like the “Frustrated Businessman” who com-
plained about the conditions of entrepreneurship in Bahrain, members of 
the diasporic elite use this public forum to position themselves in support 
and compliance with the vision promoted by the state. Put another way, 
the public space managed by the newspaper functions not just as a venue 
for that national vision to be deployed: it is also a venue for various com-
munities to resist, accommodate, or in this case promote their compliance 
with that vision.
Contradictions, Modernity, and Strife
At the outset of the previous chapter, I sought to delineate a public 
sphere that encompassed some portion of the many and diverse cultures 
and communities on the island. To that end, I have described two venues 
in which the generation and activity of this public sphere seem particularly 
Figure 6.3. The author and fellow members of the Riffa chapter of the Lions Club. 
Photographer unknown.
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acute. In the social clubs and other voluntary associations, foreigners often 
fi nd spaces where they can interact with citizens as relative equals. Moreover, 
the identities they collectively establish in those clubs and associations, even 
when constrained from active participation in this public sphere, deeply 
refl ect the social conditions they face on the island. The English-language 
newspapers, meanwhile, provide one of the primary stages on which collec-
tive identities are articulated, rehearsed, and negotiated in relation to one 
another, to the state, and to a global cosmopolitan audience.
The bulk of my analysis has been devoted to demarcating the spaces, 
both virtual and real, where this public sphere is generated. But what about 
the content of this public sphere? In other words, what can we say about 
what is being said and written? Certainly interpretations could lead in many 
different directions. To my mind, however, there is one theme—or, bet-
ter, bifurcation—that encapsulates many of these public discussions, argu-
ments, and performances. In many of the junctures and arenas described 
in the previous two chapters, foreigners in the Gulf reinforce their posi-
tion as integral and docile instruments of the prevalent national vision. In 
the case of the debate concerning the Budweiser Band competition, the 
Filipina writers scold their countrywomen for their cultural transgressions; 
in many junctures, foreigners portray themselves as dedicated workers; and 
as the evidence from the Lions Club suggests, they publicly marry their 
efforts to the articulated interests of the state. They assert, sometimes vo-
ciferously, the need for a more transparent state and for an effi cient and 
accommodative bureaucracy. I understand this perspective as an essentially 
neoliberal one, for in their contentions they seek to extend the economic vi-
sion of the nation that predominates on the island to the social and cultural 
realm. They seek a more meritocratic workplace, a more transparent state 
bureaucracy, the implementation of a universal set of rights that inhere to 
the individual rather than the social collective, and a sociocultural context 
that respects and accommodates the diversity of its workforce.
What, then, are the citizens of Bahrain saying in this public sphere? In 
the most general sense, the discursive terrain of these public interactions 
with South Asian workers often frames foreigners as a potential source of 
pollution, disorder, and danger. Whether we are talking about the police 
monitoring and regulating the behavior of the young Nepalese couple 
whose story began this chapter, or about the response to Fatima concern-
ing her knowledge and understanding of the Quranic tradition, or about 
the public consternation concerning “mixing” at the social clubs, these de-
bates and interactions shift the discussion away from the cosmopolitan 
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and neoliberal terms that predominate in the national vision and toward a 
set of terms grounded in cultural difference. That said, in these two chap-
ters the voices of the citizenry in this public sphere are faint. In the fi nal 
chapter of this book, I focus on the citizenry and state, and map the cultur-
ally framed frictions described here over the social and political realities of 
contemporary Bahrain.
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The multifaceted system that governs foreign laborers in Bahrain—
a system of arrangements, norms, laws, ideas, and beliefs—has been the 
center of attention in my analysis. The danger in focusing so closely on the 
structural violence this system produces, however, rests in the portrayal of 
Bahraini citizens as what Anthony Giddens called “structural dopes” (1979, 
52)—as nothing more than the empty vessels through which foreigners are 
governed or, in the vocabulary of my analysis, as the faceless agents of the 
structural violence endured by the foreign laboring class. In this chapter my 
primary task is to remedy that shallow portrayal. By turning the analytic 
lens on the Bahraini citizenry, I illuminate their experiences, both compli-
cate and humanize their portrayal in this book, and better contextualize the 
structural violence that foreign labor endures.
With the abundance of attention paid to transnational communities and 
their relationship to the states from which they come, the impact of trans-
national movement on host nations is often eclipsed—hence Mahler’s call 
to examine “the role transmigrants play in transforming those communities 
that they occupy which are not their communities of origin” (1998, 93; see 
also Reitz 2003). In illuminating the Bahraini perspective, I also investi-
gate the considerable role the large transmigrant communities have played 
in shaping the experience, identity, and social relations of the Bahraini 
people.
The argument at the foundation of this chapter can be summarized as 
follows: the system by which foreigners are governed, as described in pre-
vious chapters and rooted in the institutions and policies of the state, is 
a strategic response to the challenges and pressures of the contemporary 
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global order. Decades of dependence on inexpensive, educated, and trained 
transnational laborers who, together, remain integral to the construction 
and maintenance of the Gulf-wide vision of modernity has left much of 
the citizenry poorly positioned to compete in the private sector. Instead, 
the state itself emerges as the locus of their power in the global system. The 
habitus of everyday interactions with foreigners and the institutional gov-
ernance of transmigrants on the island become two facets of an increasingly 
invigorated state. The state is the tool through which the citizens negotiate 
the impacts of the transnational fl ows of people, capital, ideas, and culture. 
The state, however, is also the tool through which citizens insulate them-
selves from the logic of those transnational fl ows. Potential resistance to the 
inequalities codifi ed by the Bahraini state is trumped by the state’s ongoing 
role as the nexus of the citizens’ collective resistance to the neoliberal calcu-
lus of the global political economy.
The Nation as Host
One afternoon during my fi eldwork a Bahraini friend, Abdullah, sug-
gested I accompany him to the house he had occupied as a child. His fa-
ther, and his father’s father, had been prosperous merchants in the city of 
Manama, and the signifi cant dwelling was only a ten-minute walk—through 
winding alleys, down a few long boulevards, and then back again into a 
few winding alleys—from my small fl at in the neighborhood of Hoora. 
Like many others in the middle class, his family had long ago abandoned 
the city center for the suburbs. Indeed, this house had been rented to a large 
contingent of South Asian laborers, and the detritus of their impoverished 
existence could still be seen in the now-empty rooms of the decrepit villa.
The house itself fi t squarely within one aspect of the island’s historic 
architectural vernacular. The interior was impervious to the eyes on the 
street—yielding only a few doorways and high windows to pedestrians. 
This description hints at an old trope in the literature concerning the promi-
nence of the public/private divide in the spatial arrangement of life in the 
Middle East, and without straying too far down that path I add that the 
house was arranged around a central courtyard. Like both historic and con-
temporary homes on the island, it included a majlis, or reception room near 
the front of the house, in which members of the family hosted guests. These 
greeting rooms represent a liminal space that bridges the divide between 
public spaces outside the home and the private space of the home’s interior.
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What was perhaps most interesting about this house, however, was that 
it also included a small and separate living quarters located at one corner of 
the home. The single doorway to this apartment led to the street, so that 
no passage was possible between the main house and the guest apartment. 
My host was in the midst of a long narrative about his childhood—describ-
ing, for example, how he used to sit in the room upstairs listening to the 
Beatles—but I eventually asked him about this separate apartment and its 
purpose. He said that the small apartment was constructed to accommo-
date the foreign merchants with whom his father and grandfather traded. 
I later confi rmed that this feature was common enough among merchants’ 
houses from that era, and the episode I describe here sank into the recesses 
of the fi eld notes I maintained while on the island.
I eventually returned to this fi eld note with particular interest, for over 
the intervening years I have come to think of the layout of this traditional 
merchant’s home as a spatial metaphor that speaks to the transnationality of 
the island and, more specifi cally, to the way that the Bahraini citizenry and 
state have confi gured their relationship to the peoples and cultures they host 
on the island. Consider the house that Abdullah’s grandfather constructed 
and its small apartment in which traveling merchants might stay: this guest 
apartment was at once part of the house, but also clearly distinct and sepa-
rate from it. His grandfather, like many others on the island, constructed a 
home in this manner to accommodate the presence of foreigners while, at 
the same time, insulating the private sphere from foreign incursion. This 
spatial relationship within the merchant’s home helps us understand a key 
aspect of the Bahraini national imaginary that congeals around the idea of 
hospitality and the roles of host and guest.
The conceptualization of the nation-as-host is certainly a product of 
Bahrain’s particular historical circumstances. With its rich pearl beds and 
capable port, the island emerged as a regional entrepôt in the larger trade 
circuits of the Indian Ocean world. This trade brought much of that world 
to the island’s shores and produced centuries of conditions whereby the in-
digenous Bahrainis and other early arrivals negotiated their identity against 
the heterogeneous cast of foreigners, who included merchants, traders, 
slaves, conquerors, and many others who passed through the bustling port. 
Moreover, in the last centuries Bahrain functioned as the seat of the British 
colonial presence in the region, a situation and set of relations that pro-
duced an even more complex form of hospitality as the peoples of the island 
negotiated the legal and political mechanisms for sharing power. Decades 
of struggle over which peoples on the island were subject to indigenous 
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Bahraini law and which were subject to British jurisdiction, for example, can 
be seen as a renegotiation of that line dividing the foreign from the local.
This idea of the nation-as-host takes more practical form in the kafala 
itself. As described in earlier chapters, transmigrants are tied to particu-
lar sponsors: adult Bahrainis often “host” numerous transmigrants, both 
in the workplace and in the home. From the Bahraini perspective, this 
relationship entails a responsibility for the behavior of these individuals: 
foreign laborers are conceived as a type of guest, potentially unruly and in-
cursive, but also potentially a source of profi t. Perhaps more illuminating is 
the sleeping-partner arrangement (described at length in chap. 4) whereby 
Bahraini citizens sell their right to own and operate a business to foreign 
entrepreneurs. In a sense, then, the Bahraini partners host the activities of 
a private sector, and in doing so they establish a profi table relationship to 
those entrepreneurial activities without subjecting themselves to the logic 












Figure 7.1. Diagram of the merchant’s home. Drawing courtesy of Hammad Iqbal.
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The essential argument I make here is that the notion of hospitality dis-
tills a key aspect of the Bahraini experience and helps explain the topogra-
phy of the contemporary arrangements on the island. The modernization 
that occurred during the second half of the twentieth century brought rapid 
and wholesale changes to Bahrain. Both the notion of hospitality and the 
arrangement of the kafala have deep historic roots in the culture of Bahrain 
(Beaugé 1985; Longva 1997), but this notion of hospitality reveals more 
than the architecture of relations between individual citizens and foreign-
ers. It also provides us with an understanding of Bahraini national identity, 
the Bahrainis’ concept of themselves as individual members of that society, 
and their collective concept of their relationship with the diverse commu-
nities and cultures that stream to the small island. Succinctly, then, I see 
hospitality as window to Bahraini national imaginary.
Space and the City
As the example of the merchant family’s house suggests, a traditional 
spatial discourse is part of the relationship Bahrainis established with for-
eigners on the island. That spatial relationship, illustrated best by the wall 
between the merchant family’s guest room (as a space for the foreign) and 
the home itself (as the space for the local), can be projected onto the city 
as a whole, for Manama and all the many booming cities of the Gulf can 
be conceived as complex amalgamations of enclaves and discrete cultural 
spaces. In that amalgamation one can perceive the ongoing tension pro-
duced by Bahraini society’s attempt to accommodate what Paul Dresch 
(2006) has called “foreign matter.”1
At the most macroscopic level, the singular urban agglomeration on 
the island is a growing mosaic of exceptional legal and economic zones. 
Like many of the other Gulf nations, Bahrain has declared and constructed 
numerous exceptional zones and spaces as part of its effort to attract for-
eign investment. Investment parks and freeholder zones are rapidly prolif-
erating on the island. The Bahrain Logistic Zone (BLZ), for example, was 
recently described in a Bahraini newspaper as “the Middle East’s fi rst bou-
tique multimodal logistics hub focusing on re-export and value-adding 
logistics activities. With zero tax, goods can be imported and re-exported 
without incurring customs duties and 100 per cent foreign ownership 
is permitted.”2 The key aspect to the BLZ, like many of these excep-
tional spaces, is the possibility of full ownership of property by foreign 
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companies. This policy is, of course, in stark contrast to the regulations in 
place for the surrounding spaces on the island. In effect, these policies seek 
to consign and compartmentalize the industry and culture of the neolib-
eral global system to discrete and particular spaces on the island.
The spatial consignment of foreign matter is perhaps most apparent 
in the location of people in the city. As noted previously, the central por-
tions of the city, once dense Bahraini neighborhoods, have been largely 
abandoned to the foreign workforce. Middle-class foreigners often fi nd 
homes in compounds, or in the conglomeration of homes and apartments 
separated from public spaces by high walls and security guards (essentially 
what one would call a gated community in the United States). Even more 
striking, however, is the plan for increased numbers of “bachelor cities”—
massive master-planned spaces meant to house and contain large numbers 
of foreign laborers. Proponents of these plans typically describe the pollu-
tive threat of the largely male workforce, and the bachelor cities are seen as 
a mechanism for protecting Bahraini culture from this foreign presence.
As the domiciles of many foreigners are cordoned off from public space, 
so too the social and cultural activities of those populations are also subject 
to this spatial governance. The restaurants, bars, and beaches that serve the 
cosmopolitan elite—or better, are funded, designed, and marketed to that 
foreign elite—are themselves cloistered, exceptional zones in the larger tap-
estry of the city. Non-Islamic religious activity, while tolerated on the island, 
is similarly consigned to a few key locations. And the many social clubs that 
serve the various diasporas on the island are, almost without exception, 
located in walled villas out of view from the street. Unruly, potentially pol-
lutive, and essentially foreign cultural practices are spatially segregated in 
the larger arena of the city.
What I chart here is not the successful and comprehensive division of 
that foreign matter from the local or indigenous space. In fact, the tension 
and friction generated by these exceptional spaces is a constant: “foreign 
matter” bleeds beyond its confi nes, public consternation and occasionally 
violence ensue, and often the state steps in to negotiate a solution.3 Rather, 
my interests are in delineating the forces and ideas behind the compul-
sion to maintain these exceptional spaces and their distinction. State and 
citizenry attempt to confi ne the economic activity of global capitalism, the 
bodies of the foreign laboring class, and the performance of the many and 
diverse cultures present on the island to discrete and exceptional spaces. 
This confi nement echoes the spatial relations of the merchant’s house and 
illuminates the underlying logic of this system: “foreign matter,” as Dresch 
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(2006) calls it, must be accommodated, for it is inextricably interwoven 
and, indeed, essential to the national vision widely promoted on the island. 
Simultaneously, however, the boundaries that distinguish that foreign mat-
ter from the local and indigenous must be policed and maintained.
The Welfare State
In late spring 2003 a group of road haulage and construction compa-
nies called for a formal protest at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.4 
In 2001, the ministry had passed a ban on foreign drivers as part of a set 
of policies that furthered Bahrainization in both the public and private 
sectors. The haulage and construction companies protested the impact 
of this particular directive, and their complaints were specifi c: the new 
citizen-drivers were inexperienced and damaged the trucks; the citizen-
employees drove at high speeds and endangered others on the road; the 
citizen-drivers frequently called in sick, to the point where one business 
owner contended that half of his workforce was often absent; and the 
citizen- drivers typically moved on to other jobs within a few months, 
particularly to positions in the government. As a result, insurance rates 
charged to the companies had risen, Saudi transportation companies 
(which employ inexpensive foreign drivers) were beginning to compete 
for business on the island, and the Bahraini companies were unable to 
meet their delivery obligations. Although the Ministry of Labor lifted its 
ban on expatriate drivers in March 2003 for situations in which “suitable 
Bahrainis” could not be found, permits for foreign workers were still not 
forthcoming. As the ministry argued, suitable Bahrainis were available.
The haulage and construction companies scheduled the rally at the Min-
istry of Labor and Social Affairs for the morning of May 4, 2003. At the 
last minute, however, it was postponed indefi nitely in lieu of a second rally 
planned for the same morning. A sit-in of unemployed citizens, co-organized 
by the Wefaq National Islamic Society, the National Democratic Action 
Society, the National Grouping Democratic Society, and the Islamic Action 
Society asked all of Bahrain’s “unemployed and those without benefi ts to 
join this peaceful sit-in along with their families, to bring attention to their 
plight.” The road haulage and construction companies issued a statement 
indicating their solidarity with the unemployed workers. As the spokesman 
for the haulage and construction companies stated, “Attention should be 
given to the unemployed and the step to temporarily suspend our protest 
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is part of our support for 100 percent Bahrainization and the demand that 
the Labor and Social Affairs Ministry take more active steps to ensure a real 
solution for the problem.”
That morning some two hundred jobless citizens gathered in front of 
the prime minister’s offi ce. Many in the crowd waved fl atbread above their 
heads, symbolizing their inability to feed their families. One protester 
spread his numerous diplomas about on the sidewalk, arguing that his 
state-approved education as a computing trainee left him unable to fi nd a 
job. Another sat with his small child and, describing his situation, said he 
had been unemployed for a year. Ironically, his last job had been as a driver. 
Along with 60 other workers, he had signed a petition demanding BD150 
($398) per month (a raise of BD30/$80). The company had countered with 
an offer of BD10 per month. At that point he had quit in protest.
The irony, of course, rests in the coincidence of these two planned 
events: the fi rst, a set of companies protesting their inability to fi nd and 
keep skilled citizen-drivers; and the second, planned for exactly the same 
morning, the former truck driver, along with hundreds of others, protest-
ing his inability to fi nd a job. One imagines that if both rallies had occurred 
as planned, many of the unemployed men may have found jobs with the 
trucking companies, and unemployment on the island, estimated to be well 
above 15 percent over the past decade, would have dropped a decimal point 
or two. Yet the logic of this imagined scenario depends on a particular set 
of neoliberal ideas—on the idea of a free and open labor market, as well as 
the primacy of competitiveness, and on the notion of a government con-
structed to facilitate a thriving private sector (see Farmer 2003, 5–6). In 
Bahrain, however, the logic of these ideas has little traction, even among 
the most disenfranchised citizenry.
In all the states of the GCC, the bonanza of petroleum wealth has 
yielded governments in which the leadership distributes some portion of 
the wealth to its citizen-subjects. The content and quantity of this support 
have varied over time and region; analysis typically focuses on free or low-
cost utilities, free or low-cost housing, free education, and free health care 
(Kapiszewski 2001; Nagy 2004).5 In Bahrain, widely recognized as one of 
the poorest of the Gulf states, these benefi ts have diminished over time. At 
present the government heavily subsidizes fuel, electricity, water, and some 
food on the island. Education and health care remain free for citizens. The 
state also provides low-cost housing to citizens, although the long delays 
involved in the distribution of that housing are a source of strife for the 
disenfranchised class of the citizenry.
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Perhaps the most signifi cant component of the redistribution of petro-
leum wealth rests in public-sector employment.6 Although consolidated data 
about the public sector are not available, an undersecretary at the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Affairs recently stated that 92 percent of the national (as 
opposed to foreign) workforce is employed in the public sector—“the high-
est percentage in the world” (Horton 2004).7 In Bahrain the public sector 
continues to dominate many activities in the economy, for that public sec-
tor encompasses much of the petroleum industry, the aluminum industry, 
and telecommunications. Employment in those (and many other) sectors is 
distributed by the Sunni-controlled government. The “tacit guarantee” of 
public-sector employment for all male nationals remains the bedrock of the 
state’s relationship to the citizenry (Louër 2008).
In Bahrain and the other Gulf states, the signifi cant entitlements that 
accompany citizenship are often portrayed as the primary mechanism by 
which the state and its leadership build and maintain legitimacy (Khalaf 
1992; Longva 2000). It is, however, important to distinguish between 
the benefi ts available equally to all citizens (such as free health care, 
government-subsidized utilities, and free education) and those that are 
distributed unequally to the citizenry (such as jobs in the public sector). 
In the latter case, the inequalities of this distribution forge economic 
classes out of sectarian divisions. It was the Shi’ite citizen-participants in 
this research who pointed out the realities of the situation to me. As they 
observed, many of the government ministries are predominantly, if not 
exclusively, Sunni—particularly the ministries of Interior and Defense, 
both of which are at the center of the state’s repressive apparatus.8 The 
unequal distribution of state-controlled wealth complicates theories of 
the welfare state, for it reveals the sectarian, tribal, and essentially per-
sonal logic of patronage at work in the apparatus of the Bahraini state.
The royal majlis, particularly popular with the formal ruler, provided a 
spatial venue for these personal appeals. One of my informants recalled his 
experience at the royal majlis:
I went to the emir’s court—this was during the current king’s father’s 
rule—and back then they gave away all kinds of money. The govern-
ment here—no secret—it was corrupt. And at the court, people were 
there asking for money for all kinds of reasons. All kinds of people. 
I was there to ask for money to help me with my education in the 
states, because my dad couldn’t help me for the entire stay. So I was 
there to ask for some money and do the paperwork. Next to me was 
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this fat-cat royal family member, and I knew his son, so I asked him 
if he was Ahmed’s dad. He looked at me, but didn’t say anything. 
He looked like he didn’t want to be there . . . and then I overheard his 
conversation at the desk, and it ends up he was there to get money for 
his whole family’s tour around Europe that summer. He was getting 
the royal court to pay for it! He was a Khalifa, and he didn’t want to 
pay for it out of pocket, and he wanted himself and his wives to have 
a free ride around Europe that summer. And then there was this old 
Shi’i man, with a long white beard, and he had holes all over his thobe 
[the long-sleeved ankle length garment typically worn by Arab men 
in the Gulf ], and he was walking around with his son who was on a 
crutch, and he was trying to get money for his son’s medication. He 
was anguished, walking from offi ce to offi ce. I was just trying to get 
money for college. I could have gone to the University of Bahrain, 
but if the royal family can help me, great. But I felt guilty—I felt it 
was such a shady society, a shady government that doesn’t really care. 
And I just wanted to get up and leave the country right there. I can 
remember both their faces. And yeah, the Shi’a are really on the bot-
tom of the pile.
With the new leadership, these distributions more commonly take the 
form of royal decrees or orders (a new housing complex for the poor, loans 
from the state to be forgiven, and so forth). This patron-client model, over-
laid upon the relationship between citizen and the state, suggests that the 
Bahraini state has accommodated rather than replaced the tribal tradition 
(Nakhleh 1976, 176), and that in both its embodied personal form and as 
a standard structural bureaucracy the state forges inequality and divisions 
among the citizenry.
The Bahraini state, then, faces a diffi cult and seemingly contradictory set 
of tasks. While it structures difference among its citizenry, it also seeks to 
build a cohesive and unifi ed sense of nationalism. This latter goal is aided 
by the presence of the large expatriate workforce of noncitizens against 
which unifi ed national identity can be asserted. More important, however, 
the legitimacy of the leadership and the cohesion of Bahraini nationalism 
both rest on the promise of public-sector employment.9 The rallies and 
marches that were an almost weekly occurrence during my fi eldwork in 
Bahrain never challenged the idea of the state as controlling of industry 
and jobs; instead, invectives emphasized the inequities of the distribution 
of those jobs, or the inability of the state to provide enough jobs for the 
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burgeoning population of unemployed and underemployed. Through 
this process the more fundamental question of the state’s legitimacy is 
masked.
Again one can perceive the pattern fi rst portrayed in my description 
of the merchant family’s house. Jobs in the public sector are distributed 
through a complex fusion of a meritocratic logic—that is, who is properly 
qualifi ed for the job—and a familial, sectarian, and tribally focused logic. 
The many disenfranchised citizens I came to know do not consider an oc-
cupation in the private sector a viable option: they don’t protest the lack of 
jobs in the private sector but rather the inability of the state to provide them 
with public-sector jobs. Macroscopically, the relationship between this bur-
geoning public sector and the private sector resembles the distinction that 
threads through this chapter, for the state itself is confi gured as an institu-
tion for managing—or hosting—the foreign matter of the private sector, 
while simultaneously insulating citizens from its logic.
Bahrainization and the Functions of the State
The collection of policies and directives known as Bahrainization is 
a complex and ever-evolving mix of components, all of which are cen-
tral functions of the state and important elements in the experiences of 
both citizens and noncitizens on the island. In its most distilled form, 
Bahrainization is best represented by those policies that require a certain 
percentage of citizen-employees in particular types of companies. Edicts are 
often issued by “sector,” although the sectors often vary in scale: where one 
edict might be aimed at the private sector as a whole, another might address 
a specifi c “sector” such as the hospitality sector, the travel sector, and so 
forth. Edicts pertaining to sectors are complemented by an ever-changing 
system of monetary incentives that encourages companies to meet or ex-
ceed particular citizen-to-noncitizen ratios within a sectoral workforce. As 
one of the most active arenas of state activity, updates and alterations to 
these policies are a constant source of news in the local and international 
media. For example: “Firms are requested to increase employment of na-
tionals by 5 percent a year until one-half of the labor force is Bahraini. New 
establishments employing 10 or more workers are required to have 20 per-
cent Bahrainis in their workforce, with further annual increase of 5 percent 
until 50 percent is reached. Firms of less than 10 employees must employ at 
least one Bahraini other than the owner” (Fasano and Goyal 2004, 28).
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Particular regulations like the one just quoted are singular components 
of Bahrainization. Although many of these policies are aimed at the private 
sector in general, the micro-sectoral approach is particularly active. The 
taxi “sector” was fully localized in the 1990s; today in Bahrain, unlike most 
of the other nations of the Gulf, taxi drivers must be Bahraini citizens. 
Similar results have been achieved in other sectors. In a shift that predated 
my arrival on the island by only a few years, employees at petrol stations 
were required to be citizens. One of my informants said that the guards at 
shopping malls are now all Bahraini. Another informant conveyed his im-
pressions of Bahrainization with a story: “My wife and I had a broken 
washing machine in our fl at, and we called for someone to pick it up and 
repair it. When the repairmen arrived to take the machine away, they were 
all Bahraini. This too you would not have seen four years ago.” Shortly after 
my departure, the government announced plans to “Bahrainize” the travel 
sector, much to the consternation of the legion of foreign travel agents 
who serve the various transmigrant communities on the island.
Sectoral edicts and mandates governing the ratio of citizens to nonciti-
zens in the workforce constitute the most visible facet of Bahrainization 
on the island. If, however, we defi ne Bahrainization as those policies and 
practices that discourage foreign labor from fi nding and keeping employ-
ment on the island, we can include in that category many of those described 
in earlier chapters, including all those policies and practices that indirectly 
achieve this same end by preventing or dissuading foreign labor from suc-
cessfully competing with citizens in the job market. Recently, for example, 
the government announced its intentions to impose a fi ve-year limit on 
residence permits, thereby effectively limiting transmigrants’ ability to de-
rive profi t from a sojourn on the island. Similarly, policies that prevent in-
dividuals from interacting directly with the government, visa regulations 
that make it diffi cult to move back and forth between India and Bahrain, 
a sponsorship system that locks transmigrants into a structured and often-
problematic relationship with a citizen-sponsor—all of these policies and 
practices handicap foreign participation in the job market and thereby 
encourage businesses to hire Bahraini citizens. Put another way, then, the 
expanded defi nition I have delineated here suggests that Bahrainization 
includes all the edicts, policies, and practices that forge structural differ-
ences and impediments for noncitizens in the workplace. And this defi ni-
tion tells us something about the function of the Bahraini state: not only 
does the state directly deliver wealth to the citizenry (in the form of low-
cost utilities, free education, and public-sector employment), but through 
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Bahrainization it also structures the private sector in ways that are benefi cial 
to citizens and detrimental to noncitizens.
Building on this essential function, the state has emerged as the princi-
pal nexus for managing and indeed harnessing “foreign matter,” of which 
the entrepreneurial activities of the private sector are only one part. In 
other words, the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the citizenry is tied 
not only to its ability to distribute wealth, and not only to its ability to 
manage the private sector, but also to its role in governing foreign in-
fl uences on the island. In 2003 and 2004, citizen groups and municipal 
councils moved against the display of “scantily clad mannequins,” against 
the pork discreetly served in many Asian restaurants on the island, and 
against “indecent imagery” in advertisements.10 Often the social clubs be-
come targets. A Manama Municipal Council member recently declared the 
intent of the Segaiya neighborhood’s Bahraini population to burn down 
a building occupied by Asian laborers. In public discussions the issues of 
sewage and overcrowding gave way to what Councilor Ibrahim Hassan 
Ismail called the “moral aspect” of the problem: “The tenants, who are 
usually Asian, roam around in their underwear with disregard to the social 
and Islamic laws of the country.”11
These moral issues are also factors in the relations between the state and 
the Indian social clubs. The Young Goans Club, formed in 1952 and now 
one of the oldest of the Indian community’s social clubs, recently boasted 
of over six hundred members. After complaints from neighbors (who were 
largely concerned with the proximity of an Iranian school and the possi-
bility of schoolchildren witnessing men and women “mixing”), the club 
relocated from its central site near the souk, its home for fi fty years, to 
the busy-with-nightlife neighborhood of Hoora. Again, however, the club 
faced complaints from neighbors. Those complaints eventually percolated 
from the municipality to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the arm 
of the government that issues permits and oversees the diasporic social 
clubs. At this juncture, objections to the club focused on its location near 
a mosque and the presence of a bar on the premises. The ministry revoked 
the club’s license to serve alcohol, thereby removing the club’s principal 
source of income. Unable to make rent, the club faced legal action from the 
landlord and the ministry ordered it closed. Numerous other social clubs 
have faced similar issues.
As this example suggests, the citizenry’s expectations of the state surpass 
the simple disbursement of wealth. Although the orchestration of relations 
with the foreign population remains a central concern of the state, citizens’ 
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expectations have accumulated around this core function. Over time, ex-
pectations of the state have come to include the more vague responsibility 
of safeguarding citizens from the potentially detrimental impacts of global 
capitalism and, specifi cally, from the social and cultural worlds of the for-
eign populations at work on the island. It is here that the contradictions 
wrought by these circumstances are most apparent: while the vision of a 
modern, developed, and cosmopolitan nation is actively promoted by the 
state, much of the baggage that accompanies these activities is less  welcome. 
As the state acts to staunch the spread of particular foreign practices, cus-
toms, and behavior, it simultaneously shores up its relationship with its 
citizenry by reinforcing its role as the principal tool by which citizens miti-
gate their relationship to the culturally heterogeneous fl ows that continue 
to arrive on their shores.
Resistance in the Workplace
Many of the small- and medium-sized businesses in Bahrain are actively 
managed—and often partially owned—by Indian expatriates. Ask one 
of these Indian entrepreneurs what happens when a young, unemployed 
Bahraini drops in to apply for a job and they will tell some version of the 
same story: the Bahraini will demand to work a single shift, ending his 
day at two in the afternoon or thereabouts. This stance is often the fi rst 
point of negotiation. Should the Bahraini yield to the employer’s demand 
to work the regular two shifts with a midday break, or should the employer 
fi nd a way to accommodate the request for a single shift, the Bahraini will 
move on to a brief discussion of pay, set somewhere at or above the 
government-mandated minimum for nationals (nearly twice that of the 
going market rate for labor). If an agreement is reached, more problems 
are likely to ensue. The Bahraini will drift into work late. He will stand 
about, talking with the other Bahraini workers, and rarely help out unless 
under direct supervision. Even if extra pay is offered, he is unlikely to 
show up on weekends or holidays to assist with, say, an urgent shipment. 
In the end, he won’t stay at the job long—perhaps a year, perhaps less.
Although there are exceptions to this scenario, the basic thread of the 
story was repeated in numerous interviews I conducted with Indian busi-
ness owners on the island. When asked about the reasons for this prob-
lem, business owners pointed to a culturally inherent trait of laziness or 
lethargy among the indigenous citizenry. As one business owner described 
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the frustrations he and other business owners face with the requirement to 
employ Bahrainis, he observed that because of the incentives and directives 
comprising the government’s Bahrainization policy, Indian-owned busi-
nesses are desperate to hire Bahrainis. Indian business owners and man-
agers, however, are “going to be so restricted with what they’ve got, in 
terms of the kind of people, how qualifi ed they are. The effort that they 
[Bahrainis] would normally put in is half as much as an expatriate. When 
you think about wanting to put a Bahraini in, well, they’re so lazy. They 
just don’t do as much.” Another merchant who employs dozens of Bahraini 
citizens stated, “I think the basic problem is with their attitude. They’re just 
not used to working—especially hard work. They’ve taken it very easy all 
these years, and that has passed on to the younger generation. And that’s 
one of the basic reasons that you can’t rely on them.” Or, as a Bahraini ac-
quaintance related:
The things people say about the Bahraini work ethic—well, I agree 
with it in general. They feel like they’re entitled to more than what 
they’re getting, and they feel like they shouldn’t be doing as much as 
they are for it. A lot of people criticize Bahrainis for not performing 
as well as Indian workers. . . . You can see it fi rsthand. Just go into any 
place. Go to Jasmis [a fast-food restaurant that has begun to employ 
Bahrainis] or any retail place. See how the Bahraini man or lady be-
hind the counter treats you. They’ll be talking to a co-worker or on 
the mobile, or they’ll yell to the person behind you.
Although the popular comprehension of Bahrainis in the workforce fo-
cuses on an inherent laziness and proclivity toward leisure, even my in-
formants place these behaviors within the historical context of Bahrain. 
In remarking that “they’ve taken it easy all these years” or in arguing that 
Bahrainis “feel like they’re entitled to more than what they’re getting,” the 
men quoted here echo scholarly analyses of the structural issues operating in 
the petroleum states’ workforces. In his analysis of Saudi Arabia, Champion 
calls the pervasive reticence to work the “mudir syndrome,” using the Arabic 
word for “director” as a gloss for the common attitude that “nothing less 
than a position of authority, status, and respect is honorable” (Champion 
1999, 5; see also al-Moosa and McLachlan 1985). In general, these analyses 
focus on the great wealth derived from petroleum reserves and the small 
indigenous population, a combination of historical coincidences yielding a 
scenario in which states forge a social contract based on the “legitimacy of 
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largesse,” largely through public-sector employment (Champion 1999, 16). 
Others have traced the mudir syndrome to the traditional Bedouin con-
tempt for agrarian work (see Champion 1999, n. 34; Detzner 2003, 48) 
or to the legacy of slavery in the region (Wilson and Graham 1994, 256). 
All of these explanations see the citizenry’s contemporary contempt for the 
workplace, and for menial labor in particular, as a vestige of former social, 
political, and economic confi gurations on the island.
The details in this chapter challenge the premises of these analyses and 
suggest that there are rational and contemporary reasons for these atti-
tudes. First, the large public sector, as the principal form of employment 
for Bahrainis in recent times, continues to exert its infl uence on the pri-
vate sector. In the scenario described by the Indian business owners, for 
example, the ubiquitous wish to end the workday at 2:00 p.m. refl ects the 
hours typical of the public sector, where the workweek is 34, rather than 
48+ hours, and ends at 2:00 p.m. Similarly, the extremely high rates of 
turnover in private-sector jobs refl ect the robust public sector, for many 
of the young men seeking jobs as menial laborers are merely biding their 
time awaiting an opening in the public sector. Menial and other entry-level 
positions in the private sector typically lack benefi t packages, unlike their 
counterparts in the public sector. And whereas the private-sector work-
places function primarily in English, Malayalam, or other languages of the 
diasporas, government workplaces function in Arabic.
From the perspective of the expatriate business owners, the formidable 
role of the public sector in shaping the citizenry’s expectations of the private 
sector causes many problems, and they have confi gured unique solutions 
to the issue. Several of the business owners I spoke with were so frustrated 
by the situation that they simply paid Bahraini citizens to stay at home, 
thereby meeting the requirements of sectoral Bahrainization regulations 
without encountering the problems of dealing with citizens in the work-
place. As another Indian merchant said, “Maybe out of ten Bahrainis, you 
can fi nd two or three that work. But fi rst of all, why should you go to the 
trouble of weeding out two guys out of ten? You have to go through twenty 
guys before you get three that can work. It’s too much hassle and trouble. 
It’s just better to pay that guy and tell him not to come.”
I encountered a related scenario at the Bahrain Training Institute (BTI). 
Describing the chain of events to me, a foreign faculty member remarked 
that the institute’s custodial staff had been recently “Bahrainized.” Student 
nationals were hired from the BTI trainee pool at a rate of BD120 to BD130 
[$320 to $340] per month, roughly twice the salary of the transmigrant 
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custodial staff. The citizen-custodians, my informant said, “would show 
up for work in street clothes and would spend most of their time standing 
around talking to each other and the other trainees. As a result, the toilets 
were fi lthy, there was no soap, and there was no toilet paper in any of the 
bathrooms. Even the director noticed.” A solution was subsequently devised: 
the Bahraini day crew was followed by an Indian night crew. The night crew 
had to do all the work left undone by the day crew. In my interview with 
one of the members of this Indian work crew, he said that the new schedule 
means that they—the Indian crew—now have to do twice as much work.
Notions of citizenship and the appropriateness of particular forms of 
employment also reveal how conceptions of citizenship mingle with ethnic 
and racial hierarchies in Bahrain. In one of my interviews, I spoke with 
an Indian restaurant owner about the problems he faced with his Bahraini 
employees. He said that recently the young Bahraini men he employed in-
formed him that they were unwilling to wait on Indian customers and that 
they would only wait on Bahrainis. Of course situations like these cause 
all sorts of diffi culties in the contemporary workplace in Bahrain; simul-
taneously, they are symptomatic of the underlying racial construction of 
citizenship.
From the perspective of the Indian business owners and managers, 
the structure of the labor market in Bahrain creates signifi cant impedi-
ments to the success of their entrepreneurial ventures. Businesses pay a 
variety of fees to import foreign laborers who they are then unable to fi re 
(for the contracted period). Owners and managers must also take on a 
government-mandated workforce of citizen-employees, many of whom 
are unwilling to perform the basic duties associated with the position. 
The owners typically attribute the poor quality of Bahraini labor to a 
sense of entitlement of cultural, or even biological, origins. Yet from the 
perspective of Bahraini citizens, their decisions about employment and 
their behavior at work are extremely coherent. Forced by penury to enter 
the private-sector workforce, the unskilled citizen faces a losing propo-
sition. He is often less educated than the foreign laborer with whom he 
competes. His English skills—vital to global commerce on the island—
are less developed than those of the foreign workers. And his chances 
for advancement in the Indian-owned businesses of the island are neg-
ligible. That he applied for the job at all means he was unable to secure 
a position in the public sector, and the time spent moving boxes about 
the warehouse fl oor is time away from the activities that contribute and 
strengthen his social capital in the indigenous system—the reinforcement 
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of social and familial connections, being seen with the right people in the 
right places, and all the other social activities that, under the Western 
model, would easily fi t into conceptions of  “leisure.”
From the perspective of the unskilled citizen, the distended public sec-
tor represents the core component of an alternative occupational system. 
Because this sector continues to function, at least in part, by a genealogical 
logic, citizens are much better positioned to succeed in this alternative sys-
tem. Whereas at the most basic level the public sector provides citizens with 
jobs, we can also conceive of the public sector as a form of resistance to a 
Western-derived meritocracy in whose calculus the unskilled Bahraini will 
most likely fail. The durability of this dual economy is certainly in doubt, 
for as the population grows and the petroleum revenues dwindle, mainte-
nance of the large public sector will become an impossible burden for the 
state. The expectations of the citizenry, however, and the sense of entitle-
ment constructed over decades in which this dual system fl ourished are 
slow to change. After all, there are few places in the world in which a son 
does not expect to have the same opportunities as his father.
Wasta and the Logic of Leisure
If the public sector operates by a distinct and alternative logic, how 
might one describe the basic parameters of that system? And what exactly 
do citizen and state seek to protect, or perhaps preserve, in maintaining this 
dual system? In this section, I examine the conduits through which citi-
zens access the security and wealth controlled by the state. Along the way, 
the attributes associated with this citizenry, described by Indian business-
men as a penchant for leisure, an inherent laziness, and an overriding lack 
of commitment to work, become something more than individual acts of 
resistance to the neoliberal workplace: in combination with the institution 
of the public sector, these acts of resistance constitute a systemic effort to 
preserve an essentially ascribed system of relations confi gured around the 
relations of family, kinship, and tribe.
In describing the foundational role of family and kinship in Jeddah— 
the cosmopolitan hub of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and, in that sense, 
a setting similar to contemporary Bahrain—Soraya Altorki observes:
The family constitutes a person’s reservoir of economic security, po-
litical infl uence, social support, and psychological succor. . . . Kinship 
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and friendship links combine the functions that in Western countries 
are divided between distinct reference groups outside a person’s fam-
ily, such as neighbors, colleagues, business partners, professional as-
sociations, and clubs. In Saudi Arabia these links entail an elaborate 
system of reciprocal right-duty relationships. Many of these relation-
ships are activated in casual contexts and informal visiting and in 
sporadic exchanges of favors. They are ritually expressed and rein-
forced on special occasions such as life-crisis events like birth, naming 
ceremonies, marriage, divorce, sickness, and death, where the par-
ticipation of network members is mandatory. A person’s failure to 
participate in these occasions without an acceptable excuse implies a 
rejection of his/her role in that network. (1985, 81)
Altorki describes the fundamental importance of casual and informal 
 activity—glossed as leisure in the Western nomenclature—to the social re-
lations of the contemporary Saudi citizenry. Using this model as a spring-
board for further analysis, I turn to the concept of wasta as a window into 
the mechanics of this system.
Wasta is a versatile notion with no immediate parallel in the English 
language. Generally, the term refers to mediation or intercession by a third 
party, although it can also refer to the infl uence possessed by an individual 
(Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993, 1994; Detzner 2003). Perhaps the clos-
est analogy in English would be social capital, described by Bourdieu as 
“the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or 
a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institu-
tionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992, 119). The versatility of the notion was well described 
by one of my informants:
Wasta strictly translates into “intermediary” or “intermediary means.” 
Wasta is a way to get there. When I say that I have a wasta in the 
Traffi c Directorate, it means that I’ve got somebody there who can 
help me cut through the red tape. They can take care of my problem. 
But that term really evolved new meanings—now you can say, “oh, 
his dad is a real wasta,” meaning he can get stuff done for you. So it 
refers to a person. But you can also think of it as a process: “wasta 
does its worth.” You’re not talking about a specifi c person anymore. 
Or “with wasta you can do anything.” “You better get wasta” is a very 
common clause in speech. If you have wasta, you can get it done in 
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a day. It means you can get it done if you have a way—an intermedi-
ary way, a way to get in, or someone inside the system. People even 
talk about Vitamin W—that’s wasta.
Wasta remains an essential feature of the social landscape on the island 
and has already been defi ned as the logic by which public-sector employ-
ment is obtained (Khuri 1980, 123; Louër 2008, 38). If the relationship 
between citizen and state is at least partly characterized by an enduring 
familial and tribal fabric, it is wasta that helps us understand how family 
and tribe function in a bureaucratic context—how individuals connect 
with the resources controlled by the government. My informants de-
scribed many scenarios that might potentially require wasta: securing 
placement at the University of Bahrain, obtaining the appropriate papers 
for importing labor, or securing public housing or government loans, for 
example. Similarly, for both men and women seeking jobs in the public 
sector, familial, sectarian, and tribal connections—all essential compo-
nents of wasta—are key factors (Pirzada and Puri 1998). The power of 
these relations is further magnifi ed, one of my informants added, by the 
size of the city-state, where it is commonly believed that everyone knows 
everyone, at least in terms of their family and sect.
The connections between wasta and the public sector are particularly 
intricate. Unlike the private sector—which is composed of myriad busi-
nesses, including both global concerns with formalized hiring policies and 
local concerns managed or run by expatriates—the public sector is a direct 
extension of the state, an extension of the ruling family, and a manifestation 
of its hegemony over the island. Although private businesses are concerned 
with profi t, and thereby at least nominally interested in fi nding the most 
capable and least expensive employee for a particular position, the public 
sector provides ample room for ulterior motives to be exercised in the hir-
ing process. Because of the desirability of these public-sector jobs—both 
for the comforts of working in Arabic and the short working hours, but 
also because of the remuneration, and particularly the pensions, low-cost 
housing loans, and other programs—wasta functions as the mechanism 
for what Bourdieu called the transformation of capital (Bourdieu 1986; see 
also Kilankiewicz 1996). The public sector provides citizens with a venue in 
which their social capital can be transformed into economic capital.
Although an individual’s wasta is constructed on the foundation of 
his or her location in the social fabric of tribe and family on the island, 
wasta is not static. Yet building and maintaining wasta are activities whose 
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logic is diffi cult to pinpoint. When asked directly about the mechanisms 
for forging and maintaining social capital, the citizens I spoke with often 
appealed to generalities about knowing the right people, being seen in 
the right places, and more specifi cally, the combination of the two. As 
one young Bahraini described: “There’s no denying that Bahrainis be-
lieve knowing the right people is essential to getting ahead in life. They 
believe that if they hang out with the right people, one day they’re going 
to get the right job—that the friend is going to do them a favor. Whether 
it works out or not, they’re going to hang on to that person . . . because 
those connections are so important. If you want to get your business reg-
istered, and you don’t just want to sit on the list, you have to know some-
one. You have to have wasta.”
Wasta is accumulated and deployed through networks that rely heavily 
on familial, tribal, and sectarian affi liation. The genealogical foundation of 
this system means that foreigners are marginalized in its calculus and that one 
citizen may have more wasta than the next. As Detzner described in her anal-
ysis of Saudi Arabia, “foreigners lack these important connections . . . and are 
disconnected from the myriad family, tribal and regional allegiances in the 
country” (2003, 50). Wasta, then, is a form of social capital that largely fl ows 
through the exclusive and endogamous social relations of the citizenry.
In systemic terms, wasta contradicts the logic of the global fi nancescape 
and, in a larger sense, the neoliberalism codifi ed in the rhetoric of Bahrain’s 
national vision. Although many of the international agencies and states 
with which Bahrain deals clamor for open markets, good governance, 
transparency, and equality under the law, wasta provides an alternative 
set of avenues that inherently favor citizens over noncitizens and Sunni 
(who maintain stronger tribal allegiances) over Shi’a. In his analysis of 
the legal framework of Bahrain in the early 1980s, Franklin made a parallel 
point about the concept of justice: “A universal code of justice was—and 
is—antithetical to the categorical principle on which his authority and the 
plural order rested” (1985, 72).12 That same plural order relies on categori-
cal principles to organize the workforce. Where the neoliberal model lauds 
open, free, and meritocratic labor markets, wasta comprises the basis of a 
system that favors those with localized tribal and familial connections over 
those without. In this system, citizens have more power than noncitizens, 
and Sunnis have more power than Shi’ites.
As a social force with both deep historical roots and a pervasive presence 
in the contemporary milieu, wasta represents a key facet of the citizenry’s 
resistance to the fundamental terms of the global fi nancescape. Faced with 
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a global and dominant neoliberal ideology that lauds open markets, a meri-
tocratic labor force, and transparency in both public and private sectors, 
citizenry and state have confi gured an alternative system in the public sec-
tor. The individual acts of resistance charted in the previous sections are 
emblematic of a systemic rejection of the terms of neoliberal arena: for 
the middle and lower classes of the citizenry, the chances for success in the 
English-speaking, foreign-dominated workforce are negligible. Rather 
than directly compete for positions with well-trained and linguistically ver-
satile foreign workers, citizen-laborers focus their energies on investing and 
maintaining the social capital, or wasta, that potentially leads to jobs in 
the public sector. What looks like laziness, leisure, and lassitude becomes 
something quite rational: an investment in a cohesive but separate system 
that coexists with Bahrain’s private sector.
Tradition, Modernity and Social Change
Two decades ago, Soraya Altorki and Donald Cole (1989) published 
their fascinating ethnography of the Saudi Arabian city of ¨Unayzah. In 
their concluding analysis, they argue concertedly against the idea that the 
Arabian urbanites they came to know were somehow bound to a tradition-
alism that was incompatible with modernity. In making their case, Altorki 
and Cole purvey an economic determinism against the Orientalist preoc-
cupation with Middle Eastern traditionalism: the Saudi work ethic, they 
argue, is merely a refl ection of the economic relations of contemporary 
¨Unayzah. The work ethic (or lack thereof) will “change according to eco-
nomic imperatives” (Altorki and Cole 1989, 242).
The concept of change in this reasoning masks more than it reveals and 
simplifi es a process that is complex. In Bahrain, the “economic imperatives” 
include a citizenry with a signifi cant lower middle class now pushed to the 
margins of the welfare state. Their attitudes—that is, their work ethic, their 
expectations for employment, their idea of appropriate and inappropriate 
forms of labor—do not change overnight. Indeed, the fi fteen years of epi-
sodic violence between members of the Shi’ite underclass and the Sunni-
controlled state can be read as resistance to the “economic imperatives” of 
this period.
As Altorki and Cole suggested for ¨Unayzah, the story of Bahrain is 
not a story of a people trapped in the gravity of their own traditions. It 
is, however, a story about how tradition—imagined, partial, revised, and 
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contested—becomes a tool by which the citizenry and state seek to insulate 
themselves from the logic of the global and neoliberal system in which they 
are now enmeshed. To put this narrative into context, it’s not that citizens 
in Bahrain don’t want a booming and modern nation, or that they feel no 
allegiance to the hypermodern and cosmopolitan national vision promoted 
by the dominant elite; rather, it is that they don’t want to submit them-
selves to the logic of a system in whose competitive, market-based calculus 
the great majority of the citizenry are poorly positioned to succeed. The 
divide between the public and private sectors, the social and ethnic distinc-
tions that characterize the contemporary Gulf, and the mechanics of the 
kafala system all become part of the orchestration of this bifurcated system, 
and hence part of the process by which a distinctive and alternative socio-
economic system is maintained. That alternative system provides citizens 
with a refuge from the grinding logic of the neoliberal system.
Hospitality, as a practice with a long tradition in Arab cultures, helps 
explain how the relationship between these two systems is locally conceptu-
alized. In Bahrain, those ideas and practices were developed over centuries 
of coexistence with the foreign peoples who passed through the port of 
Manama. Beginning with a description of a merchant family’s aging house, 
I have connected the layout of that house to the social, economic, and in-
deed, cultural structure of the contemporary island. Citizens host the for-
eigners integral to their collective national vision of modernity. They use 
the role of host to conceptualize and structure their relationship to the cul-
tural aspects of that foreign matter. This role provides a culturally familiar 
mechanism for embracing the presence of global capitalism in the shared 
national vision of modernity without accepting the underlying values of 
that essentially neoliberal system.
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A year before my fi rst trip to the Arabian Peninsula I was part of a 
team of researchers and ethnographers exploring the impact of the offshore 
oil industry on the families and communities of southern Louisiana. In 
this large and multifaceted project, one of my principal assignments was 
to immerse myself in the world of the men at the bottom of the oil sector’s 
occupational hierarchy—the roughnecks and roustabouts who work on the 
rigs, platforms, and yards scattered across southern Louisiana and its coastal 
waters. I made my home at a down-at-the-heels motel next to the highway 
in New Iberia, Louisiana, where these roughnecks and roustabouts would 
stay, drink, and spend much (and oftentimes all) of the money they had 
just earned from two weeks of work offshore. During my fi rst few days at 
the motel I was surprised by the smell of Indian food wafting through the 
courtyard, and after some investigation I found and befriended a group 
of eight Indian men living in two of the rooms. Trained as welders in a 
renowned shipbuilding city in India, these men had paid exorbitant fees for 
the right to come weld in the shipyards of southern Louisiana for two years 
under the United States’ H-visa system. Two months after their arrival, 
they were let go by the fabrication company that had brought them to the 
United States. They and their families continued to carry the astronomical 
debts held by the labor brokers back in India. Holed up in the motel and 
desperate for work, they had become “illegal” immigrants.
I bring up this episode to reinforce the point that although the cultures 
and societies described in this book are both distant and different from 
the American one, the problems, dilemmas, and exploitation generated by 
the transnational movement of labor are not consigned to Bahrain or the 
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other Gulf states. Even the kafala has analogies in the American context: 
the men I met in southern Louisiana were, like the men I encountered in 
Bahrain, legally tied to a single employer and, simultaneously, burdened 
with a transnational debt. When framing the ethnographic study presented 
in this book, then, the reader should keep in mind that these problems, 
and the structural violence evident in these foreign workers’ experiences 
in Bahrain, are not a unique product of Arabian culture or society. Rather, 
attempts to systematically control and govern the transnational movement 
of labor become particularized to the contexts in which those fl ows take 
place. The arrangement of inequality and the justifi cation of exploitation 
are articulated through the particular experiences of the peoples and societ-
ies that deploy that governance. The Arab ideal of hospitality, the gender 
norms for the region, the historic kafala system, the relations of the tribe—
these become the tools by which the Bahrainis grapple with and govern the 
transnational fl ow of labor to their island.
Structural violence is a versatile concept, and I recognize that its ap-
plication here is a departure from the norm. A more standard use of the 
concept would focus on the considerable constellation of forces that push 
Indian men and women out of their homes to seek work in the Gulf states. 
Although the forces pushing the men out of India certainly merit more at-
tention, I have kept my focus squarely on the arrangements in which these 
transmigrants become enmeshed once they arrive in the Gulf. In more the-
oretical terms, I use Eric Wolf ’s notion of structural power, and particularly 
his focus on the power exercised in the orchestration of settings and rela-
tions, to connect the seemingly disparate forces that shape foreign workers’ 
experiences in Bahrain. I envision this path as one that reveals the mechan-
ics of structural violence, and one that demonstrates how these structural 
arrangements produce the interpersonal violence that peppered the lives of 
the men and women I came to know.
What, then, ought to be done about this situation? One of the overarch-
ing purposes of this book is to better inform those directly concerned with 
the policies, laws, and practices that manage and govern the fl ow of trans-
national labor to the Gulf. For many anthropologists, and particularly for 
those with no penchant for brands of the discipline that operate under the 
banners of public anthropology and applied anthropology, further recom-
mendations may seem audacious and misguided. I, however, do not count 
myself among them.
First, the kafala system ought to be dismantled or signifi cantly altered so 
that workers can legally and swiftly leave the employ of abusive or otherwise 
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problematic sponsors. This move is perhaps already under way in Bahrain. 
In early 2009, the minister of labor and social affairs announced plans to 
“scrap the sponsorship system” in August of that year. Details remain scarce, 
but reports suggest that the plan is much more tailored than a wholesale 
plan to scrap the sponsorship system: in essence, the state will now control 
the right of workers to switch employers. Before 2009, sponsors themselves 
had to accede to any change in sponsorship. Under the new plan, the Labor 
Market Regulatory Authority will hear petitions or otherwise govern the 
movement of workers between jobs. These proposed changes have been 
spearheaded by the progressive and occasionally combative minister of 
labor and social affairs, Dr. Majeed Mohsen al-Alawi. He has faced increas-
ing resistance to the proposed changes from citizen groups, Parliament, and 
most directly, from the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
This resistance merits discussion, for in the debates surrounding the 
proposed and upcoming changes, the forces and parties who directly ben-
efi t from the exploitation of transnational labor have become apparent. 
In essence, for the fi rst time the positions of the proponents of the status 
quo have been articulated in Bahrain’s public sphere. Although these de-
bates are both ongoing and evolving, several parameters can be identifi ed 
from the initial arguments. Perhaps the most comprehensive contention 
of the opposition suggests that the proposed changes will signifi cantly 
undermine the competitiveness of the Bahrain labor market. The changes 
will make Bahrain increasingly unattractive for business and therefore un-
dermine the kingdom’s position in the global political economy. In this 
argument, the ongoing exploitation of the foreign labor force is a necessity 
rendered by the neoliberal environment and Bahrain’s ascendant position 
in that system. Within this larger contention, many more specifi c argu-
ments about the potential impacts of the changes have been articulated. 
Business leaders, for example, have expressed grave concerns about the po-
tential theft of confi dential information as workers move between compa-
nies. As one group of fi shermen argued, the proposed changes “will have 
a huge impact on fi shermen’s livelihoods. Fishermen waste a lot of time, 
money and effort to teach their laborers the craft. Now, they can just leave 
with all that knowledge and cause the fi sherman big losses.”1 Business lead-
ers also contend that the freedom to move between jobs will allow workers 
to “blackmail” employers—to, in essence, “impose their terms and condi-
tions” on employers and, problematically, to “leave companies at their own 
will and according to their wishes.”2 Opponents have also argued that the 
impact of the proposed changes will largely be borne by small businesses 
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and entrepreneurs, and will most certainly result in higher unemployment 
among the citizenry.3
These contentions represent a signifi cant rhetorical shift in the defense 
of the sponsorship system. As Longva (1997) observed over a decade ago, 
the sponsorship system was conceived and defended as a cultural practice 
that bonded foreign outsiders to members of the indigenous social  matrix. 
Citizens, in sponsoring foreigners, took on the obligation for their well-
being and responsibility for their behavior and actions in local society. The 
recent debates over the proposed changes to the sponsorship system in 
Bahrain, however, abandon all pretense of traditional and cultural justifi -
cations for the sponsorship system. Instead, we are left with a purely eco-
nomic argument: disrupting the status quo will empower workers, thereby 
mitigating employers’ ability to exploit this foreign workforce and handi-
capping Bahrain’s position in the regional and global economy. In mak-
ing their case, opponents of the proposed changes also clearly articulate 
a perspective on basic labor rights substantially removed from that of the 
dominant Western discourse. The idea that laborers should have the free-
dom and right to depart a particular employer is portrayed as unique, as 
an undeserved “extra privilege,” and as a disruptive and unbalanced change 
that heavily favors foreign workers.4
Opponents have forwarded a variety of options, alternative plans, and 
conditions intended to preserve the position of sponsors amid the pro-
posed changes. The lower house of the Bahraini Parliament, for exam-
ple, is seeking a clause requiring workers to complete one year of service 
before being allowed to switch employers.5 Others have suggested that 
the sponsorship system should be managed by the private sector.6 Much 
of the argument, however, centers on the criteria by which the Labor 
Market Regulatory Authority will adjudicate requests from foreign work-
ers to switch jobs. Considering how the courts handled Vijay’s predica-
ment (described in chap. 4), or how recent quarrels between housemaids 
and their sponsors have been settled (Strobl 2009), it seems clear that 
establishing a legal process for laborers to petition the state for permis-
sion to switch employers is, at best, one small step toward abolishing the 
sponsorship system and the structural violence it produces.
Improving the conditions for foreign labor in Bahrain will also require 
that existing laws be comprehensively enforced. For example, it is against 
Bahraini law for sponsors to hold the passports of the laborers they sponsor, 
yet nearly every laborer I spoke with was without his passport. Similarly, 
nonpayment of wages was an extraordinarily widespread practice in the 
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labor camps I visited in Bahrain. The enforcement of existing laws should 
encompass signifi cant fi nes and other punishments, all of which should be 
deployed in a transparent and public manner. Finally, these changes and 
protections need to extend to those foreign workers in the household; 
a universal set of labor rights ought to cover all foreigners employed in 
Bahrain. Embarking on these recommendations would reinforce Bahrain’s 
position at the vanguard of progressive change in the Gulf.
These recommendations closely resemble those now being promoted 
by the institutions and trans-state organizations concerned with labor and 
human rights in the GCC, but their implications ought to be fully consid-
ered. In the penultimate chapter of this book I argued that the kafala, the 
social segregation characteristic of all the Gulf states, and the arrangements 
that marry the private sector to the foreign labor force are all facets of the 
citizenry’s and the state’s strategic response to the global and neoliberal sys-
tem to which their national aspirations are tied. The recommended changes 
to the labor market, combined with those already under way, would mark 
a signifi cant step in the erosion of the forces and arrangements that insulate 
the citizenry from the logic of the system from which they seek to profi t. 
The same forces and arrangements indicted by a rights-based perspective 
preserve an alternative and local social system with a distinct logic of its 
own. Altering the system by which “foreign matter” is governed and con-
trolled will reverberate deeply in Bahraini society.
When I discuss my research, colleagues often point out to me that 
Bahrain is an exceptional place in the context of the GCC states. The im-
plication behind these contentions is that the structural violence I describe 
is unique to Bahrain and attenuated or altogether absent in the neigh-
boring countries. More research, and particularly more ethnographically 
grounded research, is needed before this contention can be properly ad-
dressed. And Bahrain is different in ways that play a role in the lives of the 
foreign laborers who toil on the island. Unlike the other states of the GCC, 
Bahrain has a Sunni leadership who rule over a Shi’ite majority composed 
of both the indigenous inhabitants of the island as well as the more recent 
Persian arrivals. The citizenry is ethnically heterogeneous, and defi nitely 
more fractious and divided than its neighbors. Moreover, Bahrain lacks 
the spectacular wealth of many of the other GCC states. Bahrain’s public 
sector can no longer accommodate the majority of the working citizenry, 
and members of the middle class are increasingly pushed into direct com-
petition with the foreigners in their midst. These shifting political and 
economic realities are one of the engines driving the structural violence 
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described in this book, and together they distinguish Bahrain from its 
neighbors in the Gulf.
At the same time, however, Bahrain has much in common with its neigh-
bors. The kafala remains ubiquitous in the Gulf states, for example, and it 
is the coincidence of this arrangement with the motive of profi t that forges 
a space conducive to the violence I’ve described. And like the neighboring 
states, Bahrain and its citizenry continue to struggle with the ramifi cations 
of rapid development, the cultural heterogeneity of the many peoples at 
work on the island, and the preservation of a social and cultural identity 
amid an era of extraordinarily rapid change. Bahrain’s exceptional quali-
ties, and particularly the presence of a middle class increasingly marginal-
ized from ethnocratic logic of the public sector, are better understood as 
a glimpse into the future of the wealthier neighboring states. While the 
populations of the Gulf states continue to grow at astonishing rates, pe-
troleum remains a fi nite resource. The frictions of Bahrain are not unique 
or peripheral to the experiences of the other GCC states. Rather, contem-
porary Bahrain provides us with a portrait of the frictions that occur when 
the oil runs out.
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1. Introduction
 1. Nor are accurate data available concerning the size or nationalities of these 
transmigrant populations, or even of the national populations (Kapiszewski 2001, 
63). Scholars working in the Gulf point to several overlapping factors to explain 
this dearth of contextual data. Many of the sending countries lack the bureaucratic 
infrastructure to accurately gather data about the number of people departing for 
the Gulf (Nair 1999; Demery 1986, 19). Similarly, the coexistence of formal and in-
formal migration conduits between South Asia and the Gulf would confound any 
simple calculations based on migration through formal channels even if such capaci-
ties did exist. Conversely, because undocumented migration is rare in most of the 
Gulf states, one suspects that at least basic demographic data describing the national 
components of the foreign worker populations must exist. All the foreign workers 
I encountered in Bahrain, for example, had at one point been “properly” registered 
with the Population Registration Ministry and received an identity card listing their 
nationality and other data. Bahrain and most of its neighbors, however, release only 
aggregate demographic data concerning the foreign populations: we know, for ex-
ample, that the Bahraini government counted 205,626 Asians in the 2001 census, but 
we have no idea how many of those Asians are from Bangladesh, India, and so forth. 
It is often suggested that this obfuscation refl ects the tenuous political and cultural 
climate of countries where these foreign populations often outnumber the citizenry 
(Kapiszewski 2001, 27; Leonard 2002, 215; 2003, 133). That only a handful of social 
scientists have had the opportunity or desire to explore these truly massive migratory 
conduits is compounded by the fact that the foreign populations in the Gulf states 
are uncharted territory in the larger ethnography of transnational migration, and the 
violence levied against these men and women is a reason for—and a product of—the 
silence concerning the lives of foreigners in the Gulf.
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 2. Anh Longva’s pathbreaking book on relations between citizens and foreign 
workers in Kuwait grazes this topic, but in calling the relationship a “structure of 
dominance,” she avoids directly engaging the violence produced in the lives of the 
men and women working in the Gulf states (Longva 1997). In effect, she focuses more 
on the inequalities in the distribution of power and less on the lived experiences of 
those dominated by that power.
 3. This connection is perhaps most clearly distilled in Scheper-Hughes and 
Bourgois’s defi nition of structural violence as “the violence of poverty, hunger, social 
exclusion and humiliation” (2004, 1).
 4. Sadly, he was released from his position three days before my arrival on the 
island.
 5. I build here upon my many conversations with Sharon Nagy.
 6. The terms fi nancescapes and mediascapes were coined by Arjun Appadurai 
(1996) and appear throughout this volume.
 7. The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in early 1981. Its membership com-
prises the heads of the six Gulf states: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United 
Arab Emirates, and Oman (Zahlan 1989, 135).
 8. The Bahrain government published the 2000 census in Arabic, English, and 
Malayalam. The newspapers expressed much consternation about the last of these: 
Indians claimed that Hindi is the national language of India, and hence Malayalam 
was a poor choice on the government’s part. The offi cial Bahraini response stated that 
the purpose behind the choice was simply to reach as many individuals as possible, and 
with the large Keralite community on the island, Malayalam was the logical choice.
 9. Although most scholars report that citizenship in the Gulf states is not avail-
able to transmigrants (Leonard 2003, 139; Falzon 2003, 675), Bahrain and several 
other states allow foreigners to become citizens. Naturalization of Arab foreigners—
and, particularly, Sunni Arab foreigners—is reportedly substantial (Wright 2008). For 
South Asians, however, naturalization is diffi cult and rare, particularly because a dem-
onstration of facility with Arabic remains a key juncture in the application process.
10. These words appear on the Toastmasters Web page.
11. The name Santosh is a pseudonym. I use it because Santosh still lives and 
works in Bahrain, and I wish to protect him from repercussions for assisting me with 
this project.
12. “Bahrain Labour Minister Seeks Support for Scrapping Sponsorship System,” 
Gulf News (Dubai, UAE), May 28, 2009; “Date with History,” Gulf Daily News 
(Manama, Bahrain), May 14, 2009; “Bahrain to Halt Labour Sponsorship,” Al-Jazeera 
(Doha, Qatar), May 7, 2009.
2. Pearls, Oil, and the British Empire
 1. Vertovec notes that “transnationalism (as long-distance networks) certainly 
preceded ‘the nation.’ Yet today these systems of ties, interactions, exchanges and 
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mobility function intensively and in real time while being spread throughout the 
world. New technologies, especially involving telecommunications, serve to connect 
such networks with increasing speed and effi ciency” (1999, 447).
 2. Although this statement is generally true, it needs some qualifi cation. In 
Bahrain, Oman, and several other GCC states, wealthy and established South Asian 
transmigrants, albeit in limited numbers, have received GCC passports. Naturalization 
has occurred more widely, if sporadically, among Arab and Middle Eastern trans-
migrant populations in the GCC states. In Bahrain, the racial policies of naturaliza-
tion are explicit rather than implicit: the law mandates a period of fi fteen years for 
Arab applicants, and twenty-fi ve years for non-Arab applicants.
 3. In 2006, Bahrain’s crown prince and the Bahrain Defense Force’s commander 
in chief declared that a new labor law, under development at the time, would eventually 
lead to the scrapping of the sponsorship system. The changes being deployed at the time 
of this writing suggest something less than the wholesale scrapping of the sponsorship 
system, an issue explored in more depth in the concluding chapter of this book.
 4. As Longva notes, “Lack of legal protection, the predominance of women [in 
the domestic sector], and low educational background combined to make domestic 
workers the most vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, a situation of which the labor-
sending countries were acutely aware” (1997, 70).
 5. In Bahrain, that threshold was BD250 ($663) a month at the time this research 
was conducted. Foreign workers seeking visas for family members must also secure 
permission from their sponsor.
 6. Although there is some uniformity to the transmigrant experience in all the 
Gulf states, the unique social, cultural, historical, economic, and demographic facets 
of the individual states connote that neither Bahrain nor any of the other GCC states 
can serve as an unadulterated proxy for its neighbors. This suggests that the experi-
ence of foreigners in each of these respective states, while similar, is not the same. For 
example, the petroleum wealth in Qatar, Kuwait, and portions of the United Arab 
Emirates far outpaces that of Bahrain and Oman—a fact that, in these wealthier 
states, results in more housemaids per house, different attitudes concerning the work 
appropriate for the citizenry, and an expanded welfare system. The ethnic patterns 
of both the citizenry and foreign communities also differ: Oman through both its 
proximity to the African continent and through its historical relations with Zanzibar, 
Saudi and its long accommodation of Yemeni transmigration, and Bahrain and its 
long-standing connections to Iran, are all factors in shaping the variable ethnic re-
lations in these respective states. So in spite of the commonalities among the Gulf 
states—all have a citizenry composed predominately of Arabs, all discourage assimila-
tion, all provide roughly the same sort of work for transmigrants, all are engaged in the 
process of trying to compel or persuade their burgeoning young population to take 
the sort of jobs now held by foreign workers—there is nonetheless signifi cant varia-
tion among them. The experiences of the Indian transmigrants in Bahrain can only 
serve as a rough proxy for the experience of foreign workers in the Gulf as a whole.
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 7. I nonetheless continue to refer to this collection of islands in the singular, not 
only because this is common usage in Bahrain itself but also because through the contin-
ual infi ll in the bays near Manama, the many islands are seemingly merging into one.
 8. The Persians controlled the island until 1718, when the Arabs of what is today 
Oman gained control of the island (Lorimer 1908b, 836–37). By the middle of the 
eighteenth century, the Hawala Arabs (Arabs from Persia) lived on the island in great 
numbers and are still represented today (837). In 1753, the Persians again moved on the 
island. They were driven from the islands by the ¨Utub in 1783 (839). The Portuguese 
were ousted from Bahrain in 1602 (Khuri 1980, 17).
 9. Writing in 1908, J. G. Lorimer of the Indian Civil Service described the fol-
lowing groups: the Baharinah, although not really a tribe, consisted of those Shi’a 
who, as families, predated the arrival of the Sunni al-Khalifas. The Sunni Hawala, 
mostly townsmen, were (and are) Arabs from Persia who claim an Arabian tribal 
genealogy. In addition to the ¨Utub, two other Sunni tribes—the Dawasir and the 
Sadah—made their home on the island. As a mercantile hub for the region, the island 
also accommodated Persians, Basra Arabs, Hindus, and Jews.
10. Wallerstein originally posited the world-system framework in the social sci-
ences, but it was Wolf ’s revision of this framework that most captured the attention 
of anthropologists, particularly for his contention that the “history” of the peoples 
who came into contact with colonial powers, and more importantly, the history of the 
cultural and mercantile interconnections between those peoples, predated European 
contact (Wallerstein 1974; Wolf 1982). The history of Bahrain provides rich support 
for this contention.
11. Buckingham (1971) notes that the pearls are called the roomaan el-bahr, or 
pomegranates of the sea.
12. Jenner cites evidence that the divers occasionally worked in depths as deep as 
twelve fathoms (seventy-two feet), although dives in depths of six fathoms (thirty-six 
feet) was more common (1984, 27).
13. Although he includes no page reference, Jenner (1984) refers to Sir Charles 
Belgrave’s work throughout this section.
14. “Natural pearls attained unprecedented value around 1910, when elite upper 
classes vied with each other to buy them. The fact that a two-strand natural pearl 
necklace (128 pearls) was considered fair exchange for a six-story Renaissance mansion 
on Fifth Avenue in New York City clearly describes the zenith of the pearling trade. 
As both were valued at $1 million, it was a trade Mrs. Morton Plant confi dently made 
with Jacques Cartier in 1917” (Misiorowski 1998).
15. These rulers later signed a more comprehensive treaty, known as the Maritime 
Truce or Trucial System, in which they gave up their right to wage maritime warfare 
against each other in return for British protection against the same. Bahrain was ad-
mitted to the Maritime Truce in 1861 (Onley 2004, 31–32, 53–54, 72–75).
16. By 1915, the indigenous leaders offi cially ceded jurisdiction over foreigners to 
the British Political Agent (Zahlan 1989, 49).
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17. In describing the “indigenous” system of leadership, Khuri makes detailed note 
of the tribal councils (majalis) and the religious courts. These are not as hierarchical as 
Western systems of management. In the majalis meetings, “tribal chiefs took counsel 
with close relatives, consultants, intimates, supporters, or guests. They  discussed a 
wide variety of subjects: tribal history, religion, law and justice, treaties with foreign 
powers, marriages that might have political signifi cance, boat construction, pearl pro-
duction, palm cultivation, date crops, trade, markets, prices, wages, weather, and any 
news items of the day” (Khuri 1980, 37).
18. The wealth generated by petroleum was not under the direct control of the 
Khalifa family. The concession for oil production on the island was originally held 
by Gulf Oil, the American oil company that had recently ridden the Spindletop 
boom in East Texas to its pinnacle and then beyond to the crash on the other side. 
When Gulf Oil became part of the American group in the Turkish Oil Company, 
however, it also became a signatory to the Red Line Agreement—a pact that pre-
cluded any of the oil companies active in the region, as signatories, from oper-
ating independently in areas specifi ed on the agreement’s map, of which Bahrain 
was one. Hence the Bahrain concession was passed to a Canadian subsidiary of 
SOCAL, or Standard Oil of California, which was not bound by the restriction, 
and it was SOCAL that established the Bahrain Petroleum Company, more fre-
quently referred to in Bahrain as BAPCO (Yergin 1991, 282; Franklin 1985, 85). The 
fact that an American company came to control any portion of oil production in 
Bahrain was the result of the particularities of this historical juncture. The British 
were wary of the American presence in the region, and they had established agree-
ments with local sheikhs that “oil development should be entrusted only to British 
concerns, and that the British government would be in charge of their foreign rela-
tions” (Yergin 1991, 283). In 1929, the British reconsidered their position and, in 
anticipation of the benefi t of American capital to the development of oil in the 
region, capitulated (283).
19. As David Holden describes in condescending fashion, “the Indian rupee is 
still Bahrain’s offi cial currency, and in the infl ux of Indians and Pakistanis that came 
in the British wake nearly every shop seems to have been opened by a Jamshid or a 
Jahshanmall, and every clerk seems to be a Singh, or maybe Mukerjee” (1966, 176). 
The rupee was replaced by the Bahraini dinar (BD) in 1965.
20. Oman contains a signifi cant Shi’ite population, although they are not a major-
ity. The former Sunni powerholders in Iraq—a country that is neither a member of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council nor a monarchy—until recently wielded power over a 
Shi’ite majority. Although the Shi’ites are a minority in Saudi Arabia, they predomi-
nate in the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia.
21. May Seikaly sees Bahrain as the most problematic of the Gulf states. She states 
that it is the poorest and least endowed, it is characterized by a general malaise re-
sulting from high unemployment, and its social and political unrest have resulted in 
“violent, sustained uprising” on the island (Seikaly 2001, 180).
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22. Bahrain serves as an offshore banking center to Saudi wealth, a position con-
fi rmed by important concessions from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Saudi has 
also helped Bahrain by maintaining high production on a shared oilfi eld, and by being 
instrumental in attracting GCC-sponsored projects to Bahrain (Zahlan 1989, 63).
3. Foreign Labor in Peril
 1. “Youths ‘Terrorize Labour Camp Men,’ ” Gulf Daily News (Manama, Bahrain), 
August 29, 2004.
 2. In Bahrain, these amnesty periods occur infrequently. The last two occurred 
in 2002 and 2007. These amnesty periods are rarely accompanied by a state-organized 
roundup of undocumented workers. Although the state maintains the capacity to 
conduct such roundups, it has been reticent to deploy this capacity in recent years.
 3. This scene is roughly reminiscent of the protest in rural India described by 
Akhil Gupta—an encirclement of those in power that is, in Gupta’s words, “a com-
mon form of civil disobedience in India” (2006, 220).
 4. Although this phrase accurately refl ects the sentiments of the many older 
foreign workers I interviewed, Seccombe and Lawless state that the labor-recruiting 
system was, even in the early decades of the twentieth century, “widely abused by the 
recruiters for their personal profi t” (1986, 100).
 5. These issues have been explored by Seymour (1999, 2002) and others. Chopra’s 
contribution (2005) is attentive to migration, birth order, and family dynamics. Her 
portrayal defi nitely reinforces the position that migrants are one component of 
household-level strategies.
 6. Several of the illegal laborers I interviewed remarked that lawyers, man-
power agency representatives, and other citizens had exploited the laborers’ status by 
promising to regularize their visas for various fees. Many of these individuals simply 
disappeared after receiving some payment, whereas others returned regularly with 
reports of incremental progress and demands for more money. None of the men 
I spoke with had successfully resolved his status situation through these means.
 7. In 2006, Bahrain moved its weekend to Friday/Saturday.
 8. See Gamburd (2000) and Strobl (2009) for an in-depth discussion of the 
conditions housemaids face in the Gulf.
 9. This description closely resembles Kearney’s analysis of the U.S./Mexico bor-
der, where “bordering policies and practices result in a net transfer of value from the 
immigrant-migrant community into the greater U.S. economy” (Kearney 2004, 143).
4. Strategic Transnationalism
 1. It is particularly diffi cult to gauge the size of the Indian diasporic elite because 
the Bahraini census aggregates all Asian transmigrants. The 2001 census reported a 
total of 205,626 Asian transmigrants on the island. This number includes individuals 
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from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and several other nations. It is generally 
agreed that the Indian population is the largest component of the Asian commu-
nity. The same census reports that 32,662 individuals of Asian descent reported their 
reason of residence on the island as “with family.” This number, doubled to include 
spouses, serves as a basic proxy for the total size of the Asian diasporic elite, for 
only those with substantial incomes can afford to bring spouses and children to 
the island. Keeping in mind that this total (approximately 64,000) includes Indians, 
Pakistanis, Filipinos, Bangladeshis, and smaller communities from other South Asian 
nations, we can roughly estimate the size of the Indian diasporic elite to be in the 
tens of thousands.
 2. Leichtman (2005) focuses on the fact that the U.S. scholars largely ignore the 
impact of colonialism. To that I add that they also do not consider the potential impli-
cations of nondemocratic environments and alternative structures of control.
 3. Here I am building on the ideas presented in an American Anthropological 
Association session that I cochaired with Heather Hindman, titled “Movements 
Outside ‘the West’: Contemporary Issues and Current Dilemmas in Transnational 
Anthropology,” November 2003.
 4. These headlines appeared in the Gulf Daily News on May 29, 2003, July 11, 
2003, and May 18, 2003, respectively.
 5. Like Anhil earlier, this letter writer makes an explicit appeal to the neoliberal 
logic of the Bahraini national vision.
 6. Jacob Samuel, letter to the editor, Gulf Daily News, September 10, 2004.
 7. One wealthy merchant described a successful case waged against an Emirati 
business partner who attempted to take over the business. Although the Indian mer-
chant received a successful verdict in his case, he stated that he still had not collected 
a single dirham (the Emirati currency) as a result of the judgment. Another merchant 
remarked that he has had some success collecting on the numerous bad checks he 
receives from Bahrainis, but the process typically takes fi ve years.
 8. Anonymous, letter to the editor, Gulf Daily News, November 19, 2004.
 9. Anh Longva, in her ethnography of foreign workers and citizens in Kuwait, 
remarks on the periodic loopholes in naturalization policy through which foreigners 
have become citizens (2000, 185).
10. These requirements are spelled out in the Bahraini Nationality Law of 
September 16, 1963.
11. Farid described the process of procuring Canadian citizenship: “That just 
means money—it only means money. They don’t care who you are. They just want 
money. Show us this much money, you get it. Don’t have the money? You don’t get 
it. Let’s face it. Getting a visa to America or Europe, in the end of the day, at the end 
of the whole thing, the criteria is money. They are looking to see if this person is going 
to come back or not. So the criteria they use is—does he have a business here? Does 
he have money? Does he have a bank account? Does he have the ties to bring him 
back? And most of those ties are money.”
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5. The Public Sphere
 1. In the context of the Gulf states, one may also question the Habermasian fe-
tishization of European democracy, and particularly the era of French salons—issues 
that become particularly acute when seeking to apply these concepts in a complex, 
nondemocratic environment that includes both citizens and transmigrants.
 2. Generally speaking, the disenfranchised citizens of whom I speak are princi-
pally Shi’ite, often referred to as al-Baharna. I describe this population at length in 
chapters 2 and 6.
 3. Three weeks later, and to much public fanfare, the Bahraini landlord offered to 
pay one month’s rent for the workers displaced by the fi re.
 4. As I describe in earlier chapters, the laboring class is largely composed of 
transmigrant men. Although a small number of women arrive to work under similar 
contracts, and even larger numbers arrive to work as housemaids, few of these women 
fi nd their way to the central neighborhood described here.
 5. According to one of my informants, there are over two thousand members in 
the Gulf region. The Toastmasters Web site reports 9 chapters in Kuwait, 37 in Saudi 
Arabia, 13 in Qatar, 28 in the UAE, and 14 in Oman as of 2005.
 6. This quotation is from the Toastmasters Web site.
 7. Unusually, they actually own the property upon which the temple stands.
 8. Although SNEHA is always capitalized in print, it is not an acronym. Rather, 
as one of the members noted, the word is a play on the Sanskrit for “loving care.”
 9. The Indian Ladies Association asked me to coteach the English course in 
2003. I met weekly with a group of approximately forty men and women who sought 
to improve their English conversational skills.
10. The current emir’s wife, in a break with tradition, is outgoing and maintains a 
signifi cant public profi le on the island.
11. For a good example, see the letter to the editor titled “Segregation ‘Helps Avert 
Moral Decay,’ ” Gulf Daily News, August 25, 2004.
12. In the 1990s the Indian community formed the Co-ordination Committee of 
Indian Associations as an overarching body meant to represent the interests of all the 
social clubs on the island. My informants reported the mixed success of this venture: 
most noted that the committee itself has become mired in the politics of the Indian 
community.
6. Contested Identities, Contested Positions
 1. “ ‘Sex in Public’ Couple Jailed,” Gulf Daily News, October 25, 2006.
 2. Although there has been much attention paid to blogs and other Internet fo-
rums, lack of access to the Internet effectively screens out much of the lower segments 
of the population in Bahrain from participating in these forums.
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 3. International Press Institute, Bahrain Report, May 8, 2008, http://www.
freemedia.at/index.php?id=227&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=2563&tx_ttnews[backPid]=3
34&cHash=7ce11dca09 (accessed June 19, 2009).
 4. Comment on Jaddwilliam2 Blog, June 19, 2006, http://jaddwilliam2.blog
spot.com.
 5. “Bahrain on Right Track,” Gulf Daily News, June 2, 2009.
 6. Syed Ahmed Khan and Family, letter to the editor, Gulf Daily News, 
August 21, 2008.
 7. Anonymous letter to the editor, Gulf Daily News, October 13, 2006.
 8. Anonymous letter to the editor, Gulf Daily News, February 27, 2009.
 9. “Offi cials ‘Must Quit over Fire Tragedy,’ ” Gulf Daily News, August 1, 2006; 
“Camp Horror Could Have Been Averted,” letter to the editor, Gulf Daily News, 
August 2, 2006; “Bodies Stuffed into Drawers,” Gulf Daily News, July 31, 2006.
10. I encourage readers to view their performances on YouTube.
  11. These quotations and summaries were drawn from letters published in the 
Gulf Daily News, August 23 and 31, September 4, 7, 14, 16, 21, 27, and 29, 2006, 
respectively.
7. The Invigorated State
 1. Longva suggests that this foreign matter is best conceived as an “international” 
norm of Euro-American pedigree (Longva 2005; Dresch 2005, 5).
 2. “Bahrain Logistic Zone to Be Pivotal Middle East Hub,” newsletter, Offi ce of 
the Economic Representative of Bahrain, July 21, 2008.
 3. Should the state not effectively quell the consternation, citizens take it upon 
themselves to remedy the situation.
 4. These events, and the quotations in this section, are documented in three se-
quential articles in the Gulf Daily News: “Bahrain Firms Hit by Shortage of Drivers,” 
May 1, 2004; “Jobless to Stage Peaceful Protest,” May 4, 2004; and “Jobs Demand by 
Protesters,” May 5, 2004.
 5. Four percent of Bahrain’s annual budget is devoted to providing the citizenry 
with housing (Bahrain Brief 1, no. 7 [August 2000]).
 6. Sulayman Khalaf noted the redistribution, and the implications of civic em-
ployment, in his analysis of Kuwait (1992, 65–66).
 7. Other sources report different numbers. Hammouya (1999, 17) reports that 
28.3 percent of the total workforce is employed in the public sector. As Hammouya 
states (1999, 8), the signifi cant differences in the reported size of the public sector 
relate directly to the diffi culty of defi ning the boundaries of the public sector. In 
Bahrain, many citizens are directly employed by government offi ces; others, however, 
are employed by state-owned industries, or by the police force or national guard, for 
example.
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 8. See Louër (2008) for a more in-depth discussion of the systemic exclusion of 
Shi’ite citizens from key components of the state apparatus.
 9. Champion, describing Saudi Arabia, calls the social contract the “legitimacy 
of largesse” (1999, n. 23), where the welfare state is forged in return for political qui-
escence. He also argues that “more realistic socioeconomic expectations appear to be 
gradually gaining prevalence” (4). This form of authority also resembles what Weber 
called “patrimonial administration” (1947, 351–54). The role of the public sector in this 
calculus is explored at length by Laurence Louër (2008).
10. “Ban Mannequin Displays of Lingerie!” Gulf Daily News, November 18, 2004; 
Gulf Daily News, September 4, 2004.
11. “Vigilante Threat to Labour Camp,” Gulf Daily News, November 9, 2004. 
These “social and Islamic laws of the country” are not codifi ed.
12. “Saudis have never had a single unifi ed legal code that is evenly applied or can 
be consulted. . . . They claim to operate according to Shari’a law, but [there is] no last-
ing consensus about its make-up. . . . A consequence of the lack of a uniform, enforce-
able legal code is what would be perceived in the West as widespread corruption and 
nepotism. However, in Saudi society the family is so central that it is considered dis-
honorable not to use any means at one’s disposal, including, often, one’s bureaucratic 
position, to get a relative a job, or make sure an unfavorable legal decision is reversed 
so as to protect their interests” (Detzner 2003, 50).
8. Conclusion
 1. “Fishermen’s Fury over Labour Law,” Gulf Daily News, May 27, 2009.
 2. “Bahrain Business Community Blasts Al Alawi over Scrapping Sponsorship 
System, Gulf News (Dubai), May 8, 2009.
 3. “Chamber in Job Switch Rules Row,” Gulf Daily News, May 26, 2009.
 4. “Bahrain Business Community Blasts Al Alawi”; “Fishermen’s Fury over 
Labour Law.”
 5. “Bahrain Labour Minister Seeks Support for Scrapping Sponsorship System,” 
Gulf News (Dubai), May 27, 2009.
 6. “Sponsorships ‘Must Be Scrapped,’ ” Gulf Daily News, April 7, 2008.
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